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ABSTRACT 
A series of neuroimaging experiments were conducted using adult participants to explore the 
neurocognitive bases of reasoning and control processes in Theory of Mind (ToM). Through 
careful manipulation of psychologically relevant parameters, these were designed to modulate 
neural regions considered important for ToM, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), alongside regions more typically associated with executive 
function, the ventrolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices (vlPFC / dmPFC respectively). 
This enabled close inspection of the functional profile of these regions, in the context of 
mentalizing. The core findings were: 1) TPJ was modulated by the valence of mental states. 
Thus, TPJ does not simply respond to mental representation; the content of the representation 
is important. 2) The presence of activation in rostral mPFC was manipulated by varying the 
mode of reasoning. Context is therefore relevant to how adults approach ToM.  3) A neural 
dissociation was identified between two accounts of control processes for ToM in vlPFC and 
dmPFC. Such processes mediate the expression of certain ToM concepts. Together, these 
findings suggest that a neurocognitive account of ToM should describe a flexible system 
which adapts to the specific conceptual and contextual demands of the social world at that 
time. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
2 
 
“When you are a Bear of Very Little Brain, and you Think of Things, 
you find sometimes that a Thing which seemed very Thingish inside you 
is quite different when it gets out into the open and has other people looking at it.” 
A. A. Milne, The House at Pooh Corner (1928) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 It often feels that we navigate the social world with ease, using our social cognition to 
rationalise and predict the observable, and unobservable, causes of behaviour. Psychologists 
and Neuroscientists have, however, demonstrated that this is not the case. Negotiating the 
social world is cognitively and neurally effortful; when we look inside ‘the black box’, the 
brain is in a constant state of social chatter (Schilbach, Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink, & 
Vogeley, 2008), suspending such processes only briefly to make way for others. Young 
children, for example, are notoriously bad at modelling the minds of others (Wellman, Cross, 
& Watson, 2001). When it comes to being a know-it-all, the pre-schooler wins first prize, 
where bias towards new information replaces their knowledge of what they knew before – 
“but I knew it all along, Mummy” (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Gopnik & Astington, 1988). In 
adulthood, we improve, yet still our brains tend to reference our own perspective, when trying 
to take someone else’s. We even automatically compute other people’s viewpoints, when we 
need not (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly, & Samson, 2013). 
To make decisions about what is going on in someone else’s mind, we call on parts of the 
brain involved in autobiographical memory, prospection and storytelling (Mar, 2011; Spreng, 
Mar, & Kim, 2009); we bring together creative streams of our past and future selves, to 
service the current social referent. For similar reasons, our brains automatically engage neural 
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regions that are involved in the execution of our own movement, when viewing the 
movements of someone else (Pobric & Hamilton, 2006; Ramsey & Hamilton, 2012). Taken 
together, as Winnie the Pooh suggests, how ‘Things’ feel inside can be very different to what 
is there when opened up for all to see: our ‘social qualia’ may not reflect our social cognition.  
 As the fields of Psychology and Neuroscience come together, it is now becoming 
possible to see the hard work that goes into negotiating the social word. Perhaps unlike most 
other research fields, however, those involved in understanding social cognition face a unique 
challenge with ToM in that, whilst the vast majority of us have it, and though most of us use it 
every day, ‘Theory of Mind’ is a term that is largely unfamiliar outside of the academic 
domain. Like the social beings in which it is housed, ToM encompasses myriad abilities and 
processes, which ultimately serve the capacity to know what it is all about in another person’s 
mind. Examining this essentially opaque ability, however, requires research which seeks to 
either constrain ToM into a unified concept, or attempts to systematically vary potential 
constituent parts to better describe what it really is and, importantly, how it is done. In 
examining ToM in typically functioning adults, my thesis adopts the latter approach. 
 This thesis presents four studies of adult Theory of Mind (ToM). Using functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), this 
thesis outlines four novel experiments which explore the functional profile of two core 
mentalizing regions – the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC) – alongside two regions believed to provide some of the executive control processes 
required to facilitate the expression of ToM – the ventrolateral and dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortices (vlPFC / dmPFC, respectively). This first chapter provides an historical account of 
ToM. The overview given is biased towards the themes and protocols that feature throughout 
this thesis. As such, it should not to be considered an exhaustive or even complete account of 
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how ToM research has evolved. However, the intention is to ground the reader in the research 
context in which this thesis is based.  
  
The Role of Misinformation in Representation 
 The term ‘Theory of Mind’ was coined in the late 1970’s in a seminal paper by 
Premack and Woodruff (1978). In a series of tasks, the authors sought to determine whether 
Sarah, a 14 year old chimpanzee, could represent the mind state of a human agent. Sarah was 
shown video footage which depicted a human actor in a cage struggling to retrieve a banana, 
which was out of reach. After watching the footage, Sarah was required to choose from a 
selection of objects, one of which could assist the actor in retrieving the banana, such as a rod 
to extend the actor’s reach. Remarkably, Sarah typically selected the appropriate object, 
which the authors argue demonstrated that she could impute both the actor’s intentional state 
– to retrieve the banana – and the actor’s knowledge state – that the actor had the capacity to 
know how to retrieve the banana using the object. In this context, Premack and Woodruff 
(1978) described how the ability to think in such a way reflects a ‘theory’ regarding the 
contents of the actor’s mind: a ‘theory’ as these mental phenomena are unobservable entities 
which can be used to generate predictions.  
 The study by Premack and Woodruff (1978) caused a flurry of commentaries, of 
which some have informed the approach to studying ToM in the present thesis. In particular, 
one critique, framed with reference to children’s delight at Punch and Judy shows, suggested 
that ToM would be more believable if demonstrated, first, in the absence of overt training – as 
it was difficult to extend their findings to the wider chimpanzee population – and, second, 
where some form of outward expression, made by the subject, reflected a behavioural 
prediction referenced to an agent acting on misinformation. In the case of Punch and Judy, 
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this is children’s joy with Punch as he is about to throw the box, which he falsely believes 
contains Judy, over the cliff (Dennett, 1978). The expression, in this case the children’s glee, 
demonstrates that they expected Punch to throw the box off the cliff to serve his own desire, 
that is, to cause the demise of poor Judy. This approach was formalised into a false belief task 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) which has heavily featured in 
ToM research and the current thesis.  
 In a typical false belief task, a character, Maxi, places his chocolate in cupboard X. He 
leaves the room and, in his absence, his mother moves the chocolate into cupboard Y. 
Participants are then asked to indicate which cupboard Maxi will look in to find his chocolate 
when he returns. The overall premise of this scenario is that, in order to identify that Maxi 
will look in cupboard X, one’s prediction must be constrained by Maxi’s beliefs. One cannot 
meaningfully refer to anything other than the unobservable contents of Maxi’s mind. In their 
initial study involving 4- to 9-year old children, Wimmer and Perner (1983) identified a 
developmental trend, where children under the age of 5 years tended to (incorrectly) point 
towards cupboard Y – the real location of the chocolate – whereas older children correctly 
identified that Maxi would believe that his chocolate was in cupboard X. Interestingly, none 
of the children selected the control location, suggesting that they were either systematically 
choosing the location that complemented their own knowledge state – as was the case with 
younger children – or using a theory of Maxi’s mind to successfully predict his behaviour. 
Using the format of this ‘unexpected transfer task’, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) demonstrated 
that autistic children behaved very much like the younger children described by Wimmer and 
Perner (1983). Unlike developmentally typical controls and children with Down’s syndrome, 
children with autism systematically predicted the behaviour of an agent on the basis of their 
own perspective. The authors conclude that this reflects a cognitive deficit in the ability to 
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ascribe higher order mental states, which has also been later speculated to be present in 
clinical disorders such as schizophrenia (Brune, 2005), bipolar affective disorder (Kerr, 
Dunbar, & Bentall, 2003) and antisocial personality disorder (Dolan & Fullam, 2004). 
 In order to better understand the basis of young children’s difficulty with false belief 
reasoning, a control task was devised which negates the need for representing mental content 
but, nonetheless, requires representation of an alternative, non-mental referent  (Zaitchik, 
1990). As illustrated in the following overview, the ‘false photograph’ task adopts a similar 
format to the unexpected transfer false belief task, yet is solved without using ToM.  
 
Belief format 
 Actor A places object into location X then leaves 
 Actor B moves the object to location Y 
 Test question: “Where does A think the object is?”  
Photo format 
 Actor A places object into location X then takes a photo of it 
 Actor B moves the object to location Y 
 Test question: “In the picture, where is the object?” 
False Belief / Photo Task Overview  
Zaitchik (1990) 
  
The two tasks comprise a similar structure, although one requires reference to the content of 
Actor A’s mind, whereas the other refers to the content of a physical representation. The 
photo is kept from view from the participant, thus mimicking the need to represent 
unobservable content. A series of experiments with children aged between 3- and 5-years old 
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replicated the developmental divide between younger and older children, suggesting here that 
ToM is evident at some point around a child’s fourth birthday. Similarly, those children that 
struggled with the false belief task also found the false photograph task difficult. On the basis 
of this result, Zaitchik (1990) goes on to propose that “mental representations may be hard not 
because they’re mental, but because they are representations” (p. 61). This is couched in 
terms of difficulty in assigning conflicting truth states to a single referent: the representational 
content presents as one reflection of the world, yet this is at odds with the child’s perception 
of the state of the world. Children may see photographs and beliefs as necessarily true; 
however, failure in these tasks may be because the veridicality of the representational sources 
is overridden by the child’s own perception of the true state of affairs. This is something that 
is explored extensively in Chapter 5, where I argue that representing mental state content is 
cognitively different from representing non-mental state content.  
 
Emergence, Expression and Executive Functions 
 As already alluded to, ToM follows a fairly predictable developmental path. In their 
influential meta-analysis of false belief tasks, Wellman et al. (2001) demonstrated that false 
belief reasoning shifts from below- to above-chance performance during the pre-school years, 
at around the age of four. This provides strong evidence that the nature of children’s 
responses switches from incorrectly, but systematically, maintaining their own viewpoint as a 
point of reference, to being able to actively realise the competing, but contextually relevant, 
perspective of an agent. Wellman et al. (2001) outline two major theoretical interpretations in 
respect of this trajectory. Conceptual change accounts suggest that ToM concepts must first 
be acquired before they can be expressed. ToM is, therefore, characterised by dichotomy – it 
is a conceptual problem to be overcome. Proficiency with executive functions, for example, 
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coincides with the development of ToM but is not directly related to ToM ability. As a result, 
younger children may fail false belief tasks as they lack the necessary executive skills to allow 
the ToM concept to emerge. An alternative account argues, instead, for early performance. 
This proposal suggests that the expression of ToM is mediated by supporting processes, such 
as executive functions, and that variation in ToM performance across the lifespan reflects 
cognitive aptitude or limits with such processes (also see Apperly, 2012). Wellman et al. 
(2001) identified that children’s performance in false belief reasoning could be enhanced by 
changes to the task protocol, such as making the agent’s mental state more salient, or reducing 
the salience of the participant’s own, real-world, perspective. Note, however, that 
performance was unaffected by variations in the referent on whom the representational 
content was assigned, such as puppets, dolls and real people. The characteristics of those 
performance-relevant task changes hint, not only, towards the presence of underlying control 
mechanisms in facilitating ToM, but also to the cognitive methods with which we approach 
mentalizing. Nevertheless, variation in task performance, through paradigmatic changes such 
as salience manipulations, could not sufficiently facilitate performance to shift children from 
being unsuccessful to successful in false belief reasoning; it simply served to account for 
noise at varying points over early childhood, outside of a relatively stable point of ToM 
acquisition. Thus, Wellman et al. (2001) argued for a developmental account of ToM, where 
development should be taken to refer to the expression, as it interacts with the concept, of 
ToM. In Chapters 2, 4 and 5, this theory is examined. Using data from adult participants, 
these chapters demonstrate that the difficulties experienced by children persist in adulthood. 
This suggests that executive function may, therefore, not simply be requisite to facilitate the 
emergence of ToM, but that executive mechanisms work alongside ToM on an ongoing basis 
throughout the lifespan. 
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 The relationship between ToM and executive function has been studied extensively, 
with the majority of studies drawing a parallel between ToM and the maturation of control 
processes, particularly inhibitory control (see reviews by Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, 
Moses, & Breton, 2002; Hughes, 1998; Perner & Lang, 1999). Leslie and Polizzi (1998) 
outline a model of false belief reasoning which attributes successful performance to a ‘target 
shifting’ mechanism. Working on the premise that a concept of belief is only meaningful if it 
typically reflects the truth, Leslie and Polizzi (1998) suggest that reasoning about a false 
belief requires representation of a non-default state which, therefore, attracts an inhibitory 
cost. On this basis, if inhibition fails, the default, true belief content is allowed and the agent 
is incorrectly assigned a reality congruent belief state. False belief reasoning, thus, takes on a 
sequence where the default true belief content is identified, and inhibition then follows to 
disengage and redirect attentional resources towards the alternative, false belief content. This 
model is defined in more general terms as enabling a shift from one salient, to a second less 
salient, target. This enabled Leslie and Polizzi (1998) to extend their theory to explain how a 
more complex ToM reasoning might successfully be applied to an agent, such as in the case 
of belief-desire reasoning. If we return to Maxi, one commonly overlooked feature of this task 
is that it is implicit that Maxi wants to find his chocolate. If, however, Maxi did not want to 
find his chocolate – perhaps he was hoping to avoid temptation from over indulging – the 
participant must take account of more than just Maxi’s belief as to where he left his chocolate. 
Now, whether Maxi wants to locate his chocolate, too, becomes relevant. Here, the model 
predicts that one would first identify the target which is thought to contain the chocolate, so as 
to then go on to pinpoint the desired, chocolate-free cupboard. The participant must therefore 
disengage their attention in order to shift it from one target to another. On the basis that Maxi 
also held a false belief about the true location of chocolate, however, Leslie and Polizzi 
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(1998) propose that an effortful double inhibition must occur, in which the attentional shift 
from belief and desire content interact to cancel one another out.  
 The task analysis of inhibition in belief-desire reasoning proposed by Leslie and 
Polizzi (1998) provides an outline of how executive control might be exerted in ToM. In turn, 
this makes a strong prediction as to what specific ToM states would look like behaviourally. It 
also suggests that belief and desire would recruit a single neural mechanism to perform this 
task (Hartwright, Apperly, & Hansen, 2012). Overall, their model suggests that, compared 
with true belief and positive (approach) desire reasoning, false belief and negative (avoidance) 
desire reasoning will prove more effortful. This effect has been demonstrated in young 
children (Cassidy, 1998; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998) and adult participants (Apperly, Back, 
Samson, & France, 2008; German & Hehman, 2006; Hartwright et al., 2012). The fact that 
adults experience similar difficulty to young children is particularly interesting, as it suggests 
that a pure conceptual account of ToM is insufficient to explain difficulty with reasoning 
about beliefs. Although it is not unreasonable to assume that young children fail ToM tasks 
due to an underdeveloped concept of belief, it is unfathomable to apply this logic to an adult. 
When considered in the context of the evidence provided, such difficulty is likely, therefore, 
to reflect processes which are not purely incidental to task design. This is a core element that 
runs through the present thesis; what are the neurocognitive processes involved when 
representing these effortful ToM states? Chapter 2 begins to unpack this. 
 Difficulty with false belief reasoning may also, or instead, reflect interference from 
one’s own knowledge of reality (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Ruby & 
Decety, 2003). This theory stems from young children’s propensity to systematically adopt 
their own viewpoint. For example, if shown that a tube of Smarties actually contains pencils, 
children of 3-years old describe the contents as if they had always known that there were 
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pencils inside, and as if others would also expect there to be pencils inside  (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988). Adults also tend to overestimate the extent to which others share their 
visual perspective (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; McCleery, Surtees, Graham, Richards, & 
Apperly, 2011), own general knowledge (Thomas & Jacoby, 2013), or outcome knowledge 
(Fischhoff, 2003). As previously outlined, pre-school aged children consistently and 
systematically adopt their own, privileged knowledge point when attempting to reconcile a 
false belief (Wellman et al., 2001). Similarly, adults demonstrate processing costs when 
imputing belief states that are distinct from their own conceptual perspective (Apperly et al., 
2008; German & Hehman, 2006; Hartwright et al., 2012). Performance can be enhanced in 
ToM tasks where the salience of own perspective is reduced (Samson, Apperly, 
Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005), or the salience of the agent’s perspective is 
increased (Wellman et al., 2001). Collectively, these data suggest that our own perspective 
may interfere with our ability to assume the viewpoint of an agent (Birch & Bloom, 2004; 
Birch & Bloom, 2007; Ruby & Decety, 2003; Samson et al., 2005). In order to solve a classic 
unexpected transfer task, the participant has to suppress their own prepotent but, in the case of 
the task, incorrect true belief, whilst simultaneously holding action relevant information in 
working memory. If we return to Maxi, then, the difficulty may lie in knowing that Maxi’s 
mother moved the chocolate to cupboard Y; our own, salient self perspective is a possible 
source of interference. Within this framework, in order to predict where Maxi will look for his 
chocolate, self knowledge of the real location must be resisted in order to select the empty, 
and therefore somewhat erroneous, location X. This task analysis explains that the 
behavioural difficulty that is evidenced with false belief reasoning, in particular, may be 
attributable to a “curse of knowledge” (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007) or 
“reality bias” (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991). In the case of young children, failure on false 
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belief tasks could reflect immature executive control systems, not simply an ignorance of 
belief states, or this extra effort may serve to exaggerate existing conceptual limitations (Birch 
& Bloom, 2007).   
 The bias towards the content of one’s own perspective makes clear predictions about 
which ToM states will be more effortful for children and adults to impute. Specifically, it 
suggests that conflict will exist when there is incongruence between self and other 
perspectives, as is the case in classic false belief reasoning: we know that Maxi’s chocolate is 
in cupboard Y, yet Maxi thinks his chocolate is in cupboard X. If Maxi, however, held a true 
belief – he saw his mum move the chocolate to cupboard Y – there is no difference between 
our views on the state of the world (with regards to the location of his chocolate). Note, 
however, that his desire to find or avoid his chocolate conflicts in no way with our own 
perspective. The fact that he wants to find his chocolate, or not as the case may be, is in no 
way logically incongruent with our viewpoint of the world as it really is (Hartwright et al., 
2012, [Chapter 2 here]). The curse of knowledge, therefore, makes a prediction regarding 
epistemic mental states (Samson et al., 2005), where processing a false versus true belief, but 
not an avoidance versus an approach desire, will have a demonstrable neurocognitive cost. 
This is examined in detail in Chapters 2, 4 and 5.  
 
A Social Cognitive Neuroscience of Theory of Mind 
 A breadth of research tools including fMRI, lesion data, comparative studies and 
neurophysiological techniques attempt to describe how ToM may be represented neurally. As 
a result, researchers have used an array of paradigms including mentalizing vignettes, static 
cartoons, interactive games, videos and animations to attempt to engage and modulate ‘the 
social brain’ (Carrington & Bailey, 2009). Earlier in this chapter, I loosely defined ToM as the 
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ability to know what it is in another person’s mind. Within neuroscience, however, the data on 
which our perspective of an agent is based, in terms of physical or mental cues, has different 
neurocognitive consequences. Thus, a distinction between following bodily cues, sometimes 
termed ‘motor ToM’ (Agnew, Bhakoo, & Puri, 2007), and following mental cues, 
‘mentalizing’, should be made (Van Overwalle, 2011). This is fundamental as two separate 
neural networks have been identified to subserve action observation versus mentalizing. Not 
only do these comprise different cortical regions, but the properties of the neurons within 
these regions are quite different. This is of consequence for theorising about how the 
respective element of social cognition is achieved. Though not the focus of the current thesis, 
physical action is rarely separate from the social context (Hamilton, 2013a), and observations 
of such actions do not float free from ToM (Gallese, 2007; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). 
Consequently, I now provide a brief overview of the neural system involved in ‘motor ToM’, 
the Mirror Neuron System (MNS). The MNS has been typically studied during the execution 
and observation of movement, for example, the participant might be required to lift their 
index finger as if to tap the table, then watch an agent making the same movement. The MNS 
comprises neurons which reflect a unique ‘mirroring’ property; thus, these neurons discharge 
both during the execution and observation of an action (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Rizzolatti 
& Craighero, 2004). The property of mirror neurons provides a motor theory for social 
development (Vanderwert, Fox, & Ferrari, 2013), for example, in terms of explaining early 
infant imitative action as a precursor to more complex social cognition (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Vanderwert et al., 2013). Mirror neurons were initially identified using single unit 
recording in macaques (Casile, 2013); however, neurophysiological evidence from 
electroencephalogram (EEG) and TMS studies suggested that regions of the human premotor 
cortex (PMC) reflect similar mirroring properties (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), for 
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example, by using the finger tap approach described previously. Brain imaging has 
corroborated  these data, but additionally suggests that inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 
(IFGop), the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and superior temporal sulcus (STS) may also 
demonstrate this action-observation effect in human subjects (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Vanderwert et al., 2013).  
 In terms of how the MNS and the properties of mirror neurons may relate to 
mentalizing, researchers have speculated that a deficit in the MNS might explain ToM 
dysfunction in autism. For instance, if the MNS were disrupted, this would preclude the 
ability to generate internal representations of others through embodied simulation; therefore, 
preventing any experiential understanding of others  (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). A recent 
review, however, found weak evidence for this (Hamilton, 2013b). Nevertheless, the MNS is 
responsive to more than biological movement. For example, the MNS is significantly more 
active when viewing hand actions within, versus without, a social context, such as grasping 
the handle of a cup as if to drink. This suggests that the MNS is automatically responsive to 
social intention, not just the act of grasping (Iacoboni et al., 2005). Furthermore, co-activation 
of the MNS alongside core ToM brain regions suggests that the MNS might co-opt ToM 
regions when identifying social intention through action kinematics (Becchio et al., 2012). 
When an agent performs an unusual or implausible physical act, however, such as switching 
on a light using their knee, ToM brain regions are recruited in place of the MNS. Thus, the 
MNS appears to generate and operate on the basis of movement-related schema, where 
readily interpretable physical acts are assimilated in order to prepare a socially relevant 
response. Where a physical behaviour does not return a match to the movement schema, 
higher-order ToM brain regions are brought in to facilitate social understanding. 
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 Whilst the MNS enables recognition of a goal through perceived physical action, the 
ToM network utilises ‘social intelligence’, or mental state content to make sense of an agent’s 
behaviour (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Neural regions most widely agreed to constitute 
a core mentalizing network are the TPJ and mPFC (Bzdok et al., 2012; Carrington & Bailey, 
2009; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009); however, 
ToM also regularly recruits the temporal poles, precuneus and lateral prefrontal regions 
(Lieberman, 2007; Mar, 2011; Spreng et al., 2009). Though there is relative consensus that 
TPJ and mPFC constitute ‘core’ ToM regions, less is understood about how they respond to 
different ToM contexts, or how other neural regions, particularly those which support 
executive processes, might interact with TPJ and mPFC. Nevertheless, from the 
developmental literature reviewed earlier, it should be clear that ToM is likely to engage 
executive functions. The preceding text highlighted that the pre-school years reflect an 
important transitional period in the development of ToM where, at around the age of 4-years, 
most children demonstrate an understanding of other people’s mental states. It is unlikely to 
be a coincidence that significant cortical reorganisation occurs during the pre-school years. 
This consists of both an increase in cortical surface area within the prefrontal and temporal 
association cortices, alongside a reduction in cortical thickness in medial prefrontal regions 
(see Brown & Jernigan, 2012 for a review). Nonetheless, as will be argued throughout this 
thesis, both lateral and midline frontal regions play an important role in supporting an adult 
ToM.  
 A common approach to studying the neural basis of ToM follows the developmental 
approach. Accordingly, the process of representing mental content, such as an agent who 
holds a false belief, versus representing structurally matched, non-mental content, like a false 
photograph, is examined. Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) formulated this approach into a ‘ToM 
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localizer’ task. Below are two example stimuli from this localizer. The participant reads a 
short story which is followed by a question requiring a true or false response. Participants 
complete a series of these false belief and false photograph vignettes whilst fMRI data are 
collected. The localizer task works on the premise that the two types of vignette differ only in 
the type of representation that is required. Thus, those brain regions which are preferentially 
responsive to false belief, over and above false photograph reasoning, are thought to reflect 
differential processing between representing mental, versus non-mental, content. For example, 
 
False belief format 
 
Anne made lasagne in the blue dish. After Anne left, Ian came home and ate the lasagne.  
Then he filled the blue dish with spaghetti and replaced it in the fridge. 
 – 
Anne thinks the blue dish contains spaghetti.  
True  False 
 
False photograph format 
  
A photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a tree branch. The picture was not viewed for 
half an hour. In the meantime, a strong wind blew the apple to the ground. 
– 
The developed photograph shows the apple on the ground. 
True   False 
Vignettes from Saxe and Andrews-Hanna (n.d.) 
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Repeated use of this localizer demonstrates consistent recruitment of TPJ, mPFC, precuneus 
and temporal poles (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2009; Hartwright et al., 2012; Mitchell, 2007; 
Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe & 
Wexler, 2005; Scholz, Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Brown, & Saxe, 2009; Young, 
Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010). Therefore, this task has been used extensively to interrogate the 
functional profiles of these regions. This approach has highlighted that, compared with the 
other regions identified by the localizer, only right TPJ appears to be selectively responsive to 
representing mental state content, such as the beliefs and desires of an agent, and that it is not 
simply responsive to the mere presence of social content or human actors (Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005). As the localizer task identifies parts of the brain that seem to be 
specifically engaged for ToM, this tool is used alongside some of the novel experiments 
presented in this thesis. 
 
Neural Regions of Interest 
Likely due to the breadth of disciplines that utilise neuroimaging methods, there is no single, 
standardised neuroanatomical labelling system (Devlin & Poldrack, 2007). Limited spatial 
specificity associated with tools such as EEG or Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 
necessitates labelling on a macroanatomical level, where regions may be described using 
lobular terms, or in respect of gross sulcal or gyral anatomy. High resolution methods 
including functional and structural MRI, on the other hand, attract labelling of functional or 
connectional architecture. Due to the inconsistent neuroanatomy nomenclature, it is 
challenging to qualitatively evaluate commonalities across studies localizing ToM or ToM 
processes. The experiments outlined within this thesis focus on neural regions which are 
regularly implicated in ToM, the TPJ and mPFC, alongside those which are more typically 
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associated with executive control, the vlPFC and dmPFC. I make special effort to delineate 
these relatively large anatomical regions, in terms of both defining where in vlPFC might be 
most relevant for ToM, and demonstrating how a differing ToM context yields a functional 
divide in mPFC. For clarity of discussion, Fig. 1. highlights anatomical location and labelling 
of the core neural regions which are evaluated within this thesis. 
 
Fig. 1.  Neural Regions of Particular Relevance 
Coloured regions reflect brain areas which receive regular discussion throughout this thesis. 
TPJ = temporoparietal junction; PFC = prefrontal cortex; l = lateral; v = ventral; m = medial; r 
= rostral. dACC = dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
19 
 
Thesis Structure 
 The data presented within this thesis detail how specific mental states are represented 
in ToM and executive control regions. Novel task analyses are presented from which specific 
hypotheses regarding how experimental manipulation will modulate core brain regions are 
tested. These data suggest that ToM processing is affected by differences in executive 
demands that are associated with certain ToM contexts and concepts. My work highlights that 
existing descriptions of the neurocognitive bases of specific belief and desire states require 
modification. Such modifications should include reference to how changes within mental state 
concepts, and the wider representational context, affect the distribution and functional profile 
of resources used within the brain. 
 Each empirical chapter comprises a self-contained manuscript. Each chapter, 
therefore, typically comprises an overview of any core terminology and background literature, 
a detailed account of the methods used and results obtained, plus a discussion in the context 
of the particular question(s) of interest. The first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, evaluates two 
theoretical frameworks concerning the role of executive control in ToM. The first framework 
suggests that the ability to represent the perspective of self, versus that of another, necessarily 
requires executive control. This process is postulated to be more effortful when the thoughts 
and beliefs of an agent are incompatible with our own. The second suggests that executive 
selection resources are required more generally, in attentionally demanding situations, for 
example, when circumstances elicit competing information streams. By using a novel, belief-
desire reasoning task alongside an extensively published ToM localizer task, a neural basis for the 
processes underlying each of these frameworks is proposed. In particular, a role for vlPFC in the 
inhibition of self perspective, and dmPFC, particularly ACC, in supporting more general control 
demands, is outlined. The response of TPJ to this manipulation is also described. This is explored 
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in the context of what these results suggest about the function of TPJ in the wider ToM sphere. 
The overall results are then contextualised within how children and adults might apply a ToM.  
 Intrigued by the absence of neural activation in mPFC in Chapter 2, a region often 
thought critical for mentalizing, the third chapter presents a task analysis of ToM. Here, three 
processes – representation, control and reasoning – are explored. These processes are 
suggested to feature in ToM, in varying degrees, according to the representational context. 
The ToM task outlined in Chapter 3 sought to explain the absence of mPFC in terms of this 
proposed contextual effect. A new task is outlined, which adopted a minimal change to the 
paradigm that features in Chapter 2. This enabled close inspection of how variation in the 
mode of reasoning modulates core ToM brain regions, and was used to demonstrate a 
functional dissociation in mPFC. Here, the theory that two distinct types of reasoning can be 
employed when making a representational judgment is described.  
 The experiment presented in Chapter 2 postulates that vlPFC supports inhibition of 
self perspective in ToM. Chapters 4 and 5 focus in on this region, in order to further explore 
its functional profile. The study described in Chapter 4 used TMS. Perturbation techniques 
such as TMS enable a causal inference regarding the role of the stimulated region, by 
inducing a ‘virtual lesion’ and any associated behavioural consequences (Pascual-Leone, 
Walsh, & Rothwell, 2000). Thus, TMS permits more powerful conclusions regarding the role 
of vlPFC in ToM. As the experimental protocol differs from the other methods presented in 
this thesis, the merits of TMS are briefly reviewed in relation to neuropsychological and fMRI 
evidence. Consideration is given to the application of TMS to vlPFC, in particular. The 
effects of TMS were shown to be highly variable across subjects. The failure to elicit the 
hypothesised effects is reviewed in relation to physiological issues – such as difficulties with 
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localization and neural efficacy – and paradigmatic concerns, which have arisen following 
recent evidence which now brings into question the TMS protocol that was used.  
 The final empirical chapter uses the same ToM localizer task that features in Chapter 
2. However, in order to clarify the role of vlPFC in ToM, Chapter 5 describes a modification 
to the original localizer that systematically varies the salience of a participant’s own 
perspective, when making a representational judgement. In doing so, modulation of vlPFC 
was demonstrated. The study outlined in Chapter 5 identified a functional dissociation in 
vlPFC, where salience of self perspective was only relevant when representing mental versus 
non-mental content. In light of this, Chapter 5 describes existing theories regarding possible 
processing differences between mental and non-mental representation. These theories are 
integrated into a unified proposition which tentatively aims to explain the role of vlPFC in 
ToM and non-mental representation.  
 The closing chapter of this thesis provides a summary of the major findings. In 
Chapter 6, an attempt is made to integrate these results into a flexible framework. Such a 
framework reflects how the data presented in this thesis might extend our interpretation of 
what constitutes the core ToM network, in terms of the neurocognitive bases of context 
specific ToM processes. 
  
22 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
MULTIPLE ROLES FOR EXECUTIVE CONTROL IN BELIEF-DESIRE 
REASONING: DISTINCT NEURAL NETWORKS ARE RECRUITED FOR SELF 
PERSPECTIVE INHIBITION AND COMPLEXITY OF REASONING
1
 
  
                                               
1
 This chapter is published: Hartwright, Charlotte E., Apperly, Ian A., & Hansen, Peter C. (2012). Multiple roles 
for executive control in belief-desire reasoning: Distinct neural networks are recruited for self perspective 
inhibition and complexity of reasoning. NeuroImage, 61(4), 921-930. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.03.012 
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ABSTRACT 
Belief-desire reasoning is a core component of ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM), which can be used to 
explain and predict the behaviour of agents. Neuroimaging studies reliably identify a network 
of brain regions comprising a ‘standard’ network for ToM, including temporoparietal junction 
and medial prefrontal cortex. Whilst considerable experimental evidence suggests that 
executive control (EC) may support a functioning ToM, co-ordination of neural systems for 
ToM and EC is poorly understood. We report here the use of a novel task in which 
psychologically relevant ToM parameters (true versus false belief; approach versus avoidance 
desire) were manipulated orthogonally. The valence of these parameters not only modulated 
brain activity in the ‘standard’ ToM network but also in EC regions. Varying the valence of 
both beliefs and desires recruits anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting a shared inhibitory 
component associated with negatively valenced mental state concepts. Varying the valence of 
beliefs additionally draws on ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, reflecting the need to inhibit self 
perspective. These data provide the first evidence that separate functional and neural systems 
for EC may be recruited in the service of different aspects of ToM. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The capacity to reason about the mental causes of action, termed ‘mentalizing’ or 
exercising a ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM), has received considerable interest from social 
neuroscientists over the last decade.  Much attention has been given to identifying which, if 
any, brain regions should be considered as specialised for ToM. This work has made 
considerable progress in identifying possible contenders, and converges on the importance of 
a network of brain regions including temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal 
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cortex (mPFC) (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Lieberman, 2007; Mar, 2011; Van Overwalle, 
2009). TPJ has been identified in the majority of neuroimaging studies of ToM, and appears 
selectively responsive when representing mental states such as beliefs, desires and intentions, 
over and above representation of physical states, personality traits or dispositions of the 
person, and above non-mental representations, such as photographs (Aichhorn et al., 2009; 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005).  mPFC is also identified in most 
neuroimaging studies of ToM, though its activity may be less specific to mental state 
representation (Amodio & Frith, 2006), and may be most strongly recruited when reflecting 
on more enduring mental states, such as personality traits and social or moral beliefs (Van 
Overwalle, 2009), or when making inferences under conditions of high uncertainty (Jenkins & 
Mitchell, 2009). The strong convergence of neuroimaging data has lead to a general 
consensus that TPJ and mPFC constitute the ‘core’ network for ToM, and that the functions 
they support are the most psychologically important for understanding ToM.  
 ToM has been studied most extensively using false belief tasks. A classic paradigm, 
the object transfer task, requires participants to make a prediction about the behaviour of a 
character, based upon the character’s belief and desire at that point in time. A typical 
experimental sequence outlines a protagonist putting an object into location A. They then 
leave the scene. Whilst the protagonist is away, the object is transferred to location B. The 
character then returns, wishing to find the object but holding a false belief about its location 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In order to successfully identify where the protagonist will look 
for the object, it is necessary for participants to infer the character’s false belief about the 
object’s location and predict the character’s action on the basis of their false belief, while 
resisting interference from their own privileged knowledge of the object’s true location, and 
what the right course of action would be. This task analysis leads to the expectation that 
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successful ToM will not only require processes that might be specific to inferring and 
representing the mental states of others, but also processes for executive control (EC) to 
ensure that the correct information is selected for inferring mental states and predicting 
actions. It follows, then, that a complete account of the neural basis of ToM must also include 
brain regions associated with these sorts of control processes. To date, however, the brain 
bases of EC in ToM have been little explored. 
 Numerous researchers have noted that executive ability appears to contribute 
significantly to proficiency with ToM (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson, 
Moses, & Hix, 1998; Friedman & Leslie, 2004; German & Hehman, 2006; Leslie, German, & 
Polizzi, 2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Perner & Lang, 1999; Wellman et al., 2001). For 
example, in the classic false belief paradigm mentioned above, children under the age of four 
seem unable to overcome their own knowledge of where the object really is. As a result, they 
consistently state that the protagonist will look for the object in the object’s true location. 
Younger children, however, may sometimes pass the false belief task if the true location of 
the object is made less salient (Carlson et al., 1998; Wellman et al., 2001). These kind of 
‘egocentric errors’, sometimes referred to as the ‘curse of knowledge’ (Birch & Bloom, 2004; 
Birch & Bloom, 2007) or a ‘reality bias’ (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991), have also been 
observed in older children and healthy adults (Bernstein, Atance, Loftus, & Meltzoff, 2004; 
Birch & Bloom, 2007) and appear to reflect the need to exert EC to solve such tasks (see e.g., 
Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005; Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2009 for relevant 
discussions). 
 Two broad theoretical frameworks have been proposed concerning the role of EC in 
ToM. The first suggests that EC is necessary when a perspective difference between self and 
other exists, as is the case of false belief or conflicting desires. For example, knowledge of the 
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true location may interfere with the ability to select the believed, or false, location. As a 
result, the self perspective must be inhibited in order to assume the perspective of the other 
(Ruby & Decety, 2003; Samson et al., 2005). This theory arises from behavioural 
observations of young children’s propensity towards responding with their own knowledge, 
and data suggesting that performance in ToM tasks can be manipulated by varying the 
salience of self perspective (Carlson et al., 1998; Wellman et al., 2001). A growing literature 
suggests that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) may support this process of ‘self 
perspective inhibition’. For example, Vogeley et al. (2001) identified that the right inferior 
frontal cortex, particularly right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), was modulated by varying the 
importance of self in a fictional scenario. This finding was later supported by a case study 
which demonstrated that damage to right vlPFC, including rIFG, resulted in interference from 
self perspective when attributing beliefs to others. In this particular case, the patient was able 
to solve ToM tasks where his own perspective was less salient, but failed ToM tasks where a 
clear incongruence between self and other knowledge state existed (Samson et al., 2005). 
Using false belief tasks from Samson et al.’s study and a stop-signal test of EC, a further 
study showed that the same ventral region of IFG was recruited bilaterally in healthy adults 
for both general response inhibition, and when contrasting false belief tasks that made high 
versus low demands on the inhibition of self-perspective (van der Meer, Groenewold, Nolen, 
Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2011). Finally, a recent study of visual perspective-taking showed an 
ERP component over right fronto-lateral cortex that was sensitive to differences between self 
and other perspectives (McCleery et al., 2011). These studies provide converging evidence 
that a functioning ToM is supported by regions outside of the ‘standard’ ToM network, and 
that the inferior frontal cortex – particularly vlPFC – may be an important, but overlooked, 
27 
 
region involved in inhibition of self perspective. Notably, however, none of these studies 
examine the role of EC in reasoning about conative mental states, such as desires.   
 The second theory of the role of EC in ToM, proposed by Leslie and colleagues 
(Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Friedman & Leslie, 2005; Leslie et al., 2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 
1998), extends beyond belief attribution to include the varying demands of desire reasoning. It 
is implicit in the standard false belief task that the character wishes to locate the object. 
However, if the agent holds a desire to avoid the object, both children and adults suffer further 
difficulty in false belief tasks (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011; Cassidy, 
1998; German & Hehman, 2006). Moreover, like false belief reasoning, proficiency with 
avoidance desire coincides with the development of executive abilities. Leslie and colleagues 
explain this in terms of a shared inhibitory component for negatively valenced
2
 mental states, 
such as false belief and avoidance desire. They suggest that, for both false belief and 
avoidance desire reasoning, participants are required to select from competing responses and 
inhibit the prepotent response (e.g., true versus believed location / desired versus undesired 
location). Consequently, false belief and avoidance desire states may draw on a domain-
general ‘selection processor’, in order to direct executive selection resources in attentionally 
demanding situations. Importantly, avoidance desire (i.e. “desire to avoid”) can concern 
objects or situations that are either intrinsically desirable or undesirable from the participant’s 
own point of view. Hence, variation in this valence of desire does not reduce to a question of 
whether the participant shares the character’s desire: indeed desire valence and self-other 
congruence of desire are logically orthogonal factors. To explain these findings, Leslie and 
colleagues suggest that EC has a more general role in ToM that is not restricted only to cases 
                                               
2
 These variations in belief and desire both vary the difficulty of the belief-desire reasoning task. However, beliefs in 
the current study varied in terms of their consistency with the participant’s self-perspective (true beliefs versus false 
beliefs), whereas desires varied only in terms of whether the target character liked or disliked the food. Therefore we 
use the term “valence” to refer collectively to these variations, so that true beliefs and desires for foods are described 
as “positively valenced” and false beliefs and desires to avoid foods are described as “negatively valenced”.  
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that require inhibition of self-perspective. Previous neuroimaging studies examining EC more 
generally in ToM have typically used separate tasks to identify ToM and EC regions. These 
indicate some overlap between neural regions recruited for EC tasks and false belief 
reasoning, extending beyond IFG to include anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), frontal 
operculum (FO) and frontal eyefields (FEF) (Rothmayr et al., 2011; Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 
2006; van der Meer et al., 2011).  
 Whilst interest in the neural basis of executive function in ToM is growing, most 
previous studies are limited in their ability to cast light on the role of executive function in 
ToM. Most have sought to identify neural regions involved only in ToM by comparing 
activation observed in a ToM condition with that in a non-ToM control condition. Such 
approaches may enable powerful tests of hypotheses about brain regions that are domain-
specific for ToM, but run the risk of subtracting out activation that is critical for 
understanding how ToM is achieved in the brain. A fruitful alternative approach is to 
manipulate psychologically relevant factors within a ToM task (for a discussion of these 
issues see Friston & Henson, 2006; Saxe, Brett, & Kanwisher, 2006). Surprisingly few 
previous studies of ToM, however, have attempted such manipulations. Sommer et al. (2007) 
provide one of the few direct comparisons between true and false belief reasoning. In their 
nonverbal task, participants viewed a series of cartoons which depicted a true or false belief 
scenario analogous to the object transfer task outlined earlier. Regions which were more 
responsive to false belief over true belief attribution included the right TPJ, ACC and right 
lPFC. The reverse contrast only identified the superior frontal gyrus, which is in contention 
with the view that TPJ is an essential component when attributing any transient mental state 
(seeVan Overwalle, 2009). These data indicate that false belief reasoning might recruit EC 
regions. However, they are difficult to interpret with confidence, because is not clear whether 
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participants were solving the contrasting true belief condition by mental state ascription or by 
simply referring to the true state of affairs (Aichhorn et al., 2009). Consequently, further 
examination of these two mental states is warranted, where attending to a protagonist’s mental 
state is made unavoidable in both true and false belief reasoning. This was the case in the 
current study.  
 The neural basis of conative states such as desires has been studied less extensively. 
Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, and D’Esposito (2008) examined neural activation when 
making empathic judgements for characters with varying perspectives. More directly relevant 
to the current study, Abraham, Rakoczy, Werning, von Cramon, and Schubotz (2010) had 
participants read a series of short vignettes which varied the valence of belief and desire: 
either an agent’s belief turned out to be true or false, or an agent’s desire turned out to be 
fulfilled or unfulfilled. The vignettes were followed by a yes/no question in which participants 
judged how the agent would feel about the true state of affairs. Their results were broadly 
consistent with the existing literature and showed recruitment of key mentalizing areas 
including TPJ and mPFC for both the belief and desire conditions compared to a non-ToM 
reasoning task. An analysis of the overall effect of valence (of both belief and desire) 
identified activation in mid-line structures, including mPFC and posterior cingulate cortex. 
This study is interesting because it attempts to separate the demands of belief and desire 
reasoning into different experimental conditions. However, this also leads to limitations. 
Firstly, it is unclear whether this separation can be entirely successful, since judging an 
agent’s feelings on the basis of his belief may lead participants to think about his desire even 
though they were not asked to. Likewise, judging an agent’s feelings on the basis of her desire 
may lead participants to think about her belief. Secondly, it is unclear how such conditions 
relate to the canonical forms of ToM reasoning, in which we combine information about both 
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belief and desire to predict or explain an agent’s action. For this reason, the current study 
followed the longstanding literature on ToM in children by asking participants to predict a 
character’s actions on the basis of his belief and desire. 
 We deployed a novel task (Apperly et al., 2011) based upon the object transfer action 
prediction ToM task, from which there are already considerable behavioural data (e.g., 
Friedman & Leslie, 2005; Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Our previous 
work has shown this design to be able to detect differences in reaction time and error rate 
when participants predicted an agent’s action on the basis of true versus false beliefs and a 
desire to approach versus avoid an object. This task allowed us to look specifically at neural 
activation during the decision making phase during which these behavioural effects are 
observed. The novel task comprises an orthogonal design whereby belief (true/false) and 
desire (approach/avoid) states are manipulated within a single, within-subjects experiment. 
The use of this factorial design enabled a whole brain analysis to isolate any neural regions 
that were modulated either by the valence of belief state, or by the valence of the desire state, 
or both. In doing so, the present study sought to address three key questions: 
Mental State Valence and the ToM Network 
Do our factors of Belief-Valence and Desire-Valence recruit any regions of the ToM 
network?  
 It is entirely possible that our factors of Belief- and Desire-Valence would not recruit 
any regions of the ToM network, because beliefs and desires feature in all of our experimental 
conditions. It is important to emphasize that the present task and analyses were not designed 
to identify regions that are specifically involved in representing beliefs or desires in 
comparison with non-ToM reasoning, but instead were designed to identify those regions that 
are responsive to variation in the valence of either belief or desire during an action prediction. 
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This is informative because, as reviewed above, previous work shows that the valence of 
beliefs and desires makes a critical contribution to the difficulty of belief-desire reasoning for 
both children and adults. 
Mental State Valence and Neural Regions for Executive Control 
If our factors of Belief-Valence and Desire-Valence recruit regions of the ToM network, is 
this just because those regions are involved in attention/executive control, not because they 
are involved in ToM per se? 
 Although the literature converges on identifying brain regions that are consistently 
associated with ToM, the role of these regions remains controversial. On one view, at least 
some regions – in particular, some regions of right TPJ – are activated during ToM tasks 
because they are specifically involved in ToM (e.g., Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Scholz et al., 
2009). On another view, such activation merely reflects the allocation or reorientation of 
attention, which is known to be a function of TPJ, and is a confounding feature of many ToM 
tasks (Mitchell, 2007; Rothmayr et al., 2011). The need for care on this question is 
emphasised by a recent structural imaging study which demonstrated that TPJ can be 
subdivided in terms of its connectivity with other brain regions associated respectively with 
ToM and attention (Mars et al., 2012). To address this issue, we used a separate ToM 
localizer task (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) alongside our novel task. This localizer contrasts 
brain activation observed during false belief trials with that observed during closely-matched 
false photograph trials. It is widely agreed that false photograph tasks are an excellent match 
for most of the confounding demands that false belief tasks make on memory, EC and 
attention (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2009; Saxe & Powell, 2006), so although interpretation of this 
localizer remains controversial (e.g., Mitchell, 2007; Young, Dodell-Feder, et al., 2010), it is 
currently the best method available for identifying brain regions that might be specifically 
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involved in ToM. By using the localizer alongside the belief-desire task, we were able to 
explore the neural signature of specific belief and desire states in those voxels within TPJ that 
appear to be specifically responsive to mental representation.  
Neurocognitive Processes for Belief and Desire 
Do we observe differential activation of executive control regions due to the Belief-Valence 
factor compared with the Desire-Valence factor? 
 The two theories of EC in ToM reviewed earlier make alternate, but not incompatible, 
predictions about the pattern of brain activation in belief and desire reasoning. Firstly, Leslie 
and colleagues’ executive performance account of ToM (Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Friedman 
& Leslie, 2005; Leslie et al., 2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998) posits that both avoidance desire 
and false belief reasoning recruit common executive resources for the selective control of 
attention. If this theory is correct, negatively valenced belief and desire states will draw on the 
same executive regions. Secondly, if EC is involved in self-perspective inhibition (McCleery 
et al., 2011; Samson et al., 2005; van der Meer et al., 2011), then we should expect to see 
different recruitment of brain areas for the factors of Belief-Valence and Desire-Valence. This 
is because false belief trials are thought to make higher demands on self-perspective inhibition 
than true belief trials, whereas there is no systematic variation in the need for self-perspective 
inhibition when the agent has a desire to avoid rather than approach the object. 
 
METHOD 
Participants  
 Twenty healthy adults participated in both of the fMRI experiments. All gave 
informed ethical consent and were given course credit or a small honorarium for their 
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participation. The study had appropriate research ethics approval from the University of 
Birmingham. One participant was excluded from all analyses due to poor behavioural task 
performance during scanning
3
. The remaining 19 participants were included in all analyses (6 
male, 13 female; age range 18-39,    age = 25 years). All participants were strongly right 
handed, measured with a modified form of the Annett Handedness Questionnaire (1970), and 
were proficient English speakers. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Pre-screen 
 Suitability to participate was determined several days prior to collecting the 
neuroimaging data. The Wide Range Achievement Test – Third Edition (WRAT-3) Reading 
Scale was administered to screen for reading disabilities and ensure reading proficiency 
commensurate with the experimental tasks. The participants then completed a computer based 
interactive training session which gave an overview of the belief-desire reasoning experiment. 
They then attempted one block of experimental trials outside of the MRI scanner. Only 
participants who performed above chance at p < 0.05 on this pre-test block took part in the 
fMRI experiments (see Appendix 1 for detailed participant screening information). Of twenty 
three prospective participants, 3 individuals (3 female; age range 19-24,    age = 23 years) 
were unable to perform the Belief-Desire Reasoning experiment to above chance at the pre-
screen stage and thus did not participate in any of the fMRI experiments. 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 Based on a binomial distribution at p < 0.05, this participant performed below chance on the belief desire task.  
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Belief-Desire Reasoning Experiment 
 The main experiment was based on a paradigm devised by Apperly et al. (2011) which 
was revised for use as an event-related design within the MRI scanner. Pilot work using the 
revised paradigm confirmed that experimental timings were appropriate in that the 
participants were able to perform the task to a high degree of accuracy (> 90% correct trials). 
The experiment utilised an orthogonal design which had four equally occurring conditions 
that were based on a protagonist’s belief state (true (B+) or false (B-)) and desire state 
(approach (D+) or avoid (D-)). By varying the protagonist’s beliefs and desires four 
conditions were created: B+D+, B+D-, B-D+ and B-D-. Note that immediately prior to 
participating in the main experiment all participants completed one further practice block 
outside of the MRI scanner so as to refamiliarise themselves with the main experimental task. 
None of the pre-test or practice trials were used in the main fMRI experiment. 
 The experiment required participants to predict which one of two different coloured 
boxes a character would open based on a scenario in which the character would seek out food 
they love and avoid food they hate (Fig. 2).  
 A male protagonist, introduced during the training and practice sessions as Simon, was 
always used with male participants, whereas a female character, Sally, was always used with 
female participants. Each scenario consisted of three centre justified statements followed by a 
picture response probe then rest. Statements were separated by a fixation period of 400 ms. A 
variable interstimulus interval was used (range = 9000-14000 ms,     = 11500 ms), during 
which a small fixation dot was displayed. The temporal order of the statement types was 
randomised, but all scenarios contained one belief statement (e.g., he thinks the chips are in 
the red box), one desire statement (e.g., he loves chips) and one reality statement (e.g., the 
chips are in the blue box). This design meant that participants were always explicitly told the 
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character’s belief, whether the belief was true or false. Moreover, randomisation of the 
statement order ensured that participants needed to encode the character’s true belief on at 
least the 50% of trials on which they did not already know the object’s true location. In these 
ways our design addressed the weakness of earlier studies in which participants could safely 
ignore a character’s beliefs on true belief trials, relying instead on their own knowledge of 
reality.
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Fig. 2. Method: Belief-Desire Reasoning Paradigm  
(Panel A) Experimental sequence of a single trial. Response probe 1 is an example of the image displayed for a trial of interest, picture 2 is 
an example of the response probe displayed during the anti-strategy trials. Note that the white numbered boxes were not part of the stimuli. 
(Panel B) Example trial sequences for each of the four conditions. The order of statement types were randomised for each trial.  
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 The statements were followed by a response probe. If the protagonist appeared in the 
response probe, participants indicated whether the character would open the left or the right 
box based on the agent’s belief-desire state, using a two button box placed in their left hand4. 
These were the trials of interest and made up two thirds of the overall number of trials 
presented. In the other one third of trials, the protagonist was replaced with a question mark in 
the response probe. In this instance, participants responded by giving the true location of the 
food. These anti strategy trials were used to ensure that the participants had to attend to all 
three statements, and did not form any part of the analyses presented within the present paper. 
Twelve different food types were used, which were consistently “loved” or “hated” by the on 
screen protagonist. Food preferences were counterbalanced so that half of the participants saw 
one consistent set of preferences, whereas the other half saw the opposite preferences. The 
correct response corresponded to the left and right box an equal number of times. Participants 
completed four blocks of trials, each of which contained 24 trials (16 trials of interest, 8 anti 
strategy trials). Each block lasted 7 minutes 22 seconds which included an initial instruction 
and final thank you screen.  
 
Theory of Mind Localizer Experiment 
 The localizer task was substantially based on the experimental procedure devised by 
Saxe and Kanwisher (2003). Stimuli consisted of a subgroup of the current localizer stories 
(see Saxe & Andrews-Hanna, n.d.), some of which were anglicised for use in the present 
experiment. Participants read a total of 24 short vignettes which referred to either a 
protagonist’s false belief (FB) or an outdated physical representation, such as the false 
photograph scenario (FP). Each vignette was displayed for 10 s, which was followed for 4 s 
                                               
4
 The left hand was used to differentiate potential language related neural activity from motor activity 
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with a short true or false question about the preceding story. This required participants to 
make a response using a two button box that was placed in their left hand. Stories alternated 
between FB and FP and were interleaved with a 13.5 s rest period. The localizer experiment 
comprised of four blocks of six trials, each containing three of each type of story. Participants 
were given four practice trials immediately prior to scanning to familiarise themselves with 
the localizer task. 
 
Data Acquisition and Analysis 
Neuroimaging Data Acquisition and Processing 
 Each participant’s data were acquired during a single scanning session using a 3T 
Philips Achieva scanner. All stimuli were presented using Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, CA) which also recorded the behavioural response data 
simultaneously. Participants completed two blocks of the main belief-desire experiment 
followed by all four blocks of the localizer task and the remaining two blocks of the main 
experiment. 177 T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) volumes were obtained per block 
of the belief-desire experiment and 77 EPI volumes were acquired for each block of the 
localizer task. Both tasks utilised the same general imaging parameters to achieve whole brain 
coverage (TR = 2.5 s, TE = 35 ms, acquisition matrix = 96 x 96, flip angle = 83°, voxel size = 
3x3x3mm
3
). EPI images consisted of 42 axial slices that were obtained consecutively in a 
bottom up sequence.  High resolution T1-weighted structural images were acquired following 
collection of the functional data (1x1x1mm
3
 isotropic voxels). 
 Preprocessing and statistical analyses of the data were performed using the FMRIB 
software library (FSL version v.5.98; FMRIB, Oxford, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). For both 
experiments, initial preprocessing of the functional data consisted of slice timing correction, 
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and motion correction using rigid body transformations (MCFLIRT). The blood oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) signals were high-pass filtered using a Gaussian weighted filter of 30 s for 
the belief-desire task and 21 s for the localizer task. The BOLD data were then spatially 
smoothed using a 5mm full-width-half-maximum kernel. The functional data were registered 
to their respective structural images and transformed to a standard template based on the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain, using a 6-DoF linear transformation 
(FLIRT). 
 
Belief-Desire Reasoning Experiment Analysis 
The functional data resulting from the four conditions were modelled as four explanatory 
variables (EVs) of interest: B+D+, B+D-, B-D+, B-D-. To focus on the decision making 
phase of the sequence, the onset of each event was time locked to when the participant made a 
button response for each trial. Each EV comprised an arbitrary duration of 100 ms. The EVs 
were convolved with a gamma derived haemodynamic response function (HRF) within a 
general linear model framework (GLM). Motion parameters were treated as regressors of no 
interest in order to account for unwanted motion effects. The sentence phase was modelled as 
a regressor of no interest and orthogonalised with respect to the main EVs.  Session data were 
aggregated per participant using a second level fixed effects model. These 19 second level 
models were used to provide the input data for ROI analyses. Third level modelling was used 
to aggregate the data across participants in a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Belief-
Valence (B+/B-) and Desire-Valence (D+/D-) as within subjects factors. The final whole 
brain result was based on a mixed effects (ME) analysis with cluster based thresholding at Z > 
2.3, pcorr < 0.05. 
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ToM Localizer Experiment Analysis 
The localizer task was modelled as per Saxe and Kanwisher (2003). Statistical analysis was 
conducted using a GLM. Two EVs which reflected the two conditions, FB and FP, were 
convolved with a gamma-derived HRF. Second and third level modelling was used to 
aggregate the data across sessions and participants for the contrast of interest FB > FP. For 
examination of activation between the two experimental paradigms, post-stats processing of 
the group result was conducted as per the parameters used for the main belief-desire reasoning 
task (ME analysis, Z > 2.3, pcorr < 0.05).   
 
Overlap Analysis 
 Using the whole brain data, any overlap between activations from the localizer task 
and the belief-desire task were identified using FSL’s command line tools (fslmaths). A 
logical AND function was applied to the thresholded data (Z > 2.3, pcorr < 0.05) for the factors 
of Belief-Valence and Desire-Valence and the localizer FB > FP contrast.   
 
ROI Analysis 
 ROI masks were created using the MarsBaR region of interest toolbox (version 0.42 
marsbar.sourceforge.net) for SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Masks comprised a sphere 
with a 5-mm radius centred on the single subject peak voxel within TPJ for the FB > FP 
localizer contrast. ROI analyses were carried out on each participant’s aggregated sessional 
data for the 4 EVs modelled in the main belief-desire experiment. The mean percentage signal 
change (PSC) for each condition of interest within each ROI was extracted using FSL 
Featquery (www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/feat5/featquery.html). 
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RESULTS 
Belief-Desire Reasoning Task Behavioural Results  
 All reaction times (RTs) were recorded from the onset of the response probe. Any 
incorrect responses or data points that were 2 standard deviations outside of the participant’s 
condition mean were removed for RT analysis. A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the remaining data, with Belief-Valence (B+/B-) and Desire-Valence (D+/D-) 
as within subjects factors. This revealed significant main effects of Belief-Valence, where B- 
> B+ (F(1,18) = 46.94, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.72) and Desire-Valence, where D- > D+ (F(1,18) = 
25.21, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.58) but no interaction (F(1,18) = 0.21, p = 0.66, η2 = 0.01). Fig. 3A 
summarises the mean RT for correct responses given across the four conditions. 
 The participant’s error rate was analysed in a further 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA. 
This also indicated significant main effects of Belief-Valence where B- > B+ (F(1,18) = 
22.55, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.56)  and Desire-Valence where D- > D+ (F(1,18) = 5.86, p = 0.03, η2 
= 0.25), but no interaction between the two (F(1,18) = 0.63, p = 0.44, η2 = 0.03). Fig. 3B 
illustrates the mean proportion of incorrect responses. 
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(A)            (B) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Results: Belief-Desire Reasoning Behavioural Data 
Error bars reflect +/-1 SE of the mean. (Panel A) Group mean reaction time per condition for correct responses (ms). (Panel B) Percentage 
of errors made per condition. 
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Whole Brain Analysis 
Belief-Desire Reasoning Experiment 
 A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA of the belief-desire reasoning task identified main 
effects of Belief-Valence (B+/B-) and Desire-Valence (D+/D-) but no interaction between the 
two factors. Manipulation of Belief-Valence recruited bilateral TPJ, superior parietal and 
occipital cortices, as well as frontal areas including the ACC (BA 32), bilateral dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) (BA 9, 46) and vlPFC including bilateral orbital frontal cortex, IFG 
and FO (BA 44, 45, 47) (Table 1; red shading Fig. 4). Varying Desire-Valence also elicited 
activation in bilateral TPJ, superior parietal and occipital cortices, and medial frontal regions 
including the ACC. However, in contrast to the factor of Belief-Valence, frontal activation 
was largely left lateralised, spanning both dlPFC and superior regions of vlPFC. Modulation 
of right frontal areas was limited to dlPFC (Table 2; green shading Fig. 4). Thus, whilst the 
valence of belief and desire both modulated activation in ACC, only belief was shown to 
influence the most inferior parts of vlPFC. 
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Table 1 Cluster Peaks for the Belief-Desire Reasoning Task: Factor of Belief-Valence 
Hemisphere and region 
Brodmann 
areas 
  Cluster size 
(voxels) 
  Peak MNI coordinates   
Z-values 
    x y z   
L inferior frontal gyrus, L middle frontal gyrus, L frontal operculum, L frontal orbital cortex 
6, 8, 9, 38, 
44, 45, 46, 
47, 48 
  3134   -50 20 24   4.97 
L temporoparietal junction, L supramarginal gyrus, L lateral occipital cortex 22, 39, 40   2859   -54 -52 26   4.92 
R orbital frontal cortex, R frontal operculum, R inferior frontal gyrus, R middle frontal gyrus 
9, 38, 44, 
45, 46, 47, 
48 
  1414   34 24 -6   4.85 
R temporoparietal junction, R lateral occipital cortex, R middle temporal gyrus 22, 39, 40   1411   52 -54 24   4.78 
L/R superior frontal gyrus, L/R paracingulate gyrus, L/R anterior cingulate cortex 8, 9, 24, 32   2069   0 28 46   4.37 
R cerebellum crus I -   561   18 -70 -34   3.78 
Note. Clusters reflect results of 2-way repeated measures ANOVA for the factor of belief-valence (B+/B-). Table shows neural regions which are modulated by varying truth-status (true/false), pcorr < 0.05 
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Table 2 Cluster Peaks for the Belief-Desire Reasoning Task: Factor of Desire-Valence 
Hemisphere and region 
Brodmann 
areas 
  Cluster size 
(voxels) 
  Peak MNI coordinates   
Z-values 
    x y z   
L middle frontal gyrus, L inferior frontal gyrus 
6, 9, 44, 45, 
48 
  2339   -46 12 36   5.37 
L/R precuneus 7   736   2 -66 42   4.63 
L angular gyrus, L temporoparietal junction, L lateral occipital cortex 21, 39, 40   2141   -40 -56 52   4.46 
L/R superior frontal gyrus, L/R paracingulate gyrus, L/R anterior cingulate cortex 8, 9, 24, 32   767   2 18 54   4.33 
R angular gyrus, R temporoparietal junction, R supramarginal gyrus 
7, 22, 40, 
41, 48 
  1067   36 -48 42   3.80 
R inferior frontal gyrus, R middle frontal gyrus 
9, 44, 45, 
48 
  467   44 28 20   3.69 
Note. Clusters reflect results of 2-way repeated measures ANOVA for the factor of desire-valence (D+/D-). Table shows neural regions which are modulated by varying desire-status 
(approach/avoid), pcorr < 0.05 
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Fig. 4. Results: Belief-Desire Reasoning Whole Brain Analysis 
Results from 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA whole brain analysis of the belief-desire reasoning task, with Belief-Valence (B+/B-) and 
Desire-Valence (D+/D-) as within-subjects factors. Selected slices highlight modulation in ToM and executive control regions for the 
factors of Belief-Valence (red) and Desire-Valence (green). Yellow areas indicate regions recruited by both factors (B/D). The group data 
are overlaid on the MNI brain template, showing significantly activated voxels where Z > 2.3, pcorr < 0.05. Slices from top left to bottom 
right, x = -1, 54; z = -2, 18 respectively. Images reflect Z-corrected F-stat images and are displayed in neurological convention, where left 
is represented on the left side of the image.  
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Theory of Mind Localizer Experiment 
 A mixed effects analyses of the whole brain localizer data identified neural regions 
that were more responsive to mental than physical representation (FB > FP, pcorr < 0.05). 
These results were consistent with previous ToM studies, showing that the FB > FP contrast 
recruits core regions of the ToM network, including bilateral TPJ and mPFC (Table 3; green 
shading Fig. 5A).  
 
Overlap Analysis Results 
 Inspection of the activation maps from the group data suggested considerable overlap 
between neural regions recruited by the localizer task and the belief-desire reasoning task, as 
shown in Fig. 5A. An overlap analysis identified that only bilateral TPJ was required for all 
three variations of mentalizing (Fig. 5B). 
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Table 3 Cluster Peaks for the ToM Localizer Task, showing Activation where False Belief > False Photograph 
Hemisphere and region 
Brodmann 
areas 
  Cluster size 
(voxels) 
  Peak MNI coordinates   
Z-values 
    x y z   
R temporoparietal junction, R lateral occipital cortex, R middle temporal gyrus 
21, 22, 39, 
40, 42 
  4157   60 -58 18   4.76 
L/R precuneus 7   2866   2 -58 36   5.56 
L/R frontal pole, L/R medial prefrontal cortex, L/R superior frontal gyrus 8, 9, 10, 11    3511   -4 66 -12   4.65 
L middle temporal gyrus 20, 21   1441   -58 -8 -20   4.72 
L lateral occipital cortex, L temporoparietal junction, L angular gyrus  
7, 19, 21, 
39 
  1263   -42 -70 -38   4.08 
L cerebellum crus II -   957   -30 -80 -40   3.84 
L cerebellum IX -   382   -4 -56 -46   3.92 
Note. Clusters reflect results from t-test of FB>FP. Table shows neural regions which are more responsive to false-belief than false-photo stimuli, pcorr < 0.05 
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(A)        (B) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Results: Belief-Desire Reasoning & Localizer Task Overlap Analysis 
(Panel A) Activation map for the contrast FB > FP (green) shown with the cluster maps from the belief-desire reasoning task, where the 
factors of Belief-Valence and Desire-Valence are represented by a single colour (red). Yellow areas indicate regions recruited for both the 
localizer and the belief-desire reasoning task. Each map is overlaid onto the MNI brain template and shows significantly activated voxels 
where Z > 2.3, pcorr < 0.05. (Panel B) Blue clusters reflect conjunction between localizer contrast FB > FP, and Belief-Valence Desire-
Valence factors B+/B- & D+/D-, pcorr < 0.05. Slices x = 52, z = 24. Images reflect Z-corrected t-stat images and are displayed in 
neurological convention, where left is represented on the left side of the image. 
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ROI Results 
 As bilateral TPJ were the only regions identified for both mental representation 
(localizer) and variation in mental state valence (belief-desire task), we focused ROI analyses 
on these areas. ROIs were identified using the localizer task in 18 of 19 individual participants 
in the rTPJ and 18/19 in lTPJ. ROI analysis was conducted on data from the belief-desire 
reasoning task and a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the mean PSC data for 
each ROI (Fig. 6). The right TPJ’s response was higher when reasoning about a false than a 
true belief (F(1,17) = 20.43, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.55) and higher for avoidance versus approach 
desire (F(1,17) = 9.47, p <  0.01, η2 = 0.36). No interaction existed (F(1,17) = 2.87, p = 0.11, 
η2 = 0.14). Similar effects were detected in lTPJ where it’s response was higher when 
reasoning about a false- than a true-belief (F(1,17) = 12.73, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.43) and higher 
for avoidance- versus approach-desire (F(1,17) = 28.64, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.63), but no 
interaction existed between Belief- and Desire-Valence (F(1,17) = 1.97, p = 0.18, η2 = 0.10). 
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Fig. 6. Results: Belief-Desire Reasoning Region of Interest Analysis 
Error bars reflect +/-1 SE of the mean. Results from the ROI analysis, where ROI masks generated using the localizer task were applied to 
the belief-desire task. Group mean percentage signal change (PSC) per condition 
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DISCUSSION 
 Behavioural evidence suggests that negatively valenced mental states – false beliefs 
and avoidance desires – are more difficult to process than their positively valenced 
counterparts. On developmentally sensitive tasks, young children pass false belief and 
avoidance desire tasks at a later age than true belief and approach desire tasks (Cassidy, 
1998). Suitably adapted tasks demonstrate that adult participants, too, show a similar pattern 
of relative difficulty, reflected in response times and residual error rates (Apperly et al., 2011; 
German & Hehman, 2006). Moreover, in both children and adults, performance on such tasks 
is associated with independent tests of EC (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; German & Hehman, 
2006). The neuroimaging literature consistently identifies TPJ and mPFC as core ToM 
regions, but less is known about how activity in these regions is modulated by 
psychologically relevant differences between positive and negative valence. Likewise, little is 
known about how and when neurocognitive systems for EC are recruited in the service of 
different aspects of ToM. We addressed these issues in the current study by manipulating the 
valence of belief and desire states and by examining neural activity during the response phase 
of each trial, during which the behavioural costs of belief-desire reasoning have been 
observed on this task.  
Mental State Valence and the ToM Network 
Do our factors of Belief-Valence and Desire-Valence recruit any regions of the ToM 
network?  
 We set out to investigate how variation in the valence of belief and desire states affects 
recruitment of the ToM network. A whole brain analysis demonstrated that variation in 
mental state valence modulates activity in neural regions regularly implicated in general ToM 
tasks including temporoparietal, medial parietal and some prefrontal regions. This finding 
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converges with evidence from a small number of studies that suggest that these regions not 
only respond to ToM tasks in contrast to non-ToM baseline tasks, but also that their activity 
varies according to the valence of belief and/or desire (Abraham et al., 2010; Sommer et al., 
2007; van der Meer et al., 2011). Importantly, we find these effects during a canonical ToM 
task that requires participants to predict the action of an agent on the basis of belief and 
desire. 
 Alongside TPJ, anterior rostral areas of the mPFC are also commonly implicated in 
studies of ToM (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Lieberman, 2007; Mar, 
2011; Van Overwalle, 2009). Whilst belief and desire reasoning modulated dorsal areas of the 
medial frontal cortex – particularly dorsal ACC – our novel paradigm showed no activation in 
anterior rostral mPFC. This finding contrasts with the ToM localizer task, which did show 
activity in anterior rostral mPFC. We believe that this pattern may be understood on the 
hypothesis that rostral mPFC is recruited for ToM to the degree that participants must go 
beyond the information immediately available to them, making social inferences about traits 
and norms, engaging in self-reflection or episodic thinking about the past or future (Gilbert, 
Spengler, et al., 2006). Such requirements are common in laboratory tasks and in everyday 
ToM, but are not a necessary feature of ToM cognition. In our belief-desire task participants 
were directly informed of the character’s mental states, and the correct prediction of his or her 
action was wholly determined by deductive reasoning from this information. Thus, although 
participants needed to represent and reason about mental states, there was simply no need for 
inferences about traits, self reflection or episodic thinking. In contrast, the localizer task 
involved vignettes that, though short, did require participants to construct a situational context 
in which the character’s mental states might be inferred. We suggest that it may be this need 
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for elaborative processing that results in the recruitment of rostral mPFC in the service of 
ToM inferences. 
Mental State Valence and Neural Regions for Executive Control 
 If our factors of Belief-Valence and Desire-Valence recruit regions of the ToM network, is 
this just because those regions are involved in attention/executive control, not because they 
are involved in ToM per se? 
 There are three main alternate explanations as to the role of TPJ in ToM. One is that 
this region responds specifically to transient mental states, regardless of their content or 
status; thus, TPJ may be specialised towards ToM (e.g., Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van 
Overwalle, 2009). Support for this theory is found in data which pinpoint TPJ for a variety of 
ToM, but not control, tasks. This includes the attribution of beliefs (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 
2009; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Scholz et al., 2009) and, although 
little explored, desires (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). The second possibility is that TPJ may 
regulate the distinction between self and other (e.g., Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Decety 
& Lamm, 2007). Activation of TPJ is a consistent feature of both mentalizing and seemingly 
disparate tasks such as the inhibition of imitative behaviour. It has therefore been suggested 
that TPJ is recruited for situations which require a person to disengage self from other, so that 
an individual can appropriately assign behaviours or mental states as belonging to an external 
agent. Lastly, it has been suggested that TPJ activation is observed in ToM tasks because TPJ 
supports domain-general processes that are unintended confounds of ToM tasks, such as 
reorienting spatial attention away from miscued locations (e.g., Mitchell, 2007; Rothmayr et 
al., 2011). When applied, for example, to a false belief scenario, this process might reflect the 
need to redirect one’s attention from location A (“true” location) to location B (“false” 
location). It is suggested that, as a result, ToM and exogenous attention tasks mutually 
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activate right TPJ, which indicates that there may be some shared attentional component 
between ToM and spatial reorienting (Mitchell, 2007; Rothmayr et al., 2011). 
 Our findings do not fit well with the last of these three possibilities. The localizer task 
subtracted activation observed during false belief trials (which involve reasoning about false 
beliefs and management of attention between “false” and “true” locations) from activation 
observed during false photograph trials (which involve reasoning about photographs that are 
outdated/false and management of attention between “false” and “true” locations). Since the 
need to manage attention between “false” and “true” locations is present in both the false 
belief and false photograph conditions, and indeed, appears present to a similar degree, little 
activation due to such attention management is likely to survive the subtraction between these 
conditions. Instead, the surviving activation is more likely to be due to a difference between 
reasoning about false beliefs compared with false photographs. It is noteworthy, then, that this 
surviving activation in bilateral TPJ overlaps substantially with regions modulated by our 
novel belief-desire task. We think it unlikely that the common activation across these 
comparisons is due to a confounding requirement to reorient attention that has nothing to do 
with ToM. 
 Our findings also pose a challenge for the claim that TPJ is specialised for ToM and 
responds specifically to such transient mental states, regardless of their content or status (e.g., 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009), because we found that activity in these 
regions was modulated by the valence of both beliefs and desires. However, our findings 
might be reconciled with this theoretical interpretation by supposing that TPJ is playing a 
similar functional role across these conditions, but its activity is up- or down-regulated by the 
relative difficulty of the different belief-desire conditions. The participants in the present 
study were slower to respond to both false belief and avoidance desire scenarios, and for this 
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reason alone, activity in TPJ may have been held high for longer, or held higher overall. A 
further possibility is that TPJ is playing distinct functional roles across our belief and desire 
conditions, due to differential demands of representing true versus false beliefs and approach 
versus avoidance desires, or of making action predictions on the basis of this information. 
One potential source of differential demands is the need to maintain a distinction between self 
and other (e.g., Brass et al., 2009; Decety & Lamm, 2007), though this need varies much 
more obviously between true and false beliefs than between positive and negative desires. 
What is potentially interesting in this general interpretation is that it offers a way of 
combining the insights of the other two: on the one hand TPJ recruitment during ToM tasks 
may not be due to confounding demands on attentional control in ToM tasks, on the other it 
may be that attentional control is intrinsic to ToM problems, not least in order to maintain and 
switch between representations of self and other. 
Neurocognitive Processes for Belief and Desire 
Do we observe differential activation of EC regions due to the Belief-Valence factor 
compared with the Desire-Valence factor? 
 Leslie and colleagues find that false belief and avoidance desire will attract greater 
processing costs than true belief and avoidance desire (Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Friedman & 
Leslie, 2005; Leslie et al., 2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). Our data converge with these 
findings and the wider literature on behavioural performance in adult belief-desire reasoning 
(Apperly et al., 2011; German & Hehman, 2006). Leslie and colleagues additionally specify 
that belief and desire reasoning is supported by a common process (termed a ‘selection 
processor’ in their account) which directs executive selection resources in attentionally 
demanding situations, for example, when attributing negatively valenced mental states. Our 
data are consistent with this idea and identify ACC as a possible candidate for EC processes 
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associated with such variation in task difficulty. Whilst most extensively examined in the 
cognitive literature (e.g., Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, 
Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Carter et al., 1998), ACC is increasingly acknowledged to play an 
important role in supporting social cognition (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Lieberman, 2007). 
Converging electrophysiological and neuroimaging data suggest a functional division within 
ACC, where dorsal areas subserve conflict monitoring and error detection, and rostral-ventral 
areas are primarily involved in the assessment of motivational or emotional information 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995). For 
the present experiment, both the valence of both belief and desire states was shown to 
modulate activation in dorsal ACC, suggesting that reasoning about very basic belief and 
desire states draws on a common cognitive process. As seen in our behavioural data, 
manipulation of mental state valence yielded processing costs in terms of error rates and 
response latencies. On this basis we propose that dorsal ACC indexes conflict (between self 
and other perspectives, and between the agent’s belief about the object and his desire to avoid 
it) in order that further executive processes, such as inhibition and selection, may be initiated.  
 We have suggested that increased attentional demands may help explain behavioural 
difficulty with negatively valenced mental states, but it may be that this does not exhaust the 
role of EC in ToM. As described in the introduction, a growing body of research suggests that 
participants will be slower and more error prone when holding in mind mental states which 
are incongruent with their own self perspective, such as a false belief or conflicting (not 
merely avoidance) desire state (Ruby & Decety, 2003; Samson et al., 2005; van der Meer et 
al., 2011). In the present study, we manipulated congruence with self other perspectives by 
asking participants to make predictions about a protagonist’s behaviour in true and false belief 
scenarios. In contrast, our manipulation of approach versus avoidance desire did not result in 
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differences in congruence of self and other perspectives, and so did not vary the need for self-
perspective inhibition. 
 Belief-Valence, but not Desire-Valence, was seen to recruit the most inferior parts of 
bilateral vlPFC. Variation in the conflict between the perspectives of the participant and of the 
agent was manipulated in the Belief-Valence, but not Desire-Valence, condition. Thus, our 
data are consistent with the view that activation in vlPFC is modulated by variation in the 
need for self perspective inhibition, and show that this is a critical difference between true and 
false belief trials, as well as between false belief trials between which the salience of self-
perspective is experimentally varied (Samson et al., 2005; van der Meer et al., 2011). The 
present dataset therefore provides strong evidence for a distinct role for EC beyond the 
generic control of attention during ToM tasks. In addition, EC is necessary when a 
perspective difference between self and other exists, as is the case for false belief. This 
converges with behavioural data from the current study and others indicating that knowledge 
of the true state of affairs interferes with the ability to select the believed (i.e. false) location, 
when the real and believed location are incongruent, giving rise to the well-known 
phenomenon of egocentric biases and errors (Bernstein et al., 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2004; 
Birch & Bloom, 2007; Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991). The process of inhibiting this self 
perspective, we suggest, specifically recruits vlPFC.  Importantly, such activity would 
necessarily be missed in studies using the best-controlled comparisons between ToM and non-
ToM tasks. For example, it would not be observed in the Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) ToM 
localizer because both the false belief and the false photograph conditions require inhibition 
of self perspective, and so any associated activation would be lost in the subtraction of one 
condition from another. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The present study provides evidence that converges with and extends a number of 
findings concerning the functional and neural basis of ToM. We find evidence that activation 
in TPJ is modulated by the valence of mental states, suggesting that this region is not 
responsive to transient mental states per se (e.g., Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van Overwalle, 
2009), but rather the content of such mental states. We find evidence that the mere 
requirement to represent a mental state may be insufficient to recruit rostral mPFC, but that 
this region is recruited when mental states need to be inferred on the basis of contextual 
information, consistent with Amodio and Frith (2006); Van Overwalle (2009).We also find 
evidence of the recruitment of neural regions associated with EC, which converges with 
behavioural evidence that ToM problems often require domain-general EC processes, as well 
as processes that might be more specific to ToM (Apperly et al., 2008; Apperly et al., 2011; 
Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson et al., 1998; Cassidy, 1998; Friedman & 
Leslie, 2004; German & Hehman, 2006; Leslie et al., 2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Perner & 
Lang, 1999). 
 The present study significantly extends understanding of the relationship between 
ToM and EC, and the neural systems that support these abilities. ToM problems that 
participants find more difficult to solve – such as those involving false belief and avoidance 
desire – result in greater activity in neural systems involved in attentional control, such as 
ACC, and also in parts of the “ToM network”, such as TPJ. Importantly, this effect of general 
difficulty can be distinguished from a more specific effect due to the need to resist 
interference from self perspective. This need only arises when there is a perspective 
difference between self and other – as in the false belief condition of the current study – and 
appears to recruit vlPFC in a distinctive manner. Nonetheless, additional work is required to 
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further examine the role of EC in ToM and, in particular, the involvement of vlPFC in 
inhibition of self-perspective. The use of an established EC paradigm in parallel with a tightly 
controlled ToM task, such as was presented here, would advance our understanding of the 
neural basis of those domain-general processes that support ToM. Moreover, specific 
manipulations in terms of desire reasoning, where an agent’s desire state is made 
systematically congruent or incongruent with self, would serve to further delineate the role of 
vlPFC in inhibition of self-perspective.  
 In sum, we demonstrate how the virtues of subtractive, “localizer” methods and 
methods that allow psychologically relevant parameters to be varied orthogonally may be 
combined to give a deeper understanding of the cognitive and neural basis of ToM than would 
be possible with either method alone. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
REPRESENTATION, CONTROL OR REASONING? DISTINCT FUNCTIONS FOR 
THEORY OF MIND WITHIN THE MEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX
5
 
                                               
5 This chapter is published: Hartwright, C. E., Apperly, I. A., & Hansen, P. C. (2013). Representation, Control, 
or Reasoning? Distinct Functions for Theory of Mind within the Medial Prefrontal Cortex. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00520 
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ABSTRACT 
The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is frequently reported to play a central role in Theory of 
Mind (ToM). However, the contribution of this large cortical region in ToM is not well-
understood. Combining a novel behavioural task with fMRI, we sought to demonstrate 
functional divisions between dorsal and rostral mPFC. All conditions of the task required the 
representation of mental states (beliefs and desires). The level of demands on cognitive 
control (high versus low) and the nature of the demands on reasoning (deductive versus 
abductive) were varied orthogonally between conditions. Activation in dorsal mPFC was 
modulated by the need for control, whereas rostral mPFC was modulated by reasoning 
demands. These findings fit with previously suggested domain-general functions for different 
parts of mPFC, and suggest that these functions are recruited selectively in the service of 
ToM. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 Theory of Mind (ToM) is a term used to describe the ability to attribute mental states 
such as beliefs, desires and intentions to other individuals. By applying a ToM, social agents 
are better able to predict the behaviour of those around them, and may additionally direct our 
own behaviour in terms of whether we choose to deceive, cooperate, or empathise with others 
(Gallagher & Frith, 2003). This ability to ‘mentalize’ has received much attention from the 
neuroimaging community over the last decade, and has identified a set of brain regions that 
are consistently responsive when thinking about the contents of other people’s minds: the left 
and right temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial parietal cortices including the precuneus and 
posterior cingulate, the temporal poles and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (for reviews 
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see Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Lieberman, 2007; Mar, 2011; Van Overwalle, 2009). The 
most prominent debate within the literature, however, surrounds how medial prefrontal and 
temporoparietal regions support a functioning ToM.  
  One challenge for social neuroscientists is to localise ToM processes more precisely 
by identifying functional subdivisions within the anatomical regions associated with ToM. 
mPFC, in particular, comprises a large area of the cortex and is involved in many aspects of 
social cognition (Amodio & Frith, 2006), together with an array of executive processes such 
as reallocation of attention, action monitoring and control (Lieberman, 2007; Ramnani & 
Owen, 2004; Rushworth, Buckley, Behrens, Walton, & Bannerman, 2007), relational 
integration and multitasking (Gilbert, Spengler, et al., 2006; Ramnani & Owen, 2004), 
outcome monitoring (Gilbert, Spengler, et al., 2006), working- and episodic-memory (Gilbert, 
Spengler, et al., 2006; Lieberman, 2007; Ramnani & Owen, 2004; Spreng et al., 2009) and 
default mode or spontaneous ‘at rest’ cognition (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Ramnani & Owen, 
2004; Spreng et al., 2009). Since ToM is a social process but undoubtedly also entails 
executive processing, attention and reasoning (Apperly, 2011), it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the role of mPFC in ToM remains unclear (Rothmayr et al., 2011). 
 
ToM: A Task Analysis 
 It is likely that activation of mPFC in some ToM tasks reflects executive processes 
that are an incidental feature of the task used to present the ToM problem, and thus do not 
constitute core processes which underlie ToM. Nonetheless, there are also good reasons for 
believing that specific sub regions of mPFC are more centrally involved in ToM. A task 
analysis of ToM suggests three processes which may explain how specific regions of mPFC 
are involved in mentalizing. First, a common theme across all forms of ToM reasoning is the 
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requirement for representation of a mental state. Thus, regardless of whether an individual is 
asked to reason about an agent’s belief, desire, intention, or the like, it is necessary to 
represent a mental state of some kind. The frequency with which more rostral areas of mPFC 
are recruited for ToM and other social cognitive functions has lead researchers to tentatively 
suggest that mPFC might subserve such a process (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 
2006; Frith & Frith, 2003). Other data suggest that TPJ may be even more selectively 
responsive than mPFC to representation of mental states (Aichhorn et al., 2009; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Scholz et al., 2009). Resolution of this debate is 
unnecessary for our current purposes. What matters for now is that there are grounds to 
suppose that mPFC may be involved in representation of mental states, and that it is possible 
to distinguish this representational requirement, which attends all ToM tasks, from other 
important requirements for cognitive control and reasoning, which vary across ToM tasks or 
experimental conditions.  
 Second, a large body of behavioural and neural evidence indicates that ToM is 
associated with processes for cognitive control (e.g., Apperly, 2011; Lieberman, 2007). 
Control processes for inhibition, conflict monitoring and working memory are not only 
necessary for meeting the demands of the relatively complex stories or cartoons frequently 
used to study ToM, but also seem to be essential for ToM per se. For example, in the classic 
false belief paradigm (see Wimmer & Perner, 1983), an agent holds an outdated, or ‘false’, 
belief about reality. Predicting the agent’s action requires participants first to infer that the 
agent’s belief is different from their own, second to hold this false belief in mind and not 
confuse it with their own knowledge, and third to predict the agent’s action selectively on the 
basis of the agent’s belief, rather than according to the participant’s own knowledge of the 
right course of action. Behavioural data from both children and adults suggest that the effort 
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required for ToM reasoning (as indexed by response times and error rates) depends upon 
whether an agent’s belief is true or false, and whether their desire is to approach or avoid a 
target object (Apperly et al., 2011; German & Hehman, 2006; Hartwright et al., 2012). 
Attempts to understand the neural basis of such effort consistently identify more dorsal 
regions of mPFC (dmPFC) approximating Brodmann Areas (BA) 8, 9 and 32. For example, 
dmPFC is modulated by contrasting ToM concepts where maximal conflict exists, as is the 
case in false belief reasoning versus reasoning about an agent whose belief is a ‘true’ 
representation of reality (Döhnel et al., 2012; Hartwright et al., 2012; Sommer et al., 2007).  
Importantly, recent evidence suggests that the contribution of frontal regions does not 
just vary according to overall task difficulty, but according to the source of that difficulty in 
the ToM task. In a recent study on which the present paradigm is based, participants predicted 
the action of an agent whose belief was either true or false, and whose desire was either to 
approach or avoid an object (Hartwright et al., 2012). Both factors have the potential to vary 
cognitive conflict, because both false belief and avoidance desire lead the agent into counter-
intuitive actions away from a salient target object. However, only the belief factor (true versus 
false) leads to systematic variation in perspective between the character and the participant. In 
this study dmPFC was modulated equally by the belief and desire factors, suggesting that it 
was performing a general role in resolving cognitive conflict. This contrasted with more 
lateral prefrontal regions, such as bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), which responded 
differentially to true- versus false-belief, but not to approach- versus avoidance-desire. These 
findings suggest that dmPFC underlies frontline control processes which monitor conflict 
during ToM reasoning, whereas other regions, such as IFG, are recruited for more specific 
processes such as inhibition of self-perspective. This theory about the contribution of dmPFC 
converges with neuroimaging research outside of the social domain which identifies mPFC, 
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particularly more dorsal regions including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), in 
conflict monitoring and error detection. It has been shown that activation in dmPFC is 
modulated by task difficulty, where those tasks that attract increased error-rates and response 
latencies make the most demands on this region (Botvinick et al., 2004; Botvinick et al., 
1999; Bush et al., 2000). 
 The final process we propose within our task analysis of ToM is the focus of the 
current study, and refers to the different roles of reasoning. Philosophers, Logicians and 
Computational Scientists have long debated the formulation of reasoning. These debates are 
beyond the scope of the present paper; however, we borrow two theoretical concepts in order 
to illustrate how different approaches to ToM can activate alternative modes of inference and 
their neural correlates. In the belief-desire task used by Hartwright et al. (2012), participants 
were told three facts for each trial: the agent’s belief about the location of an object, the 
agent’s desire to seek out or avoid the object and the true location of the object. Given this 
information, participants had to identify which location the agent would choose on the basis 
of his belief and desire state. Thus, participants had to reason “deductively”, so no reasoning 
beyond the facts explicitly presented was required (Morris, 1992; Pagnucco, 1996). Unlike the 
vast majority of neuroimaging studies of ToM, activation within rostral mPFC (rmPFC), 
approximating BA10, was noticeably absent from this deductive ToM paradigm.  
However, many ToM studies, and certainly a good deal of ToM outside of the 
laboratory, do not provide explicit access to all of the facts necessary to solve the task 
(Jenkins & Mitchell, 2009). Consequently, the individual is required to engage in open-ended 
“abductive” reasoning about an agent’s behaviour in order to use their ToM effectively.  
Consider a typical ToM vignette taken from Saxe and Andrews-Hanna (n.d.),  
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The morning of the high school disco Sarah placed her high heel shoes under her dress and 
then went shopping. That afternoon, her sister borrowed the shoes and later put them under 
Sarah's bed. 
- 
Sarah gets ready assuming her shoes are under her dress. 
True  False 
 
Unlike the deductive approach, reasoning here is used to explain an observation on the basis 
of a hypothesis, which may or may not turn out to be correct. Here, participants are required 
to reason abductively – that is to infer the most likely cause (Sarah’s belief that her shoes are 
under her dress), on the basis of the given effect (that Sarah gets ready unaware that her shoes 
might not be where she expects to find them) and a ToM principle (that Sarah will look for 
the shoes on the basis of her belief state). Here, then, reasoning is an inference to the most 
appropriate explanation (Menzies, 1996). Reasoning deductively, where one uses a set of 
rules and preconditions to generate a conclusion (Menzies, 1996), is likely to involve 
cognitive process that differ from an abductive approach involving reasoning to explain an 
observation (Morris, 1992). Whilst the neural basis of deductive reasoning has been studied 
extensively (see Prado, Chadha, & Booth, 2011 for a recent review), little work has been done 
for abductive inference. Nonetheless, when considered in terms of the underlying process of 
thinking beyond the given information, studies indicate that rmPFC is recruited when 
participants are required to reason beyond the constraints of the information immediately 
available to them (Gilbert et al., 2007; Hartwright et al., 2012; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2009), 
whether the context is social or non-social. This leads to the hypothesis that, rather than being 
involved in representing mental states, rmPFC is recruited whenever ToM tasks require 
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abductive reasoning. This would account for the frequent observation of rmPFC activation 
because abductive reasoning is very common in ToM tasks. 
 However, there is an alternative explanation for the lack of variable mPFC activation 
in Hartwright et al. (2012), that remains consistent with the hypothesis that rmPFC supports 
the representational demands of ToM, as touched upon earlier in our task analysis. The need 
to represent mental states was present across all conditions in Hartwright et al.’s deductive 
task; consequently, rmPFC might not be identified by orthogonal comparisons across 
conditions if this region generally services the process of representation. Therefore, the 
present study manipulates the need for abductive reasoning within-task in order to 
disambiguate these two possibilities. 
 In sum, there are multiple theoretical reasons for thinking that mPFC might be 
involved in ToM, and several competing hypotheses designed to account for this. 
Furthermore, there are grounds for thinking that there might actually be functional 
differentiation within mPFC, which a number of researchers have suggested would be best 
identified using a single, within-experiment, within-subjects design (Abu-Akel & Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011; Carrington & Bailey, 2009). The task analysis presented here proposes three 
separate processes for ToM: representation, control and reasoning. Representation, we argue, 
is a ubiquitous feature of mentalizing. Control and reasoning processes, conversely, vary 
across different ToM tasks. The latter two ToM processes lend themselves well to 
manipulation within a single, repeated-measures paradigm. Consequently, the present study 
served two purposes. First, to replicate Hartwright et al.’s earlier finding that dmPFC is 
modulated as a function of control. Second, by making a minimal change to our previous 
paradigm, we aimed to demonstrate that we could recruit the previously absent rmPFC by 
including a condition which required abductive reasoning. In order to achieve this, we present 
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a 2x3 repeated measures orthogonal design. The valence of an agent’s belief was either true or 
false; the valence of desire was either approach- or avoidance- (as in Hartwright et al., 2012), 
or it was unspecified. The novel, unspecified, condition required participants to reason about 
whether they thought the agent would have an approach- or an avoidance-desire, on the basis 
of what sort of person they thought the agent was. We expected those mental states where 
conflict is inherent, but presented unambiguously in our paradigm (i.e. false belief, avoidance 
desire), to preferentially recruit dmPFC. Conversely, a mental state that required abductive 
reasoning (i.e. desire unspecified), was expected to preferentially activate rmPFC. 
 
METHOD  
Participants  
 Twenty right-handed adults participated in the fMRI experiments (12 female; mean 
age = 21 years). All were native-English speakers and were given a small honorarium for their 
participation. The study had research ethics approval from the University of Birmingham.  All 
participants gave written consent to participate in the study.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
Pre-screen 
 A pre-screen to determine suitability to participate was conducted several days before 
collecting any neuroimaging data. This consisted of a handedness measure, using a modified 
form of the Annett Handedness Questionnaire (1970), and a reading scale – the Wide Range 
Achievement Test Third Edition (WRAT-3) – to ensure reading proficiency commensurate 
with the experimental tasks.  
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 Participants were informed that the social judgements task required them to make 
predictions about how real individuals played a game in a previous experiment. They then 
completed a computer based interactive training session and two test blocks of the social 
judgements experiment. Those who performed above chance
6
 on the test blocks were invited 
to participate in the fMRI experiment (see Appendix 1 for detailed participant screening 
information). Of twenty six prospective participants, 6 individuals (4 female; age range 18-24, 
   age = 21 years) were unable to perform the social judgements experiment to above chance 
at the pre-screen. These individuals were not invited to participate in the fMRI experiment. 
 
Social Judgements Experiment 
 The social judgments task was based on a paradigm devised by Apperly et al. (2011) 
and Hartwright et al. (2012). The experiment comprised an orthogonal design where a 
protagonist’s belief state (true (B+) or false (B-)) and desire state (approach (D+), avoid (D-) 
or unspecified (D±)) was systematically manipulated, resulting in six equally occurring 
conditions: B+D+, B+D-, B+D±, B-D+, B-D-, B-D±. Immediately prior to collecting any 
neuroimaging data, participants were again informed that the task was based on real game 
playing data from real individuals, and that the participant’s job was to predict how these 
individuals played the game. All participants then revisited the interactive training program 
used in the pre-screen and completed a further practice block outside of the MRI scanner. 
Note that none of the practice trials were used in the fMRI experiment. 
 The fMRI experiment required the participants to watch and predict which one of two 
different coloured boxes a character, referred to as ‘the contestant’, would open in a virtual 
game show. A single round (i.e. trial) of the game show consisted of the contestant being told 
                                               
6
 Chance at p < 0.05, based on a binomial distribution 
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what prize was on offer, followed by them guessing which one of the two boxes contained the 
prize, ending in them opening one box. The contestant would win whatever was in the box 
they opened; however, one box was always empty and the other always contained the prize. If 
the box contained a prize, they would win it. If it was empty, they would win nothing and 
play a new round.   
 Each contestant played multiple rounds. The prizes ranged in desirability and, as the 
contestant could only win a finite number of prizes, it was not always in their interest to play 
to win every prize.  If the contestant liked the prize on offer, they would open the box where 
they guessed the prize was hidden, in the hope of winning that prize. If they did not like the 
prize, they would open the opposite box to where they guessed the prize was hidden (i.e. the 
empty box), in the hope of having another chance to win something more to their liking. Note, 
however, that the game show was designed such that the contestant would only take home a 
prize in half of the trials. Furthermore, in half of the ‘winning’ trials, the contestant would win 
a prize that they did not actually want to win. 
 Whilst the fMRI data were collected, participants watched a computer based mock-up 
of the contestants playing the afore-described game show. The participants’ job was to predict 
which box the contestant opened on the basis of the contestant’s belief and desire state, in 
terms of which of the two boxes the contestant believed contained the prize, and the 
contestant’s desire to win or gamble and play on for a better prize. Participants were always 
told the contestant’s belief about the location of the prize and the true location of the prize, 
but had to infer the contestant’s desire to win the prize, based upon a colour photograph which 
depicted the contestant smiling (D+), frowning (D-) or with a neutral (D±) expression. The 
training sessions conducted prior to collecting any fMRI data taught the participants to treat a 
smiling face as signalling the contestant’s pleasure and, therefore, their desire to open the box 
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that they thought contained the prize (approach desire), and a frowning face as signalling the 
contestant’s displeasure and, therefore, their desire to avoid opening the box that they thought 
contained the prize (avoidance desire).  Where the contestant was shown with a neutral 
expression, participants were asked to consider what sort of person they thought the 
contestant was, in terms of what their likes and dislikes might be, and to select which box 
they thought the contestant would open (unspecified desire). Just as with approach/avoid 
(D+/-) trials, in these unspecified desire (D±) trials, participants were told to select the box 
that the contestant believed contained the prize if they thought the contestant would have 
played to win the prize on offer, or to select the opposite box (i.e. what the contestant believed 
to be the empty box) if they thought the contestant would have wanted to avoid winning the 
prize. Note that in all cases, participants were told to make their responses on the basis of the 
contestant’s belief state, which could be either true (B+) or false (B-), therefore requiring 
them to ignore their own knowledge of the true location of the prize.  
 Each block of trials opened with an instruction screen followed by an initial 
interstimulus interval (ISI) of 11600 ms. A single trial comprised three centre justified 
statements shown singularly for 1600 ms and separated by a 500 ms fixation period, followed 
by a picture response probe shown for 2500 ms, then a rest period. A variable ISI was used 
for rest (range = 9000-14000 ms,     = 11500 ms) during which a small fixation dot was 
displayed. Each trial lasted 8800 ms, excluding fixation. The experiment comprised 6 separate 
blocks, each of which contained 28 trials and took 9 m 36 s to complete. 
 Each trial opened with a prize statement (e.g., The prize on offer: designer shoes), 
followed by either a belief statement (e.g., The contestant thinks the prize is in the red box) or 
a reality statement (e.g., The prize is in the blue box), then the remaining belief or reality 
statement. The temporal order of belief and reality statements was randomised, but contained 
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an equal number of each ordering overall. The final statement was followed by a response 
probe then rest. Participants were able to respond from the onset of the response probe, using 
a two button box placed in their right hand. Participants responded by pressing the left button 
to indicate the left prize box and the right button to indicate the right prize box. 
 Two formats of response probe were used. The format indicated to the participant 
what type of response to give. If a full colour photograph of the contestant was shown, the 
participant had been trained to indicate which box they thought the contestant opened, based 
upon the contestant’s belief-desire state. These were the trials of interest and made up 75% of 
the total number of trials. In order to ensure that the participants must attend to the 
contestant’s belief state, regardless of whether it was true or false, anti strategy trials, termed 
herein ‘fillers’, formed 25% of the presented trials (see Hartwright et al., 2012 for further 
discussion). Here, the response probe consisted of a full colour photograph of the contestant, 
which had been blurred using a Gaussian smoothing kernel of 10 pixels FWHM. A black 
question mark obscured part of the contestant’s face. Participants had been trained to indicate 
the true location of the prize when this format of response probe was shown. These fillers did 
not form any part of the analyses presented here.    
 Images of the contestants were taken from the Radboud Faces Database, (Langner et 
al., 2010). 28 contestant’s featured in the experiment (all Caucasian; 14 male), where each 
face was shown on 6 occasions throughout the experiment, once per block. Each facial 
expression – happy, sad, neutral – was shown twice for each face.  Each image consisted of a 
head and shoulders shot on a plain grey background. All contestants were wearing a plain 
black t-shirt. Each participant viewed a total of 168 rounds of the game show, made up of 126 
trials of interest and 42 anti-strategy fillers, each with a unique prize, presented over the 6 
blocks. Fig. 7 outlines the structure of the social judgements paradigm. 
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Fig. 7. Method: Social Judgements Paradigm 
(Panel A) Schematic example of a single trial. The left/right presentation of the red/blue box was randomised. Where XXX is written for 
the prize on offer, this would name a unique item for each trial, e.g., The prize on offer: hot tub (Panel B) Example statements for true (B+) 
and false (B-) belief scenarios. The temporal order of these statements was randomised. (Panel C) From left to right, example response 
probe for approach- (D+), avoidance- (D-), unspecified-desire (D±) and filler trials. 
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Data Acquisition 
 Data were acquired in a single session using a 3T Philips Achieva scanner, with an 8 
channel head coil. Whole brain coverage was achieved with the following parameters: TR = 
2.5 s, TE = 35 ms, acquisition matrix = 96 x 96, flip angle = 83°, SENSE factor = 2. 232 T2*-
weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) volumes were obtained per block of the experiment, each 
of which consisting of 42 axial slices obtained consecutively in a bottom up sequence, 
reconstructed voxel size = 3x3x3mm
3
.  Four dummy volumes were acquired at scan time; 
these were removed prior to image reconstruction. Following acquisition of the functional 
data, a T1-weighted anatomical image was acquired (3D TFE, sagittal orientation, TR=8.4 
ms, TE=3.8, matrix size 288x288, 175 slices, reconstructed voxel size = 1×1×1mm
3
). During 
the acquisition of functional data, Presentation software (v. 14.1; Neurobehavioral Systems, 
CA) was used to display the stimuli and record the behavioural response data simultaneously. 
 
Whole Brain Analysis 
 The FMRIB software library (FSL version v.5.98; FMRIB, Oxford, 
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) was used to perform all preprocessing and statistical analyses. 
Preprocessing of the functional data consisted of slice timing (regular up) and motion 
correction (MCFLIRT). High-pass filtering was conducted on the blood oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) signals using a Gaussian weighted filter of 30 s. Spatial smoothing was 
then applied using a 5mm full-width-half-maximum kernel. The functional data were 
registered to their respective structural images and transformed to the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) reference brain using a 7-DoF linear transformation (FLIRT). 
 The modelling approach replicates the procedure outlined in Hartwright et al., (2012), 
which allows direct comparison following the minimal change to our previous paradigm. Six 
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explanatory variables (EVs) of interest – B+D+, B+D-, B+D±, B-D+, B-D-, B-D± – were 
modelled to reflect the six experimental conditions. The onset of each EV was time locked to 
the button response and reflected an arbitrary duration of 100ms. Due to anticipated 
differences in reaction times as a function of experimental condition, this approach ensured 
that activation reflected the decision making phase within the experimental sequence.  This 
approach mirrors Hartwright et al. (2012) which was adopted following careful inspection of 
time series data. Each EV was convolved with a gamma derived haemodynamic response 
function (HRF) within a general linear model framework (GLM). The time series prior to the 
onset of the response probe was modelled as a regressor of no interest and orthogonalised 
with respect to the main EVs. Motion parameters and filler trials were also modelled as 
regressors of no interest. Higher level modelling was used to aggregate the data across 
participants within a mixed effects (ME) model using cluster based thresholding at voxel Z > 
2.5, cluster pcorr < 0.001.  Note that this particular threshold was applied for ease of 
comparison with the earlier published version of this paradigm. This final whole brain result 
reflected a 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA with Belief (B+/B-) and Desire (D+/D-/D±) as 
within subjects factors, plus 8 contrasts for directional tests comparing the levels of each main 
factor (e.g., B+ > B-, B- > B+ etc).  
 
Contrast Masking Analysis 
 In order to demonstrate voxels which were preferentially active for each of the three 
levels within the factor of desire, using FSL’s command line tools (fslmaths), the corrected, 
thresholded data from the directional whole brain analysis were used as inputs to generate 3 
masks, D+pref,  D-pref  and D± pref . This was done by computing a logical AND which 
collapsed across the pairs of directional contrasts for each level (i.e., D+pref = D+ > D- AND 
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D+ > D±; D-pref  = D- > D+ AND D- > D±; D± pref  = D± > D+ AND D± > D-). Note that this 
analysis was not required for the factor of belief, as the directional contrasts serve this 
purpose (B+pref = B+ > B-; B-pref = B- > B+). The mean effect across all conditions was also 
computed for significantly active voxels within a bisected region of interest (slices X = -10 
through to +10; MNI coordinates). This enabled identification of voxels which were 
preferentially active for unspecified-desire (D±) versus all other belief (B+/B-) and desire 
(D+/D-) conditions within mPFC.  
 
RESULTS 
Behavioural Data  
 All reaction times (RTs) were recorded from the onset of the response probe. Any 
incorrect responses were removed for RT analysis. Note that correct responses are only 
applicable in D+/D- trials as D± requires a subjective judgement. A 2x3 repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted on the remaining RT data, with Belief (B+/B-) and Desire (D+/D-
/D±) as within subjects factors. This revealed significant main effects of Belief, where B- > 
B+ (F(1,19) = 166.65, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.90) and Desire, where D± > D- > D+ (F(1,19) = 
99.40, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.84), and a significant interaction (F(2,38) = 4.86, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.20). 
Simple effects analyses revealed significant effects of belief at each level of the factor of the 
desire, and significant effects of desire at the two levels of the belief factor, (all ps < 0.01); 
however, with the interaction being accounted for by the effect of belief being largest when 
desires were negative. A further two-way ANOVA was computed on the error data, with 
Belief (B+/B-) and Desire (D+/D-) as repeated measures. This identified a main effect of 
Belief, where errors B- > B+ (F(1,19) = 6.68, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.26) and Desire, where errors D- 
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> D+ F(1,19) = 8.35, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.31). No interaction was identified (F(1,19) = 0.20, p = 
0.66, η2 = 0.01). Fig. 8 summarises the mean RT (Panel A) and accuracy data (Panel B) . 
 
fMRI Data 
Whole Brain Analysis 
 A 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA identified main effects of Belief (B+/B-) and 
Desire (D+/D-/D±) but no interaction between the two factors. Manipulation of an agent’s 
belief state replicated our previously published findings (Hartwright et al., 2012), yielding 
regions regularly implicated in ToM such as bilateral TPJ and precuneus. Variation of an 
agent’s belief state modulated considerable portions of the frontal cortex including bilateral 
dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices spanning middle frontal and inferior frontal 
gyri, extending to orbital frontal cortex. This factor also recruited bilateral dorsal medial 
frontal regions comprising superior frontal, dorsal anterior cingulate and dorsal paracingulate 
gyri (Table 4; red shading Fig. 9). Similar to belief reasoning, manipulation of an agent’s 
desire state also recruited bilateral temporoparietal junction. However, lateral and medial 
prefrontal regions were recruited more extensively; thus, encompassed bilateral frontal poles 
on the lateral and medial surface, as well as rostral medial frontal regions including more 
ventral sections of the anterior cingulate and paracingulate gyri. Unlike the belief condition, 
variation of an agent’s desire state also saw extensive recruitment of occipital regions 
spanning bilateral occipital poles to anterior occipital regions such as the calcarine cortex 
(Table 4; green shading Fig. 9).
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(A)         (B) 
 
Fig. 8. Results: Social Judgments Task Behavioural Data 
Error bars reflect +/-1 SE of the mean. (Panel A) Group mean reaction time per condition for correct responses (ms). (Panel B) Group 
mean percentage of errors; error data not applicable to D±. 
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Table 4 Factorial Analysis of Belief and Desire  
Region 
  
Hemi 
  Brodmann 
Area 
  MNI coordinates    
Z-value 
      x y z   
Main effect of Belief                     
Temporoparietal Junction   R   22   54 -56 26   6.47 
Precuneus Cortex   R   7   2 -66 48   5.76 
Orbital Frontal Cortex   L   47   -32 26 -2   5.42 
Temporoparietal Junction   L   40   -52 -52 32   5.41 
Insular Cortex   R   47   46 16 -6   5.22 
Middle Frontal Gyrus   R   44   50 20 38   5.18 
Paracingulate Gyrus   L   8   -4 20 48   5.09 
Frontal Pole   R   46   38 52 18   5.03 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars opercularis   L   45   -48 16 0   4.97 
Precuneus Cortex   L   7   -6 -66 54   4.94 
Paracingulate Gyrus   R   32   2 42 28   4.86 
Middle Frontal Gyrus   L   44   -46 14 36   4.80 
Insular Cortex   L   47   -40 16 -6   4.40 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   R   9   2 40 42   4.38 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars opercularis   R   48   52 18 4   4.34 
Supramarginal Gyrus, anterior division   L   40   -54 -40 38   4.21 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   R   39   44 -60 52   4.18 
Supramarginal Gyrus, posterior division   R   40   48 -46 42   4.12 
Postcentral Gyrus   L/R   5   0 -54 72   3.52 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   L   6   -2 14 68   3.29 
Cingulate Gyrus, anterior division   L   32   -8 40 16   3.16 
                      
Main effect of Desire                     
Paracingulate Gyrus   R   8   2 24 48   8.34 
Paracingulate Gyrus   L/R   8   0 28 42   8.15 
Occipital Pole   R   18   22 -98 -2   7.42 
Occipital Pole   L   18   -24 -94 -8   7.16 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   L   8   -8 30 58   6.34 
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Orbital Frontal Cortex   R   47   36 24 -6   5.78 
Occipital Fusiform Gyrus   R   18   18 -84 -8   5.66 
Intracalcarine Cortex   R   17   14 -84 2   5.63 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   R   8   4 54 40   5.61 
Occipital Fusiform Gyrus   L   18   -14 -84 -12   5.59 
Middle Frontal Gyrus   R   45   52 28 24   5.57 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   L   19   -22 -86 20   5.56 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars opercularis   R   48   54 20 6   5.50 
Orbital Frontal Cortex   L   47   -38 22 -8   5.29 
Frontal Pole   R   46   24 56 22   5.07 
Cingulate Gyrus, anterior division   L/R   32   0 44 14   5.01 
Temporoparietal Junction   L   39   -46 -58 44   4.70 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis   L   45   -50 20 0   4.43 
Temporal Pole   L   38   -48 16 -10   4.28 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis   R   45   54 34 12   4.19 
Supramarginal Gyrus, posterior division   R   40   52 -44 48   4.04 
Frontal Pole   L   47   -50 34 -20   4.03 
Temporoparietal Junction   R   22   60 -58 26   3.96 
Middle Frontal Gyrus   L   44   -48 16 36   3.92 
Supramarginal Gyrus, anterior division   L   40   -42 -38 38   3.88 
Supramarginal Gyrus, posterior division   L   40   -42 -44 38   3.88 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars opercularis   L   45   -52 22 22   3.69 
Temporal Pole   L   38   -40 28 -24   3.62 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   R   39   54 -62 34   3.54 
Supramarginal Gyrus, anterior division   R   2   54 -32 48   3.43 
Postcentral Gyrus   L   40   -32 -36 42   2.59 
Note. Regions identified using F-contrasts in a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA with factors of Belief (B+/B-) and Desire (D+/D-/D±). Table lists local maxima for cortical 
regions which are modulated by varying belief status (true/false) and desire status (approach/avoid/unspecified) Z > 2.5, pcorr < 0.001. All anatomically unique local maxima 
(with minimum peak separation of 5mm) are listed. Brodmann Areas are approximate. 
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Fig. 9. Results: Social Judgments Task Whole Brain Analysis 
Result from 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA whole brain analysis with Belief (B+/B-; red) and Desire (D+/D±/D-; green) as within-
subjects factors. Yellow areas indicate regions recruited by both factors (B/D). The group data are overlaid on the MNI brain template, 
showing significantly activated voxels where Z > 2.5, pcorr < 0.001. Maps reflect Z-corrected F-stat images and are displayed in 
neurological convention, where left is represented on the left side of the image. (Panel A) Activation maps highlighting modulation on the 
lateral surface. Images from left to right show left, anterior, right, and posterior views of the cortex respectively. (Panel B) Selected slices 
highlight modulation in medial frontal regions. Slices from left to right, x = -10, -6, -2, 2, 6, 10.
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Directional and Contrast Masking Analysis 
 A series of directional contrasts (Table 5) demonstrated that bilateral temporoparietal 
junction, superior parietal and occipital cortices, plus lateral and dorsal medial frontal regions, 
were typically more responsive when applying false- over true-belief reasoning to an agent 
(Fig. 20A, B-pref). The only regions that were preferentially active for true- over false-belief 
reasoning were the left occipital pole and occipital cortex (Fig. 20A, B+pref). For desire based 
reasoning, contrast mask analyses indicated that bilateral occipital cortices and bilateral pre 
and post central gyri were preferentially responsive when applying an approach- versus 
avoidance- or unspecified-desire (Fig. 20B, D+pref). When the agent expressed an avoidance- 
versus an approach- or unspecified-desire, right precuneus was the only region to be 
preferentially recruited (Fig. 20B, D-pref). A large area covering medial and lateral prefrontal 
cortex was highlighted to be most responsive when the agent’s desire was unspecified, versus 
to approach or avoid. Medial frontal activation spanned anterior cingulate, dorsal and rostral 
medial prefrontal cortices, extending laterally to bilateral frontal poles (Fig. 20B, D±pref). As 
shown in Fig. 20C, rostral medial prefrontal cortex was preferentially active for unspecified 
desire over and above all of the other belief and desire states.  
Contrast Masking Analysis 
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Table 5 Directional Contrasts Within the Factors of Belief and Desire          
Region 
  
Hemi 
  Brodmann 
Area 
  MNI coordinates    
Z-value 
      x y z   
Belief                     
B+ > B-                     
Occipital Pole   L   18   -20 -94 -10   5.52 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   L   18   -24 -88 18   5.31 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, inferior division   L   19   -36 -90 -12   4.02 
                      
B- > B+                     
Temporoparietal Junction   R   22   50 -50 26   7.18 
Precuneus Cortex   R   7   2 -66 48   5.87 
Temporoparietal Junction   L   40   -52 -52 30   5.76 
Insular Cortex   R   47   44 16 -6   5.63 
Frontal Orbital Cortex   L   47   -32 26 -2   5.54 
Supramarginal Gyrus, posterior division   L   40   -44 -50 42   5.43 
Precuneus Cortex   L   7   -8 -64 50   5.38 
Occipital Pole   L/R   17   0 -92 -12   5.36 
Middle Frontal Gyrus   R   44   50 20 38   5.31 
Paracingulate Gyrus   L   8   -4 20 48   5.21 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars opercularis   L   48   -54 16 0   5.20 
Frontal Pole   R   46   38 52 18   5.17 
Middle Frontal Gyrus   L   9   -50 14 44   5.09 
Paracingulate Gyrus   R   32   2 42 28   5.00 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis   L   45   -60 22 8   4.96 
Temporal Pole   L   38   -52 16 -10   4.83 
Frontal Operculum Cortex   L   47   -44 18 -4   4.71 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   L/R   8   0 22 56   4.57 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   R   9   2 40 42   4.53 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars opercularis   R   48   52 18 4   4.49 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   R   39   44 -58 40   4.38 
Supramarginal Gyrus, anterior division   L   40   -54 -40 38   4.37 
Lingual Gyrus   R   18   4 -84 -16   3.97 
Postcentral Gyrus   L/R   5   0 -54 72   3.70 
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Desire                     
D+ > D-                      
Occipital Pole   L   18   -22 -94 -8   8.00 
Occipital Pole   R   18   22 -96 -2   7.49 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, inferior division   L   19   -36 -90 -12   5.60 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   R   19   12 -86 44   5.24 
Precentral Gyrus   L   6   -54 -2 46   4.85 
Precentral Gyrus   R   6   50 -8 54   4.48 
Postcentral Gyrus   R   4   4 -36 56   4.26 
Superior Parietal Cortex   R   5   20 -50 66   4.17 
Postcentral Gyrus   L   2   -28 -40 66   4.09 
                      
D+ > D±                     
Occipital Pole   L   18   -20 -96 -6   7.96 
Occipital Pole   R   18   22 -98 0   7.84 
Occipital Fusiform Gyrus   R   18   20 -82 -10   6.38 
Lingual Gyrus   R   18   16 -88 -6   6.11 
Occipital Fusiform Gyrus   L   18   -14 -84 -12   6.01 
Intracalcarine Cortex   R   17   14 -84 2   6.00 
Precentral Gyrus   L   6   -54 -2 46   5.27 
Precentral Gyrus   R   4   52 -4 38   4.61 
Postcentral Gyrus   R   3   24 -38 76   4.22 
Postcentral Gyrus   L   3   -24 -40 70   4.17 
Superior Parietal Cortex   R   5   20 -50 68   4.09 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   R   6   16 2 72   3.94 
Superior Temporal Gyrus, anterior division   L   21   -56 2 -12   3.53 
Planum Polare   L   38   -58 2 -2   3.52 
Central Opercular Cortex   L   48   -50 -2 8   3.25 
                      
D- > D+                      
Paracingulate Gyrus   R   8   2 24 48   8.06 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   R   9   2 40 42   7.17 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   L   8   -8 30 46   6.62 
Frontal Orbital Cortex   R   47   34 22 -8   6.50 
Middle Frontal Gyrus   R   45   52 28 24   6.48 
Insular Cortex   R   47   34 24 0   6.45 
Temporoparietal Junction   R   22   52 -56 26   6.39 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars opercularis   R   48   54 20 6   6.37 
Frontal Orbital Cortex   L   47   -32 24 -8   6.08 
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Temporoparietal Junction   L   40   -48 -52 42   5.61 
Precuneus Cortex   R   7   4 -68 42   5.35 
Supramarginal Gyrus, posterior division   R   40   52 -46 48   5.34 
Supramarginal Gyrus, posterior division   L   40   -46 -44 44   5.27 
Precuneus Cortex   L/R   7   0 -68 54   4.65 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   R   39   44 -58 50   4.53 
Precuneus Cortex   L   7   -8 -64 50   4.15 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   L   39   -50 -68 44   2.72 
                      
D- > D±                      
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   R   19   28 -80 24   4.43 
Supramarginal Gyrus, posterior division   L   22   -56 -46 10   4.42 
Occipital Pole   R   18   14 -88 22   4.39 
Supramarginal Gyrus, anterior division   L   40   -58 -38 32   4.36 
Intracalcarine Cortex   R   17   10 -70 14   4.29 
Occipital Pole   L   18   -18 -96 -2   4.14 
Cuneal Cortex   R   18   4 -84 32   4.11 
Precuneus Cortex   L   7   -4 -58 56   3.94 
Superior Temporal Gyrus, posterior division   L   21   -54 -30 -2   3.89 
Middle Temporal Gyrus, posterior division   L   21   -58 -24 -8   3.85 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, inferior division   L   37   -46 -70 2   3.73 
                      
D± > D+                     
Paracingulate Gyrus   R   8   2 24 48   8.67 
Paracingulate Gyrus   L/R   8   0 28 42   8.48 
Paracingulate Gyrus   L   32   -4 34 36   8.31 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   R   8   4 42 50   7.37 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   L   8   -4 28 60   7.11 
Insular Cortex   R   47   36 22 -6   6.17 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   L   39   -46 -60 36   5.63 
Temporoparietal Junction   L   39   -46 -58 42   5.29 
Cingulate Gyrus, posterior division   L   23   -2 -54 24   4.51 
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior division   R   22   60 -60 26   4.48 
Temporoparietal Junction   R   39   50 -58 28   4.37 
Supramarginal Gyrus, posterior division   L   40   -46 -50 52   3.83 
Supramarginal Gyrus, anterior division   R   2   54 -28 44   3.73 
Supramarginal Gyrus, anterior division   L   2   -46 -38 44   3.72 
Precuneus Cortex   R   7   2 -66 34   3.64 
Supramarginal Gyrus, posterior division   R   40   50 -44 54   3.52 
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Cingulate Gyrus, posterior division   L/R   23   0 -16 28   3.48 
Cingulate Gyrus, anterior division   L/R   23   0 -10 28   3.21 
Cingulate Gyrus, posterior division   L   29   -4 -48 14   2.85 
                      
D± > D-                     
Paracingulate Gyrus   R   32   2 50 26   5.97 
Paracingulate Gyrus   L/R   32   0 38 34   5.97 
Frontal Pole   L/R   10   0 60 30   5.72 
Frontal Pole   L   9   -16 40 48   5.39 
Superior Frontal Gyrus   L   8   -2 38 50   5.08 
Note. Table lists local maxima for cortical regions identified using a series of directional t-contrasts, where Z > 2.5, pcorr < 0.001. All anatomically unique local maxima (with 
minimum peak separation of 5mm) are listed. Brodmann Areas are approximate.  
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Fig. 20. Results: Social Judgments Task Contrast Masking Analysis 
The group data are overlaid on the MNI brain template, showing significantly activated voxels where Z > 2.5, pcorr < 0.001. Slices from left 
to right, x = -10, -6, -2, 2, 6, 10 respectively. Maps reflect Z-corrected t-stat images. (Panel A). Voxels which are preferentially active 
during true- versus false-belief reasoning (B+pref; cyan); false- versus true-belief reasoning (B-pref; red). (Panel B).  Voxels which are 
preferentially active during approach- versus unspecified- AND avoidance-desire (D+pref; blue); avoidance- versus approach- AND 
unspecified-desire (D-pref; magenta); unspecified- versus approach- AND avoidance-desire (D±pref; green). (Panel C) Voxels within the 
medial frontal cortex which are preferentially active for unspecified-desire versus all other belief and desire conditions. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The diverse array of social and non-social tasks that activate mPFC has meant that the 
precise role of this region in ToM has remained vague (Rothmayr et al., 2011). We employed 
an analysis of common features of ToM tasks to distinguish roles that mPFC might serve for 
representation, control and reasoning. The need to represent mental states was present in all 
task conditions, while the task made it possible for the first time to manipulate demands on 
control and reasoning within a single study. Our results suggest that dorsal and rostral regions 
of mPFC play distinctive roles in ToM control and ToM reasoning respectively, and that these 
patterns are consistent with the proposed functions of these regions in non-social tasks. 
 
Conflict Monitoring, Control and the dmPFC 
 On the basis of previous behavioural and neuroimaging work, we expected that greater 
control would be required when predicting action based on false- versus a true-belief, or a 
desire to avoid versus approach an object. Behavioural data from the current study were 
consistent with these predictions. The neuroimaging results converge with the general 
executive literature in pinpointing dmPFC, comprising dACC and paracingulate gyrus (PCG), 
in supporting these more cognitively effortful scenarios (Botvinick et al., 2004; Botvinick et 
al., 1999; Bush et al., 2000). Factorial analysis (Table 4, Fig. 9) showed that dmPFC was 
modulated by manipulating the content of specific ToM states. Investigation of the directional 
contrasts (Table 5) highlighted that these main effects were driven by those mental state 
concepts where the greatest need for control existed, such as false belief, avoidance- and 
unspecified-desire. Notably, the novel, unspecified desire condition attracted the greatest 
increase in response latencies, and made greater demands on dmPFC than both avoidance- 
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and approach-desire reasoning. We propose that this result is consistent with our suggestion 
that dmPFC serves conflict detection in support of control processes, because in order to 
predict the behaviour of the agent with an unspecified desire, participants would have to 
withhold any response until they had determined what they thought the agent’s preferences 
might be. Here, then, conflict exists not only between competing outcomes, such as the 
undesirable- versus the desirable-outcome, but also potentially between what the participant 
would do, and what someone like the agent would do in that particular situation. Taken 
together, then, these data are further evidence that dmPFC serves a very general control 
function, with more specific functions – such as inhibition of self-perspective – supported by 
other neural regions.  
 
ToM Reasoning and the rmPFC  
 Also of interest was the role of rmPFC in ToM. Existing literature, together with the 
task analysis presented here, suggests two possible roles for this region, and our task was 
designed to distinguish between them. First, the consistency with which rmPFC is recruited 
for ToM in previous research has led some authors to suggest that this region serves the 
function of representing mental states (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006; Frith & 
Frith, 2003). All conditions of our current paradigm required representation of the character’s 
mental states, and so this interpretation of the role of rmPFC does not predict any variation in 
activation across conditions. Second, a growing literature indicates that thinking beyond the 
stimuli presented recruits rmPFC even in non-social contexts (Gilbert et al., 2007; Jenkins & 
Mitchell, 2009). Thinking beyond the stimuli, and in particular so-called “abductive” 
inference to the best explanation, is a frequent requirement of ToM, both in tasks and outside 
of the laboratory. However, it is not a necessary feature, and it was not present in the belief 
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factor of the current task, while the desire factor included one level that required abductive 
reasoning (D±) and two levels that only required deductive reasoning (D- and D+).  
 Consistent with Hartwright et al. (2012), factorial analysis identified that manipulating 
an agent’s belief state did not modulate rmPFC (Table 4, Fig. 9). Thus, there was no 
difference in how reasoning deductively about an agent with a true- or false-belief state was 
handled by this region. In contrast to this, manipulation of an agent’s desire state was shown 
to modulate rmPFC. Note that this was not the case in our previous study, which did not 
require abductive reasoning in any condition. Directional and contrast masking analyses 
(Table 5, Fig. 20) were used to clarify which of the variations in mentalizing was driving this 
effect. rmPFC was shown to respond preferentially when reasoning about an agent whose 
desire was unspecified (D±), over and above any of the other deductive belief and desire 
conditions (Fig. 20C). Collectively, these data suggest that rmPFC is responsive to the 
requirement to reason abductively about mental states.  
 These findings converge with Jenkins and Mitchell (2009), who found that 
comprehension of a story whose causal structure was ambiguous or incomplete, rather than 
unambiguous and complete, preferentially recruited mPFC, including rmPFC. Such effects 
were found irrespective of whether the stories required inferences about a character’s mental 
states, and indeed it is unclear in this study whether rmPFC was recruited for the ToM 
inferences themselves or just for general comprehension of an ambiguous context. The current 
study provides important clarity on this point, by showing that rmPFC is indeed recruited for 
ToM inferences specifically in cases where abductive rather than deductive reasoning is 
required. In the broader social context, Van Overwalle (2009) notes that studies which invite 
richer inferences, such as trait ascription, recruit mPFC.  Relatedly, Quadflieg et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that rmPFC is recruited when reasoning about the type of person 
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(male/female/either), versus the type of place (indoors/outdoors/either) that is likely to be 
associated with an activity, such as mowing the lawn or watching talk shows. Thus, rmPFC 
was seen as an important neural substrate of the access and assignation of stereotype 
information. It is important to highlight, however, that this does not conflict with our assertion 
that rmPFC supports a general process that is engaged when reasoning abductively. A 
considerable literature demonstrates the automaticity of trait inferences and social 
categorisation (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), for example, on the basis of an image of a face 
(Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008), or when primed subconsciously (Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996). As such, all of our desire conditions featured the photographs of faces taken 
from a single database; our analyses would, therefore, subtract out those neural regions 
required for the attribution of stereotype schemas, as the potential for spontaneous trait 
ascription, including the automatic generation of stereotypes, is constant across all conditions. 
Our unspecified desire condition, on the other hand, is the only condition to require an 
abductive inference on the basis of such ascriptions.  When considered alongside a literature 
which implicates rmPFC in autobiographical thinking, for example, in terms of imagining 
past or future events versus simply recalling such occurrences, prospection and the default 
mode network (see reviews by Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2009), the commonality 
across these, and Jenkins and Mitchell (2009), is a shared process which reflects the 
assignation of information which is obtained through a rich, inferential process. The present 
paradigm varied the requirement for this process, by including a single, abductive reasoning 
condition alongside a series of deductive reasoning conditions. 
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Cognitive versus Affective ToM. 
 Qualitative reviews of the literature suggests a functional subdivision within mPFC, 
where a dorsal/rostral boundary may delineate cognitive- versus affective-ToM respectively 
(Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Amodio & Frith, 2006; Carrington & Bailey, 2009; 
Lieberman, 2007). Thus, belief reasoning would be expected to recruit more dorsal regions of 
mPFC, whereas desire reasoning would recruit rostral regions. Whilst the current data might 
initially appear to favour this distinction, we suggest that a simple cognitive/affective division 
provides less explanatory power for our data than the task analysis proposed here.  
 First, the present study suggests that it is likely to be the processing requirements 
within particular ToM concepts that modulate dmPFC (e.g., true versus false belief), rather 
than the cognitive or affective nature of the ToM concept. Our data identify that cognitively 
effortful situations involving false belief, avoidance- or unspecified-desire reasoning make 
greater demands on dmPFC than less effortful ToM situations such as true belief or approach 
desire. We suggest that this effort, seen in increased response latencies and errors, is a 
reflection of increased conflict between alternative predictions for the agent. Thus, increased 
effort is associated with increased demand on dmPFC, regardless of the type of mental state 
being represented.  
 Second, whilst only our affective (desire) condition recruited rmPFC, this region was 
preferentially engaged as a function of the reasoning demands within this condition, rather 
than the mere requirement to infer desires. Specifically, a context that required abductive 
inference about desire was associated with increased demand on rmPFC, compared with 
conditions that only required deductive inferences about desire. Our data show that rmPFC is 
brought in to serve context specific reasoning processes, such as when mentalizing beyond 
the information presented is required.  
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Representing Mental States 
 By definition, ToM requires people to hold in mind representations of mental states, 
and questions about this representational aspect of ToM have dominated thinking in the 
developmental, cognitive, comparative and neuroscience literatures (Call & Tomasello, 2008; 
Fodor, 1992; Leslie, 1987; Saxe & Powell, 2006). However, identification of the neural basis 
of such representations has proved a surprisingly elusive target, with ongoing debates about 
the relative specificity of mPFC versus TPJ for such representations (Aichhorn et al., 2009; 
Amodio & Frith, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 
2005; Scholz et al., 2009). The present study was not designed as a strong test of the neural 
correlates of representing mental states, as we did not include conditions without mental states 
for comparison. However, the current findings do add to a growing body of evidence 
suggesting that the mere representation of mental states is only part of the neurocognitive 
basis of ToM, in two important ways. First, other functional processes for cognitive control 
and reasoning are integral to ToM, and recruit neural regions supporting these processes in 
ways that can be predicted from functional analysis of ToM tasks. Second, even if a 
consensus does emerge on neural regions that are involved in representing mental states, it 
seems unlikely that this function will be sufficient to explain patterns of activity in those 
neural regions during ToM tasks. In the present study, mental states needed to be represented 
in all conditions, and yet we observed condition-wise variation in activity in the neural 
regions most often suggested to be the neural basis of representing mental states (rmPFC, and 
bilateral TPJ). Such variation can be understood by appeal to other functional aspects of ToM, 
such as the need for cognitive control, and the need for different kinds of reasoning. We 
suggest that this makes vivid the suggestion that ToM is subserved by a network, which may 
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be comprised of distinct functional and anatomical components, but whose activity can only 
be understood by considering the network as a whole, and the tasks in which it is engaged. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
A CAUSAL ROLE FOR RIGHT VENTROLATERAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX IN 
SELF PERSPECTIVE INHIBITION? A PERTURBATION STUDY OF BELIEF-
DESIRE REASONING  
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ABSTRACT 
Converging lesion and neuroimaging evidence suggests that ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(vlPFC) is involved in inhibiting self perspective when making certain Theory of Mind (ToM) 
judgments, such as when the belief information conflicts with own knowledge, typically as in 
false belief reasoning. The present study used a continuous Theta Burst Stimulation (cTBS) 
protocol to depress cortical excitability in right vlPFC, in order to identify a causal role for 
this region in inhibition of self perspective. An interaction effect between stimulation site and 
belief state was expected, where a behavioural cost was anticipated in false belief reasoning 
following cTBS to vlPFC, versus a control site. Despite replicating behavioural effects 
consistent with prior work, no effect of cTBS was identified. The null result is discussed in 
the context of localization difficulties with applying cTBS to vlPFC, and new evidence which 
calls into question the reliability of this particular Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
protocol.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The neural basis of mental state attribution, or Theory of Mind (ToM), has been 
studied extensively with fMRI, with considerable focus on a fronto-parietal network 
comprising medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Carrington 
& Bailey, 2009; Lieberman, 2007; Mar, 2011). Activation of these regions is posited to reflect 
the basic neural mechanisms required for representing the mind state of an agent.  
 Perturbation techniques, such as TMS, provide the opportunity to directly identify a 
causal relationship between brain and behaviour in a specified region of interest, for example, 
by causing a ‘virtual lesion’ alongside its associated behavioural consequences (Pascual-
 98 
 
Leone et al., 2000). Within the wider social cognitive literature, TMS has been used to 
demonstrate a causal role for the inferior parietal lobule in facial recognition (Uddin, Molnar-
Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2006) and movement attribution (Preston & Newport, 2008), for 
example, where disruption to this region using repetitive (r)TMS impairs the ability to 
distinguish between self and other. Single pulse TMS to the primary motor cortex, M1, has 
evidenced that motor evoked potentials during action-observation are relative to the muscle 
group and force requirements of the action observed, thus adding credence to the idea of a 
human Mirror Neuron System (Alaerts et al., 2010).  
 Most brain stimulation studies specific to mentalizing have focussed on dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), mPFC and TPJ (see Hétu, Taschereau-Dumouchel, & Jackson, 
2012). For example, rTMS to right dlPFC has been shown to reduce response latencies when 
making a belief inference, without any cost to response accuracy (Kalbe et al., 2010). rTMS to 
mPFC leads to faster recognition of emotions (Balconi & Canavesio, 2013) and an increase in 
the ability to make affective ToM judgements in individuals who report having low empathy, 
whilst impairing affective judgments in those who are highly empathic (Krause, Enticott, 
Zangen, & Fitzgerald, 2012). When applied to TPJ, rTMS impairs moral judgement, where 
knowingly causing harm to another is viewed as more permissible following stimulation. This 
effect is postulated to reflect interference in the ability to assimilate an agent’s belief state in 
relation to the actual outcome of an intentionally, but failed, harmful act (Young, Camprodon, 
Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010).  
 As researchers begin to examine the composite processes of ToM, interest is moving 
towards those coactive, but lesser studied, neural regions and the role that they might play in a 
functioning ToM. Activation in vlPFC, for instance, is readily present across multiple 
neuroimaging studies of ToM (e.g., see reviews Mar, 2011; Spreng et al., 2009), yet little 
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examined. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that vlPFC reflects ToM situations where there 
is a need to inhibit one’s own knowledge or experience (Hartwright et al., 2012; Lieberman, 
2007; Samson et al., 2005; van der Meer et al., 2011). For example, using a series of ToM 
vignettes, Vogeley et al. (2001) were able to modulate right vlPFC by varying the presence of 
the experimental participant as a key character in each vignette, thus suggesting that this 
region is recruited as a function of self perspective. Following on from this, patient WBA, 
despite a sizeable right frontal lesion, was able to pass false belief tasks provided that the 
salience of his own perspective was minimised. Thus, when the prepotent, ‘true’ state of 
affairs was undisclosed, patient WBA could successfully demonstrate an understanding of 
someone else’s belief state (Samson et al., 2005). These results were corroborated by van der 
Meer et al. (2011), who adapted the Samson et al. (2005) paradigm for use with 
neurologically intact participants. Their study identified bilateral vlPFC for high versus low 
salience scenarios and, within the same subjects, overlapping activation from a motor 
response inhibition task, suggesting some shared process between high salience ToM and 
response inhibition. Likewise, by contrasting classical unexpected transfer false belief 
scenarios with true belief scenarios, Hartwright et al. (2012) demonstrated that difficulty with 
certain mental states may, in part, reflect interference from incongruent self versus other 
knowledge, which is resolved in vlPFC. Using a single repeated measures ToM task, they 
highlighted that similarly difficult ToM states that do not feature incongruence between self 
and other perspectives do not modulate this region, suggesting that activation in vlPFC does 
not simply index the general difficulty of the task.  
 In sum, in terms of understanding the neural basis of self perspective inhibition in 
ToM, converging evidence from neuroimaging and neuropsychology implicate vlPFC in 
supporting this process. However, a causal role for vlPFC in self perspective inhibition is 
 100 
 
difficult to determine given the form of data available to date. The very nature of 
neuroimaging is that any neural activation deemed ‘significant’ reflects a model of best fit 
between a neural signal – typically the BOLD response – and stimulation. Although, in 
principle, more powerful inferences can be drawn from lesion studies, working with human 
subjects prevents access to small, anatomically circumscribed lesions. Thus, researchers are 
typically working with individuals who have suffered damage to relatively large, 
heterogeneous areas of cortex, as was the case in Samson et al. (2005). TMS, therefore, 
provides the next logical step in identifying a causal role for vlPFC in self perspective 
inhibition.  
 Whilst TMS has been applied to vlPFC frequently in the study of language processes 
(Gough, Nobre, & Devlin, 2005; Nixon, Lazarova, Hodinott-Hill, Gough, & Passingham, 
2004; Watkins & Paus, 2004) and executive functions, such as memory (Feredoes, Tononi, & 
Postle, 2006; Hong, Lee, Kim, Kim, & Nam, 2000) and response inhibition (Chambers et al., 
2007; Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, & Chambers, 2010), to our knowledge, it has not been used 
in this region in the context of self perspective inhibition. The present study used cTBS 
(Huang, Edwards, Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005), an offline TMS protocol which has 
been demonstrated effective for use on inferior frontal regions (Verbruggen et al., 2010). The 
cTBS protocol was selected as the neural time course of self perspective inhibition is little 
understood, therefore negating the use of online, single pulse TMS. Furthermore, the 
behavioural effects following cTBS, in particular, have been shown to last up to one hour, 
providing a longer lasting effect compared with other TMS protocols (Huang et al., 2005). On 
the basis of neuropsychological evidence suggesting that the right frontal cortex is involved in 
inhibiting self perspective (Samson et al., 2005), and that vlPFC, specifically, is associated 
with making ToM judgments when mental state information is distinct or incongruent with 
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own knowledge (Hartwright et al., 2012; van der Meer et al., 2011; Vogeley et al., 2001), the 
present study used TMS to disrupt right vlPFC. Application of TMS to vlPFC, versus to a 
control site, was expected to increase failure to resist interference from own perspective. 
Following TMS to vlPFC, an increased number of errors were expected in ToM states that 
contain perspectives which are maximally different between self and other, such as false 
belief. No effect following TMS to vlPFC was expected in ToM states which pose similar 
behavioural difficulty, but do not comprise incongruence between perspectives, such as 
avoidance desire (see Hartwright et al., 2012 for further discussion). In order to achieve this, 
we present a 2x2x2 repeated measures design, where the TMS Site (vlPFC/control), and the 
Belief (true/false) Desire state (approach/avoidance) of an agent was manipulated. A 
statistically significant TMS Site by Belief interaction, where the effect of TMS to vlPFC 
induced greater errors and response latencies in false belief reasoning, would support a causal 
role for vlPFC in the inhibition of self perspective.  
 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Twenty one right-handed adults (9 female; age range 19-28,    age = 22 years) 
completed all sessions of the TMS experiment. All were recruited through the University’s 
research participation scheme. All were given a safety information booklet regarding TMS 
and MRI prior to participating in the study and gave informed consent in line with the 
University of Birmingham research ethics. Each was paid a small honorarium for their 
participation.  
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Materials and Procedure 
Pre-screen 
 A pre-screen was carried out prior to data collection in order to identify suitable 
participants. Suitability was determined on the basis of a TMS-MRI safety screening 
questionnaire (see Appendices 1 and 2) and their ability to perform the Game Show 
experiment. Participants completed a computer-based, interactive training session that 
outlined the Game Show experiment then completed two practice blocks. Only participants 
who could perform above chance, at p < 0.05, in the practice blocks of the Game Show 
experiment were invited to participate in the TMS experiment (see Appendices 1 and 2 for 
detailed participant screening information). Of twenty seven prospective participants, 6 
individuals (4 female; age range 20-39,    age = 24 years) were unable to perform the Game 
Show experiment to above chance and thus did not participate in any of the TMS 
experiments. 
 
Game Show Experiment 
 The game show experiment was adapted from a paradigm devised by Apperly et al. 
(2011) and Hartwright et al. (2012). The task comprised an orthogonal design where the 
Belief (true (B+) or false (B-)) and Desire state (approach (D+) or avoid (D-)) of a protagonist 
was systematically manipulated. This resulted in four equally occurring conditions B+D+, 
B+D-, B-D+, B-D-. Immediately prior to applying the TMS, participants completed 8 practice 
trials. None of these practice trials were used in the TMS experiment. 
 The task required participants to watch a sequence of events on a computer and 
identify whether the protagonist, Simon, would feel happy or sad about the outcome of a 
game show (Fig. 21). For each round of the game show, Simon was told what prize was on 
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offer and shown two closed boxes. One box was always empty and the other always contained 
the prize, but Simon was blind to the contents of both. One box was opened at random and he 
would win the contents. Therefore, if the box was empty, he would win nothing for that round 
of the game show. Importantly, as Simon could only win a set number of prizes, he would not 
always want to win the prize as they varied in desirability, so an empty box could result in 
Simon being happy. 
 A single trial consisted of 5 events. The first event, a prize statement, was always 
displayed at the beginning of the sequence. Next followed three statements, shown singularly 
and in a random order. These were a belief, a desire and a reality statement (see Fig. 21B). 
The final event was always a response probe. This depicted Simon looking at the box that had 
been selected, which was either open or closed. Each experimental block contained 16 trials 
of interest. In these trials, the box was closed, meaning that Simon could not yet see the 
contents of the box. Here, participants gave a left/right button response indicating whether 
they thought Simon was happy or sad about the box that had been selected, on the basis of his 
belief-desire state regarding what it contained. A further 16 trials, herein termed ‘fillers’, were 
devised to prevent formulaic response preparation (see Hartwright et al. (2012) for further 
discussion). In filler trials, the box was open in the response probe, meaning that Simon could 
see the contents. Consequently, in this instance, participants needed to indicate whether 
Simon was happy or sad about the outcome of the game, on the basis of him knowing what 
the box contained and his desire to win the contents.  
 The participants completed 4 blocks of the game show task. Each block contained 16 
trials and 16 fillers, with an equal number of instances of each belief-desire state. This 
resulted in 64 trials of interest per participant, comprising 16 of each belief-desire condition, 
plus 64 fillers. Each trial lasted 12500 ms and was followed with a variable rest period (range 
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= 2000-3000 ms, mean = 2500 ms) which consisted of a blank screen. Presentation software 
(v. 14.1; Neurobehavioral Systems, CA) was used to randomise the presentation of trials, 
present the stimuli and record the behavioural response data simultaneously. The left/right 
presentation of the response text ‘happy’ ‘sad’ was consistent. 
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Fig. 21. Method: Game Show Task Paradigm 
(Panel A) Schematic example of a single trial. The vertical presentation of the box colour (red/blue) was randomised. The red star * 
indicates a blank screen shown for 500ms to reduce eyestrain. The colour (red/blue) of the final box in the sequence was randomised. In 
filler trials, the final element in the sequence depicted an open, rather than a closed, box. No other differences existed (see final event in 
Fig. 22. for an example). (Panel B) Example statements for true (B+) and false (B-) belief scenarios. The temporal order of these 
statements was randomised. Where text is written within [ ], this denotes that the statement would contain only one of those options, 
dependent on whether the trial was an approach (D+) or avoidance desire (D-) condition; e.g., He hopes to avoid the prize.  
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Control Task  
 To demonstrate that any effect of TMS was specific to the process of interest, a 
control task was devised using the stimuli from the main experiment (Jahanshahi & Rothwell, 
2000). In this computer based task, participants used the buttons on a computer mouse to state 
whether the image on screen showed an open or closed box (Fig. 22). Thus, the task 
comprised a repeated measures design where the Box State (open/closed) was systematically 
manipulated. A single trial comprised an upper-centre justified image depicting Simon 
looking at the game show podium. An image of either a red or blue box, which was open or 
closed, was shown mid-centre of the display. These images were exactly as the response 
probes used in the game show task. The lower left and right quadrants of the screen displayed 
the words ‘open’ or ‘closed’ respectively, to prompt a left/right button response. The left/right 
presentation of the response text was consistent. Participants were encouraged to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible upon seeing the image of the box. Each trial lasted for 2500 
ms and was followed with a variable rest period (range = 2000-3000 ms, mean = 2500 ms), 
which comprised a blank screen. These timings replicated those from the game show task. 
Participants completed 4 blocks of the control task, which contained 8 repetitions of each 
colour (red/blue) and box state (open/closed) combination, resulting in 32 trials per block and 
128 trials in total. The presentation of each trial type was randomised in real time by the 
display software, Presentation (v. 14.1; Neurobehavioral Systems, CA).  
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Fig. 22. Method: Control Task Paradigm 
Schematic example of three trials. Each trial is followed by a variable rest period, in which a blank screen is shown. The colour (red/blue) 
and state of the box (open/closed) was randomised.
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TMS Procedure 
 Prior to completing the first TMS session, a T1-weighted anatomical magnetic 
resonance (MR) image was acquired from each participant using a 3T Philips Achieva 
scanner. The participants then completed two TMS sessions, conducted over separate days. 
Each participant was assigned at random to receive TMS to either the site of interest – right 
vlPFC – or a control site around the vertex – Cz – first. All participants completed both target 
and control site sessions. The target site was described to participants as a ‘frontal site’ 
whereas the control site was described as a ‘parietal’ site. Participants were blind to the site of 
interest. Right vlPFC was identified using a group derived coordinate set from a previous 
ToM experiment conducted with different participants (Hartwright et al., 2012). The Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates, [50, 20, -6], were transformed into individual 
coordinate sets in the current participant group using a series of transformation matrices. The 
target site was then marked on each participant’s anatomical image using Brainsight 2, a 
system for frameless stereotaxy (v2.2; Rogue Research inc, Canada). The control site, Cz, was 
identified using skull landmarks and labelled with skin markers. A cTBS paradigm – as 
outlined in Huang et al. (2005) and Verbruggen et al. (2010) – was administered using a 
Magstim Rapid2 system (The Magstim Company, Whitland, UK) with a 70 mm figure-of-
eight coil. The output intensity was calibrated according to a proportion of the resting motor 
threshold, range 30-35% of maximum stimulator output. During stimulation, participants 
were seated with their chin lowered onto a padded rest. A padded block was placed at the left 
side of the head to minimise movement. For both TMS sites, participants completed 4 blocks 
of the game show task, which were interleaved with 4 blocks of the control task. The order of 
task presentation was counterbalanced, so that half of the participants completed a block of 
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the control task first, followed by the game show task. Behavioural testing following 
application of the TMS was completed in less than 45 minutes. 
 
RESULTS 
Game Show Experiment 
 The error data were input into a repeated measures ANOVA, with Belief (B+/B-), 
Desire (D+/D-) and TMS Site (vlPFC/control) as within subjects factors. There was no effect 
of Belief (F(1,20) = 2.17, p = 0.16, η2 = 0.10) or TMS Site (F(1,20) = 1.77, p = 0.20, η2 = 
0.08). A significant main effect of Desire was identified, where error rate in D- > D+ (F(1,20) 
= 9.00, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.31). No significant interactions between any of the factors were 
identified, including TMS Site by Belief (F(1,20) = 3.454, p = 0.078, η2 = 0.147). Fig. 23A 
illustrates the mean proportion of incorrect responses, across each condition and site.  
 Reaction times (RTs) were recorded from the onset of the response probe until a 
response was made. Only correct responses were used for RT analysis. Any data points that 
were 3 standard deviations outside of the participant’s condition mean, per TMS site, were 
considered anomalous and removed. This resulted in the exclusion of 0.1% of responses. A 
2x2x2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the remaining data, with Belief (B+/B-), 
Desire (D+/D-) and Site (vlPFC/control) as within subjects factors. This revealed significant 
main effects of Belief, where B- > B+ (F(1,20) = 41.50, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.68) and Desire, 
where D- > D+ (F(1,20) = 86.74, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.81), but no effect of TMS Site (F(1,20) = 
0.50, p = 0.49, η2 = 0.02). No statistically significant interactions were identified, including 
TMS Site by Belief (F(1,20) = 0.06, p = 0.811, η2 = 0.003). Fig. 23B summarises the mean 
RT for correct responses given across the four conditions, grouped by TMS Site. 
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(A)          (B) 
 
Fig. 23. Results: Game Show Task Behavioural Data  
Error bars reflect +/-1 SE of the mean. (Panel A) Mean percentage of errors made within condition and site (Panel B) Mean RT for each 
condition and site in milliseconds. 
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Control Task 
 The error data were input into a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA, with site 
(vlPFC/control) and box state (open/closed) as within subjects factors. There was no effect of 
TMS Site (F(1,20) = 0.04, p = 0.84, η2 = 0.002); however, a significant main effect of Box 
State existed, where more errors were made identifying a closed, rather than an open, box 
(F(1,20) = 7.33, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.27).  An interaction between Box State and TMS Site 
identified that the difference in error rate between open and closed box trials was far greater 
following TMS to vlPFC than after TMS applied to the control site (F(1,20) = 6.81, p < 0.05, 
η2 = 0.25). Fig. 24A illustrates the mean proportion of incorrect responses, within each 
condition and site. 
 RTs were treated as per the game show task, with outliers being removed prior to RT 
analysis. This resulted in the exclusion of 1.82% of responses. A repeated measures ANOVA 
with TMS Site (vlPFC/control) and Box State (open/closed) as within subjects measures 
found no effect of TMS Site on participant RT (F(1,20) = 0.004, p = 0.95, η2 = 0.000), but a 
significant main effect of Box State, where closed boxes took significantly longer to identify 
than open boxes (F(1,20) = 39.96, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.67). No interaction between TMS Site 
and Box State was identified in RT. Fig. 24B summarises the mean RT for correct responses 
in open and closed box trials, grouped by TMS Site. 
 112 
 
 
(A)         (B) 
 
Fig. 24. Results: Control Task Behavioural Data 
Error bars reflect +/-1 SE of the mean. (Panel A) Mean percentage of errors made within condition and site (Panel B) Mean RT for each 
condition and site in milliseconds. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The present study sought to identify a causal role for vlPFC in inhibition of self 
perspective. By applying cTBS, a TMS protocol thought to depress cortical excitability 
(Huang et al., 2005; Ridding & Ziemann, 2010), we anticipated that stimulation to vlPFC 
would affect those ToM states which feature incongruence between self and other, such as 
false belief, but that it would not impact on other behaviourally difficult ToM states, like 
avoidance desire. In a three-way ANOVA comparing the factors of TMS Site 
(vlPFC/control), Belief (true/false) and Desire (approach/avoid), a statistically significant 
interaction between site and belief would support this hypothesis, where a larger behavioural 
cost was expected to be associated with TMS to vlPFC in false belief reasoning specifically. 
Consistent with previous work examining belief and desire reasoning (Apperly et al., 2011; 
German & Hehman, 2006; Hartwright et al., 2012), the current study identified a behavioural 
cost for reasoning about an agent who held a false belief or an avoidance desire; however, no 
overall effect of TMS on ToM was identified in either error rate or RT. Moreover, no 
interaction between site and belief were identified, indicating no specific effect of TMS to 
false belief reasoning. The present experiment, therefore, failed to identify a causal role for 
vlPFC in ToM. Still, on the basis of the data reviewed earlier, further examination is 
warranted, particularly as neuroimaging data (e.g., Hartwright et al., 2012; van der Meer et 
al., 2011; Vogeley et al., 2001) converge with lesion data  in pinpointing vlPFC in inhibition 
of self perspective (Samson et al., 2005). The absence of an effect of TMS suggests that this 
may reflect issues with localization or ‘neural efficacy’ (see de Graaf & Sack, 2011 for a 
general discussion), each of which are reviewed in turn.  
 Localization of vlPFC was guided by individual structural imaging data, where TMS 
was applied to a group-derived coordinate set from a different sample (Hartwright et al., 
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2012). Unlike phosphenes, which can be induced for early visual areas, and muscle twitches 
for primary motor cortex, cognitive processes involve areas of silent association (de Graaf & 
Sack, 2011; Jahanshahi & Rothwell, 2000). It is therefore not possible to be certain that the 
coordinate set chosen represented the foci of cortex responsible for self perspective inhibition 
in the sample here. However, approximate convergence with other published data supports the 
view that the coordinates selected are representative of vlPFC activation in ToM (e.g., see 
Spreng et al., 2009). Nonetheless, although TMS was applied using frameless stereotaxy to 
ensure accurate localization, due to large muscle masses around the prefrontal cortex, subject 
movement did occur during stimulation. Despite padding to stabilise the head, the vast 
majority of participants displayed activation of the trigeminal nerve, resulting in jaw 
clenching and mouth twitching, and the supraorbital nerve, causing a blink reflex, at each 
pulse. Note that this is not unusual during stimulation to this region (Jahanshahi & Rothwell, 
2000). Maximum coil displacement during stimulation to vlPFC ranged from 0.8-3.0 mm 
(mean = 1.48 mm, SD = 0.55); thus, it could be argued that stimulation may have been 
applied to neighbouring cortex, which may not support the process of interest. Still, as the coil 
placement was adjusted in real-time during stimulation, any deviation from the target site 
would have been momentary.     
 An alternative possibility for the null result relates to ‘neural efficacy’ (de Graaf & 
Sack, 2011). That is, that the TMS protocol used was not sufficient to disturb processing in 
vlPFC, or, that the protocol did, in fact, sufficiently disrupt processing, but that neighbouring 
regions were able to compensate. The former argument is unlikely, given that vlPFC impaired 
Box State judgement in the control task. The latter is difficult to determine without having 
taken some additional measurement at the time, such as electro- or magneto-encephalography 
(EEG/MEG respectively). Either way, Hartwigsen et al. (2013) demonstrated that cTBS to left 
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inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) produces a facilitatory drive from the homologous region to the 
lesioned area, resulting in shorter response latencies. Thus, short term cortical reorganisation 
caused by cTBS shows that the contralateral region can be drafted to support the primary 
functions of the initial cite of perturbation. Nevertheless, there is, as yet, no conclusive 
evidence that this effect may apply to the right vlPFC.  
 Lastly, our results suggest that consideration should be given to recent work which 
calls into question the overall efficacy of the cTBS protocol (Hamada, Murase, Hasan, 
Balaratnam, & Rothwell, 2012; McAllister et al., 2013; Vernet et al., 2013). For example, 
using MEG, McAllister et al. (2013) examined the neuroplastic effects of cTBS on M1. 
Notably, only half of the participants tested, herein termed ‘responders’, showed a significant 
decrease in corticospinal excitability. The remaining participants, classed as ‘non-responders’, 
either showed no effect or a marginal increase. In addition, the effect on simple motor 
response latencies differed according to corticospinal excitability; whilst responders were 
significantly slower to respond following cTBS, non-responders showed a decrease in RT. 
Similarly, Hamada et al. (2012) were only able to identify a quarter of individuals who 
responded as expected to TBS. Although this variability refers to cTBS applied to the motor 
cortex in both studies, it is plausible that a similar issue would apply to other cortical areas. 
The paucity of published null results, however, makes it difficult to determine if this is the 
case (although see Verschuere, Schuhmann, & Sack, 2012). Either way, the factors which 
influence the induction of plasticity are not fully understood; susceptibility is likely 
influenced by factors such as age, attention, sex, genetics and time of day (Ridding & 
Ziemann, 2010), adding further noise to the data. It should be reiterated that the control task 
data suggest that the current sample were susceptible to some sort of effect of cTBS to vlPFC, 
although post-hoc evaluation of the behavioural data suggest a distinct divide within the 
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sample, where over 40% of the participants actually became faster at responding following 
TMS to vlPFC. Of those, over half were less error prone, or showed no change in error rate 
following TMS to vlPFC, suggesting this subgroup were not simply pressing the button faster. 
Of course it may be that, like Hartwigsen et al. (2013) demonstrated in left IFG, temporary 
cortical reorganisation from cTBS caused the contralateral homolog to support the functions 
served by our region of interest in this subgroup of participants; thus, cancelling out any 
opposite effect in the non-responders. The sample size of possible responders and non-
responders in the current study, however, does not permit any statistically informed 
conclusion here. Regardless, like Hamada et al. (2012); McAllister et al. (2013), our data 
suggest that the effect of cTBS is highly variable across subjects, making it difficult to draw 
any meaningful conclusion regarding the role of vlPFC in ToM with the current data.  
  In sum, the present study used a cTBS protocol to identify a causal role for vlPFC in 
ToM; specifically, in inhibiting self perspective in those mental states where the knowledge 
state is incongruent between self and other. The behavioural data were consistent with the 
existing literature, in that a cost was associated with holding in mind a false belief or an 
avoidance desire. However, no effect of TMS was found on ToM. The hypothesised 
interaction between TMS Site and Belief state, where an increase in errors and response 
latencies was expected in false belief following TMS to vlPFC, was not identified. Lesion 
data from Samson et al. (2005) provides compelling evidence that vlPFC is recruited to 
inhibit a prepotent self perspective: impairment in the ability to resist interference from self 
perspective was demonstrated to coincide with a lesion to the right frontal cortex. When 
considered with a powerful interaction effect identified in a proximal region using fMRI 
(Vogeley et al., 2001), and further converging neuroimaging data (Hartwright et al., 2012; van 
der Meer et al., 2011), it is difficult to dismiss a role for vlPFC in ToM on the basis of the 
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present result, particularly as recent studies now suggest that cTBS does not produce 
consistent effects across subjects (Hamada et al., 2012; Hartwigsen et al., 2013; McAllister et 
al., 2013; Vernet et al., 2013).  
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE SPECIAL CASE OF SELF PERSPECTIVE INHIBITION IN MENTAL, BUT 
NOT NON-MENTAL, REPRESENTATION
7
  
                                               
7 This chapter is currently in preparation for submission: Hartwright, C. E., Apperly, I. A., and Hansen, P.C. (in 
prep.). The special case of self perspective inhibition in mental, but not non-mental, representation. Manuscript 
in preparation. 
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ABSTRACT 
The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) has been implicated in studies of both executive 
and social function. Recent meta-analyses suggest that vlPFC plays an important but little 
understood role in Theory of Mind (ToM). Converging neuropsychological, functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and event related potential (ERP) data, suggest that this 
may reflect inhibition of self perspective. The present study adapted an extensively published 
ToM localizer to evaluate the role of vlPFC in inhibition of self perspective. The classic false 
belief, false photograph vignettes that comprise the localizer were modified to reflect high and 
low salience of self perspective. Using a factorial design, the present study identified a 
behavioural and neural cost associated with having a highly salient self perspective that was 
incongruent with the representational content. Importantly, vlPFC only differentiated between 
high versus low salience of self perspective when representing mental state content. No 
difference was identified for non-mental representation. This result is explored in terms of the 
different processes that may be required to represent competing mental, and non-mental 
content. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The frontal lobes have long been viewed as critical for supporting complex social 
cognition. From comparative and neurodevelopmental studies, through to lesion and 
neuroimaging data, the co-localization of social and executive processes to frontal cortex 
illustrates this region’s role in supporting complex higher functions (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 
2006; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Eslinger, Grattan, Damasio, & Damasio, 1992; Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuiss, 2004; Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 2001; 
 120 
 
Semendeferi, Lu, Schenker, & Damasio, 2002; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998; Stuss & 
Benson, 1984; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001). As cognitive neuroscience has begun to 
home in on the neural correlates of more specific constituents of social cognition, Theory of 
Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states, thoughts and intentions to others, raises 
some interesting challenges in terms of understanding the interplay between the 
neurocognitive bases of social processes and any supporting executive functions. One such 
challenge concerns successfully identifying neural regions which support the expression of 
ToM, for example, in terms of executive processes.  
 Considerable effort has been directed towards attributing specific functional profiles to 
the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), regions thought to 
be critical in ToM (for reviews see Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Lieberman, 2007; Mar, 2011; 
Spreng et al., 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009). Quantitative meta-analyses, however, suggest 
consistent recruitment of several, less examined, regions across a multiplicity of paradigms, 
including the amygdala, precuneus and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) (see Bzdok et 
al., 2012; Mar, 2011; Spreng et al., 2009). The vlPFC, particularly left inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG), has been described as a possible candidate for part of the “core mentalizing network” 
(Mar, 2011, p.124); however, until fairly recently, the appearance of vlPFC in ToM has been 
largely unexamined. Nonetheless, there are good reasons for thinking that this region may 
serve an important process in ToM.  
 It is well documented that vlPFC is involved in executive control processes (e.g., 
Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; 
Badre & Wagner, 2007; Garavan, Ross, & Stein, 1999; Konishi et al., 1999). Developmental 
studies provide considerable evidence that both children and adults have difficulty with 
certain ToM states. This is thought to reflect underlying executive control processes, in terms 
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of suspending self perspective in favour of someone else’s, or selecting from competing 
perspectives (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Carlson & Moses, 2001; German 
& Hehman, 2006). For example, in a typical false belief task, considered the litmus test for 
ToM, a scenario is outlined wherein an agent places an object in a specific location. 
Unbeknown to the agent, the object is then moved from the original location to a new 
location. As a consequence, the agent is described as holding a ‘false belief’, as their belief 
reflects a misinformed state of reality. In order to demonstrate having a ToM representation of 
the agent, participants must identify which location the agent will search first in order to 
retrieve the object (e.g., see Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This can only be solved by setting 
aside knowledge of reality and selecting the location where the agent originally left the object. 
This conceptual analysis highlights that there are two information streams which may jostle 
for selection: 1) the new, true location of the object and 2) where the agent (incorrectly) 
believes the object is. Thus, successful expression of the agent’s ToM in this unexpected 
transfer task will require some form of control process, which would explain the behavioural 
difficulty that people demonstrate.  
 One approach to identifying neural regions which might support control processes in 
ToM is to compare the neural correlates of assigning a false, versus a true (i.e. reality 
congruent) belief to an agent. In doing so, assigning a true belief would be expected to attract 
lesser inhibitory demands as, in the unexpected transfer task, there is no difference between 
the believed and the true location. Whilst there are still two information streams to keep in 
mind – what the agent believes and what the real state of affairs is – as these are congruent, 
any interference between the two is likely to be low compared with false belief. Of the few 
studies that have compared true and false belief reasoning, these converge on lateral PFC and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for false, over true, belief reasoning (Döhnel et al., 2012; 
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Hartwright et al., 2012 [Chapter 2 here]; Sommer et al., 2007). This result is further refined by 
ERP data, which suggest that lateral frontal activity, in particular, reflects inconsistency 
between perspectives, for example, when judging own visuospatial perspective against that of 
an agent (McCleery et al., 2011). Whilst comparing true with false belief provides one method 
of varying conceptual perspective differences between self and other, this approach is not 
unproblematic. First, it is difficult to be certain that the status of an agent’s belief, and not the 
real state of affairs, is being represented (Aichhorn et al., 2009; Hartwright et al., 2012 
[Chapter 2 here]). Second, as well as manipulating inhibitory demands, such an approach also 
systematically varies the truth value of the belief. An alternative approach, where the salience 
of one’s own perspective is manipulated, however, would not confound truth status with the 
requirement to inhibit self perspective.   
 Vogeley et al. (2001) provide an early attempt to manipulate the salience of own 
conceptual perspective whilst adopting the perspective of someone else. A series of short 
vignettes described the participant as a central agent in the story, for example, as the owner of 
a shop that has just been burgled. This approach meant that the participant had to ascribe the 
behaviour, attitudes and perceptions of this central agent – in this instance, ‘you’ the shop 
owner – to themselves; therefore, raising the salience of their own perspective. An alternative 
series of vignettes replicated the structure and style of the high salience vignettes, but the 
participant did not feature as a character in the story. In this case, then, there was just ‘the’ 
shop owner, therefore making the participant’s own perspective less salient. As well as 
systematically manipulating the presence of self in these vignettes, the authors also varied the 
presence of another agent’s behaviour, attitudes and perceptions. The resulting design 
comprised four conditions where presence of Self (absent/present) and presence of ToM 
(absent/present) were manipulated. Variation in Self was shown to modulate bilateral ACC, 
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TPJ and precuneus. Variation in the ToM also included medial frontal activation, spanning 
dorsal regions and ACC, as well as bilateral lateral PFC. Although not the primary focus of 
the study, Vogeley et al. (2001) identified that a single, small area of right IFG was recruited 
for the interaction between ToM and Self, that is, when participants were required to feature 
as an agent in the story, whilst making a ToM judgement about a further character in the 
story. The authors suggested that this activation may have reflected an additional executive 
process, which was required in the instance of taking someone else’s perspective, whilst 
having to integrate this with their own perspective.    
 The interaction effect identified in Vogeley et al. (2001) was further clarified in a 
single case study presented by Samson et al. (2005). Following damage to right lateral PFC, 
encompassing the region of IFG identified by Vogeley et al. (2001), patient WBA 
demonstrated impairment in high, but not low, inhibition false belief reasoning. The high 
inhibition false belief task, which is a more typical ToM paradigm, comprised a short non-
verbal film depicting the unexpected transfer task outlined earlier. The footage showed a 
woman watching a man place an object into one of two containers. She then leaves the room. 
Whilst the woman is away, the man takes the object and places it into the other container. 
Importantly, the footage clearly shows which of the two containers the man places the object 
into. The woman then returns to the scene. The patient’s task was to point to which one of the 
two containers he thought the woman would look in first to find the object. In order to 
successfully identify the correct container, the patient needed to infer that the woman held a 
false belief, but also inhibit his own knowledge of the true location of the object. On this task, 
patient WBA failed to select the correct container in all but one of the trials: he was 
systematically selecting the location that conferred to his own knowledge point.  
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 In a further experiment, Samson et al. (2005) tested patient WBA on a similar 
paradigm, but with reduced inhibitory demands. As with the first task, each trial of interest 
comprised a non-verbal film depicting the unexpected transfer of an object. Again, the footage 
showed a woman watching a man place an object into one of two containers. Crucially, this 
time, it was not possible to see which container the object was hidden in. The woman then 
leaves the room and, whilst she is away, the man swaps the two containers. She then returns 
and points to one of the containers to provide a clue as to where she believes the object is 
hidden (i.e. she points to its initial, but now incorrect, location). The patient’s task was to 
identify which of the two containers really housed the object at that point in time (i.e. point to 
its new location). In order to correctly identify where the object was, the patient needed to 
infer that the woman held a false belief as to the object’s location, and consequently point 
towards the opposite box that she had hinted at. As the patient was never shown the true 
location of the object, the patient did not need to inhibit his own knowledge, in order to infer 
the woman’s false belief. In a striking contrast to the first experiment, patient WBA selected 
the correct container in all but one trial: he successfully adopted the view point of an external 
agent.  When his performance in the two tasks are considered together,  damage to the right 
lateral PFC appeared to cause an inability to resist interference from his own perspective, not 
a ToM deficit as such.  
 In an attempt to further understand the form of inhibitory processes in conceptual 
perspective taking, to our knowledge, only two further neuroimaging studies have been 
conducted. The first used a modified version of the high and low inhibition tasks in Samson et 
al. (2005). Here, van der Meer et al. (2011) collected fMRI data from neurologically intact 
adults whilst they watched high versus low inhibition false belief scenarios. The same 
participants also completed a classic Go/No-Go task. In high versus low inhibition scenarios, 
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frontal activation was limited to bilateral vlPFC and dorsal mPFC. Similarly, No-Go versus 
Go trials elicited bilateral vlPFC. Common to high > low inhibition and No-Go > Go was left 
lateral PFC and right vlPFC. These data led the authors to conclude that inhibition of own 
perspective is mediated by bilateral vlPFC when supporting a functioning ToM.  
 Along a similar vein, Rothmayr et al. (2011) asked participants to identify whether an 
agent, on the basis of their false belief, looked for the transferred object in an expected or an 
unexpected location. They used the same pictorial stimuli to create a separate, novel Go/No-
Go task. Contrast masking analyses identified that a largely left lateralised network, including 
left IFG and the wider lateral PFC, was recruited exclusively in false > true belief versus No-
Go > Go trials. A conjunction between the false > true belief and No-Go > Go identified right 
dorsal mPFC and dorsolateral PFC bilaterally, plus bilateral TPJ and other regions outside of 
the PFC. On the basis of common neural recruitment during the ToM and inhibitory control 
tasks, and other research examining either false belief or inhibitory control, the authors 
conclude that TPJ, dorsal medial- and lateral PFC support domain general processes common 
to both ToM and executive control
8
. What is particularly interesting here, however, is that left 
IFG responded preferentially to conflict in ToM, over a more classical motor-inhibition task. 
In line with Mar (2011), Spreng et al. (2009), Samson et al. (2005) and Vogeley et al. (2001), 
this provides a further hint that IFG serves a selective role in ToM.  
 Whilst a role for vlPFC in ToM emerges from the existing literature, little is known 
about how this region responds to fine-grained variation in perspectives, particularly within 
mental and other, structurally matched, non-mental representation tasks. The present study 
therefore sought to examine the role of vlPFC, specifically in the inhibition of self perspective 
during ToM and physical representation. The present study comprises a simple manipulation 
                                               
8
 Although, note they place greatest emphasis on the role of dorsal mPFC 
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to an extensively published ToM localizer task, created by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) (e.g., 
see Aichhorn et al., 2009; Hartwright et al., 2012 [Chapter 2 here]; Mitchell, 2007; Perner et 
al., 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Scholz et al., 2009). This localizer 
task was used as it controls for some of the attentional differences that would exist if 
comparing false versus true belief, for example. By modifying this task to include vignettes 
which feature high and low salience of self perspective, the present study examined the effect 
of varying inhibitory demands in mental (ToM, i.e., false belief) versus non-mental (physical, 
e.g., false photograph, false drawing etc) representation. Following on from the quantitative 
reviews by Spreng et al. (2009) and Mar (2011), alongside neuropsychological evidence from 
Samson et al. (2005), ERP data from McCleery et al. (2011) and neuroimaging data from 
Vogeley et al. (2001), Rothmayr et al. (2011) and van der Meer et al. (2011), the analyses 
focused on vlPFC. This enabled close inspection of the functional profile of this region in 
response to high, versus low, self perspective inhibition in conceptual ToM and non-ToM 
representations. On the basis of the prior neuroscience research reviewed, it was anticipated 
that vlPFC would be modulated on the basis of high versus low salience of self perspective, as 
a result of inhibitory demands. From the behavioural literature, an effect of this manipulation 
may be elicited in terms of error rates, where interference from self perspective may increase 
the number of errors when making a representation that featured a highly salient self 
perspective (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Carlson & Moses, 2001; German 
& Hehman, 2006). The nature of the localizer, however, led us to this make this assertion 
tentatively as, for typical adults, it is a relatively straightforward, slow-paced task. 
Consequently, the behavioural measure that can be obtained from this task may not be 
sensitive enough to identify such subtle effects (Birch & Bloom, 2004). There is little 
information regarding whether cognitive load from competing perspectives in conceptual 
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perspective taking will differ between mental versus non-mental representation tasks; 
however, on the basis that self perspective is present in both false belief and false photograph 
scenarios (Hartwright et al., 2012, [Chapter 2 here]), and, consistent with this expectation, the 
original localizer does not recruit lateral PFC, we anticipated that vlPFC will not differentiate 
between representational tasks. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Twenty one right-handed, neuro-typical adults (12 female; age range 19-28,    age = 
22 years) participated in exchange for a small honorarium. All were recruited through the 
University’s research participation scheme and gave informed consent in line with the 
University of Birmingham research ethics. The Wide Range Achievement Test – Third 
Edition (WRAT-3) Reading Scale was administered prior to taking part in the experiment to 
ensure reading proficiency commensurate with the task (see Appendix 1 for detailed 
participant screening information). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Modified Theory of Mind Localizer Experiment 
 The task was based on a localizer procedure devised by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003). 
Stimuli were based on a modified and expanded selection of the localizer stories (Saxe & 
Andrews-Hanna, n.d.). All of the vignettes were rated for ease of understanding and trialled 
on a separate group of individuals prior to running the fMRI experiment. For the fMRI 
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experiment, participants read a total of 56 short vignettes, which referred to either a mental 
representation (belief), such as an agent with a false belief, or a non-mental representation 
(physical), such as a false photograph, video or painting (see Zaitchik (1990)). For the sake of 
simplicity, and following previous terminology for stimuli of this nature, the physical 
representation stimuli are herein referred to as ‘false photographs’. The important feature of 
these vignettes is that they refer to a change of state which causes incongruence between 
reality and the representational content. Thus, in both types of vignettes, the term ‘false’ is 
used to illustrate that the representational content of is outdated and, therefore, no longer in 
line with reality. 
 In order to modulate neural regions that support self perspective inhibition, following 
a theoretically similar approach to Samson et al. (2005), the original vignettes were modified 
so that the salience of the participant’s perspective – the information outlining the true state of 
affairs – was systematically varied from high to low. Each belief vignette and each physical 
vignette had a high and low salience version. In high salience vignettes, the occurrence and 
precise nature of the change of state was made explicit; thus, the viewer held a highly salient 
perspective of reality. The resulting striking incongruence between own perspective and the 
representational perspective was anticipated to cause considerable interference when adopting 
the false, representational perspective, resulting in behavioural and neural consequences 
(Birch & Bloom, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007). In low salience vignettes, the occurrence of 
the change of state is still made explicit; however, the precise nature of reality is under 
specified, making the viewer’s perspective of the true state of affairs less salient. It is 
important to highlight that incongruence between the representational and real state of affairs 
is again present although, this time, incompatibility between the participant’s perspective and 
the state of reality is less vivid.  As a consequence, it is expected that participants will suffer 
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less interference from their own knowledge point when adopting the false, representational 
perspective.  
 The first example illustrates the format of a mental representation vignette with high 
self perspective inhibition demands,  
 
Lorraine dashed out the door and mistakenly left her lunch money on the side table. Thinking 
it was for a school trip, her daughter put the money upstairs in her purse. 
- 
Lorraine expects to find her lunch money in her daughter’s purse. 
True   False 
 
In this example, it is clear that Lorraine believes her lunch money is on the side table. From 
reading this scenario it becomes apparent that, unbeknown to Lorraine, the money was moved 
to her daughter’s purse. In order to successfully identify where Lorraine thinks her money is, 
the viewer must inhibit the reference to the current situation – the money is upstairs in her 
daughter’s purse – whilst framing an answer in terms of the agent’s false, i.e. outdated, belief 
– Lorraine believes her money is on the side table (conceptual analysis adapted from Russell, 
Saltmarsh, & Hill, 1999). In this example, then, the answer is false. 
 The same format is followed for high salience non-mental representation vignettes. 
For example, 
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The speed camera captured an image of the bright red car as it sped along the road. The 
following day, the car was painted a grey colour and the number plates were changed. 
- 
According to the speed camera image, the car is bright red. 
True   False 
 
This example makes clear that the speed camera footage captures an image of the bright red 
car. After reading the scenario it becomes apparent that, after the footage was taken, the car 
was painted a grey colour. In order to successfully identify which colour the footage shows, 
the viewer must inhibit the reference to the current situation – the car has since been painted 
grey  – whilst framing an answer in terms of the false, i.e. outdated, photographic 
representation – the footage shows the car when it was red (conceptual analysis adapted from 
Russell et al., 1999). In this example, then, the answer is true. 
 In low salience vignettes, the occurrence of the change of state is made explicit; 
however, the precise nature of the true state of affairs is loosely specified. Incongruence 
between the representational and real state of affairs is again present although, this time, the 
viewer’s perspective of the true state of affairs is less salient. For example, for mental 
representation, 
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Liz hurried out the door and mistakenly left her coffee money on the desk. Thinking it was for 
his school lunches, her son put the money away in the usual safe place. 
- 
Liz expects to find her coffee money on the desk. 
True   False 
 
In this example, the correct answer is true: it is clear that the Liz will believe that her coffee 
money is on the desk; however, whilst the viewer knows that the money is no longer on the 
desk, they are not privy to the precise location of the money. As in high salience vignettes, the 
viewer follows the same process of inhibiting the real state of affairs and selecting the 
representational content; however, the viewer is expected to suffer less interference from their 
own knowledge of reality versus the representational perspective. 
 Similarly, the final example illustrates the format for a low salience, non-mental 
representation vignette, 
 
The traffic camera snapped an image of the dark blue car as it jumped the traffic lights. The 
following day, the car was painted a bright colour and the number plates were changed. 
- 
According to the traffic camera image, the car is a bright colour. 
True   False 
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In this last example, the correct answer would be false. Overall, whilst the process of self 
perspective inhibition is required in both high and low salience vignettes, the interference 
suffered from competing sources of information is expected to vary as a function of salience.  
 The paradigm comprised a 2x2 repeated measures design with two within-subjects 
factors, representation ( belief/photo (B/P)) and salience of self perspective (high/low (H/L)), 
collapsed into four equally occurring conditions: BH, BL, PH, PL. Each vignette was 
displayed in black Arial point 22 font, presented on a grey background. A single trial 
comprised a short story, displayed for 10 s, followed for 4 s by a true or false question about 
the preceding story. This required participants to make a response using a two button box that 
was placed in their left hand
9
, where the left button was always used to indicate a true 
statement. The experiment contained an equal number of true/false responses, which were 
randomised across the experiment. Stories alternated between belief and physical and were 
interleaved with a 13.5 s rest period comprising a fixation dot. The presentation of high versus 
low salience was pseudo randomised to prevent more than three repetitions of either saliency 
variant, and pairs of high/low stories were not repeated within the same block. The word 
lengths of each type of vignette were equivalent (belief versus physical representation t(23) = 
0.073, p = 0.943; high versus low salience t(23) = 0.000, p = 1.000). 
 The experiment comprised four blocks of 12 trials of interest, each containing three 
vignettes of each condition. This resulted in 12 trials for each of the four conditions. 
Participants completed four practice trials immediately prior to scanning to orientate 
themselves with the task. Each block also contained a further two randomly placed anti-
strategy trials. Whilst the structure of the story element in these vignettes was identical to the 
trials of interest, the question phase required participants to answer a true/false question about 
                                               
9
 The left hand was used to differentiate potential language related neural activity from motor activity. 
 133 
 
the true outcome described within the vignette. This prevented participants from adopting a 
formulaic approach to response preparation (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). The example below 
illustrates one such vignette where the answer, on this occasion, would be false. 
 
Expecting the game to be postponed because of the rain, the Jones family left the match early. 
The score was tied, 0-0. During their journey the rain stopped and the game ended with a 
score of 5-1 
- 
The final score was tied at 0-0. 
True   False 
  
Data Acquisition and Analysis 
Neuroimaging Data Acquisition and Preprocessing 
 The data were acquired during a single session using a 3T Philips Achieva scanner, , 
with an 8 channel head coil. The stimuli were presented using Presentation software (v. 14.1; 
Neurobehavioral Systems, CA), which also recorded the behavioural response data 
simultaneously. 159 T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) volumes were obtained per 
block of the experiment, each of which consisting of 42 axial slices obtained consecutively in 
a bottom up sequence, reconstructed voxel size = 3x3x3mm
3
. Whole brain coverage was 
achieved with a TR = 2.5 s, TE = 35 ms, acquisition matrix = 96 x 96, flip angle = 83°, 
SENSE factor = 2, voxel size = 3x3x3mm
3
. High resolution T1-weighted structural images 
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were acquired following collection of the functional data (3D TFE, sagittal orientation, 
TR=8.4 ms, TE=3.8, matrix size 288x288, 175 slices, reconstructed voxel size = 1×1×1mm
3
).  
 Preprocessing and statistical analyses of the data were performed using the FMRIB 
software library (FSL version v.4.1.9; FMRIB, Oxford, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl; FEAT 
version 5.98). Initial preprocessing of the functional data consisted of slice timing and motion 
correction using rigid body transformations (MCFLIRT). The blood oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) signals were high-pass filtered using a Gaussian weighted filter of 21 s. The BOLD 
data were then spatially smoothed using a 5mm full-width-half-maximum kernel. The 
functional data were registered to their respective structural images and transformed to a 
standard template based on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain, using a 
7-DoF linear transformation (FLIRT). 
 
fMRI Data Analysis 
 Four explanatory variables (EVs) of interest – BH, BL, PH, PL – were modelled to 
reflect the four experimental conditions. Each EV comprised the story and question phase of a 
single vignette (14 s). Each EV was convolved with a gamma derived hemodynamic response 
function (HRF) within a general linear model (GLM) framework. The anti-strategy trials and 
motion parameters were modelled as regressors of no interest. Higher level modelling was 
used to aggregate the data across participants within a mixed effects model. For confirmatory 
purposes, a whole brain analysis was computed to replicate the original localizer contrast 
belief > physical, as per Saxe and Kanwisher (2003). To address the area of interest for the 
present study, a series of novel higher level analyses were computed. Given our strong a priori 
hypothesis, and due to the published statistical challenges in identifying neural regions that 
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support complex cognitive functions (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009), pre-threshold 
masking was used to constrain these analyses to bilateral vlPFC
10
. This was defined as 
comprising ventrolateral voxels in Brodmann Areas 44, 45 and 47 which had a ≥ 20% 
probability of falling within either the inferior frontal gyrus pars, the frontal operculum or 
frontal orbital cortices, as classified by the Harvard Oxford Cortical Atlas. The resulting Z 
statistic images were then thresholded using a cluster based approach, where Z > 2.3, cluster 
pcorr < 0.05. The final result reflected a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with representation 
(B/P) and salience of self perspective (H/L) as within subjects factors. To provide directional 
information regarding the effect of salience on representation, a quadrupled t-test was also 
computed using the same parameters. Results are described according to gross anatomical 
regions and anterior, mid and posterior vlPFC, approximating BA 47, 45 and 44 respectively 
(Badre & Wagner, 2007). Mean percent signal change plots of each effect identified by the 
GLM analyses were created using FSL’s Featquery. This enabled a closer examination of how 
the data contribute to each result (Poldrack & Mumford, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10 All neuroimaging analyses were verified using whole brain analysis. This indicated the likelihood of the 
presence of type II errors in frontal regions, where smaller clusters were eradicated by cluster thresholding at Z < 
2.3, p < 0.05 in a whole brain approach. By focusing the analyses on a smaller number of voxels, the multiple 
comparison correction would be less severe. This approach enabled us to apply standard cluster detection, whilst 
addressing the need to minimise type I and type II errors, in an analysis that was sensitive to activation in vlPFC. 
Importantly, all results presented were consistent with the raw data at group level. See Souza, Donohue, and 
Bunge (2009) for a similar approach in vlPFC.  
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RESULTS 
Behavioural Data 
 The participants’ error rates were analysed in a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA, with 
representation (B/P) and salience of self perspective (H/L) as within subjects factors
11
 (Fig. 
25A.). Overall, few incorrect responses were made. Whilst, across the whole experiment, 
participants made fewer errors when making a belief inference versus when making a physical 
representation judgment, factorial analysis found no significant effect of representation 
(F(1,17) = 0.46, p = 0.51, η2 = 0.03). Almost three times as many errors were made when self 
perspective was highly salient, which was supported by a significant main effect of salience 
(F(1,17) = 10.07, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.37). Post hoc comparisons confirmed a significant 
difference in the number of errors made in high versus low salience (high > low; SE = 0.44, p 
= 0.006). As illustrated in Fig. 25., participants were generally most error prone when making 
a physical representation judgment and their self perspective highly salient; however, there 
was no statistically significant interaction between representation and salience in error rate 
(F(1,17) = 2.69, p = 0.12, η2 = 0.14). Inspection of the error rate for anti-strategy trials 
determined that the participants were generally performing at ceiling, and thus attending to 
the real state of affairs (mean frequency correct 7.23/8. SD 0.89). 
                                               
11 Due to an equipment failure, behavioural data from 3 participants were unavailable. These participants were 
included in subsequent neuroimaging analyses as their inclusion yielded no key differences in the localization of 
effects in the raw, unthresholded data. 
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Fig. 25. Results: Modified ToM Localizer Behavioural Data 
Mean percentage of errors made per condition. Error bars reflect +/-1 SE of the mean. 
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Neuroimaging Data 
 Whole brain analyses of the false belief > false photo contrast, as computed by Saxe 
and Kanwisher (2003), indentified regions consistent with ToM and previously published uses 
of the localizer. This included bilateral temporoparietal junction, temporal poles, precuneus 
and medial prefrontal cortex (Table 6; Fig. 26). 
  For the main analysis within bilateral vlPFC, a 2x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with representation (Belief/Physical) and salience of self perspective (High/Low) as 
within subjects factors was conducted. This identified a main effect of representation (B/P) in 
bilateral vlPFC, where the peak activation was centred on mid vlPFC, the inferior frontal 
gyrus pars triangularis (IFGtr). This cluster extends in the rostral direction to include a small 
portion of the superior quadrant of anterior vlPFC, and in the caudal direction towards the 
posterior boundary of the frontal poles. This main effect is driven by a larger percentage 
signal change in physical versus belief stimuli (Fig. 27A; Fig. 27D. red shading). No main 
effect of salience of self perspective (H/L) was identified; however, a two-way interaction 
identified a separate cluster which chiefly comprised left anterior vlPFC (Fig. 27B; Fig. 27D. 
blue shading). This cluster centred on the IFG pars orbitalis (IFGor) and extended in the 
superior direction to encompass part of mid vlPFC, although this activation was more 
posterior to the region modulated by the main effect of representation. Fig. 4B indicates that 
the interaction was driven by an effect of salience when making a belief representation, where 
having a highly salient self perspective attracts greater resources on this region than when self 
perspective is less salient. Whilst there appears to be a trend towards the opposite effect when 
representing non-mental information, a quadrupled t-test confirmed that the effect of salience 
was only present during mental representation in vlPFC. Thus, no other contrasts within this 
quadrupled t-test, including physical high > physical low, survived cluster detection. The 
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significant t-test further confirmed different neural demands in high versus low salience when 
making a belief inference in a single cluster, which comprised left mid to anterior vlPFC (Fig. 
27C; Fig. 27D. green shading). The cluster peak for belief high > belief low was positioned in 
IFGtr extending in the caudal direction to encompass voxels identified within the factorial 
analysis for the effect of representation (Fig. 27D. yellow shading), and in the ventral 
direction to include voxels identified by the factorial interaction effect (Fig. 27D. cyan 
shading). Table 7 details contrasts performed in these analyses and the resulting cluster peaks.  
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Table 6 Confirmatory Whole Brain Analysis, where False Belief > False Photograph 
Cluster Peak 
  
Hemi 
  
Brodmann 
Area 
  Cluster 
size 
(voxels) 
  MNI coordinates    
Z-value 
        x y z   
Temporoparietal junction   R   21   1204   62 -56 16   9.53 
Precuneus   L/R   7   2441   0 -56 34   9.34 
Temporoparietal junction   L   21   767   -54 -56 22   8.35 
Temporal Pole   R   21   442   56 6 -34   8.26 
Middle Temporal Gyrus, anterior division   L   20   318   -54 0 -36   8.25 
Middle Temporal Gyrus, posterior division   R   20   82   54 -8 -20   6.97 
Frontal Pole   L   9   59   -14 52 32   6.81 
Frontal Pole   L/R   10   110   0 62 10   6.62 
Cerebellum   L   N/A   33   -28 -80 -40   6.59 
Middle Frontal Gyrus   R   9   20   28 26 34   6.44 
Middle Temporal Gyrus, posterior division   L   21   40   -64 -22 -10   6.43 
Middle Temporal Gyrus, posterior division   R   21   16   66 -26 -10   6.19 
Temporal Pole   L   20   2441   -38 16 -42   5.68 
Note. Result reflects a two sample paired t-test, were neural regions listed were more responsive to either (B) over Physical (P) representation. Thresholded voxelwise at pcorr < 0.001). 
Brodmann Areas are approximate. 
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Fig. 26. Results: Modified ToM Localizer Confirmatory Analysis 
Activation map for the contrast B > P overlaid onto the MNI brain template. Shows significantly activated voxels where pcorr < 0.001. 
Images reflect Z-corrected t-stat images. Lateral view shows right hemisphere to illustrate right TPJ. 
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Table 7 Cluster Peaks for Representation by Salience Analyses 
Cluster Peak 
  
Hemi 
  
Brodman
n Area 
  
Cluster 
size 
(voxels
) 
  MNI coordinates    
Z-value 
        x y z   
2x2 Repeated Measures ANOVA                         
Main effect of Representation                         
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis   L   45   605   -44 40 4   5.07 
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis   R   45   280   48 40 10   4.11 
                          
Main effect of Salience of Self Perspective                         
ns                         
                          
Representation * Salience Interaction                         
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars orbitalis   L   47   246   -36 30 -10   4.49 
                          
Quadrupled t-test                         
BH > BL                         
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis   L   45   669   -44 38 10   4.38 
                          
BL > BH                         
ns   -   -   -   - - -   - 
                          
PH > PL                         
ns   -   -   -   - - -   - 
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PL > PH                         
ns   -   -   -   - - -   - 
Note. Results from ANOVA reflect regions identified using F-contrasts in a 2-way repeated measures factorial analysis with Representation (belief/physical, B/P) and Salience of Self 
Perspective (high/low, H/L) as within subjects factors.  ANOVA results reflect cluster peaks for cortical regions which are modulated by varying representation status (belief/physical) and 
salience status (high/low) Quadrupled t-test reflects planned contrasts within specific conditions of interest. Brodmann Areas are approximate. ns = non-significant at Z > 2.3, pcorr < 0.05. B = 
belief, P = photo, H = high salience, L = low salience. 
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Fig. 27. Results: Modified ToM Localizer Factorial Analysis 
Activation maps overlaid onto the MNI brain template show significantly activated voxels where Z > 2.3, pcorr < 0.05. Images are displayed 
in neurological convention, where left is represented on the left side of the image. Slices highlight cluster peaks. Plots reflect group mean 
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percentage signal change in the highlighted cluster for each condition; error bars reflect +/-1 SE of the mean. (Panel A) Result from 2x2 
repeated measures ANOVA, with Representation (B/P) and Salience (H/L) as within-subjects factors. Image reflects a Z-corrected F-stat 
image of neural regions modulated by the factor of Representation (B/P). Slices from left to right, z = 4, x = -44, x = 48 (Panel B) Image 
reflects a Z-corrected F-stat image of regions modulated by an interaction between Representation (B/P) and Salience of Self Perspective 
(H/L).  Slices z = -10, x = -36. (Panel C). Image reflects a Z-corrected t-stat image following a quadrupled t-test where BH > BL. Slices z 
= 10, z = -44. (Panel D) Activation maps are rendered onto a standard brain, showing the left vlPFC. Red shading indicates main factorial 
effect of Representation (B/P); Dark blue indicates Representation*Salience interaction; Green indicates significant result from quadrupled 
t-test where BH > BL. Yellow indicates voxels recruited by both factor of Representation (B/P) and quad t-test BH > BL; Cyan indicates 
voxels recruited by R*S interaction and BH > BL t-test. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The present study aimed to examine how vlPFC responds to variation in the salience 
of self perspective, in mental versus non-mental representation. Based on the behavioural 
literature, an effect of salience was tentatively anticipated in task performance, where 
interference from own perspective in high salience representation was expected to inflate 
error rates (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Carlson & Moses, 2001; German & 
Hehman, 2006). This prediction was made with caution, due to the ease with which typical 
adults were expected to find this relatively slow-paced paradigm. On account of converging 
evidence that vlPFC plays an important part in ToM (Mar, 2011; Spreng et al., 2009), and 
drawing from neuropsychological (Samson et al., 2005), ERP (McCleery et al., 2011) and 
fMRI data (Rothmayr et al., 2011; van der Meer et al., 2011) suggesting that this role may 
reflect an inhibitory mechanism, variation in the salience of self perspective was expected to 
modulate vlPFC. Conversely, previously published results from the original localizer task 
suggest that vlPFC would not respond to variation in representational content, that is, when 
making a belief versus a physical representation.  
 In general, adult participants were skilled at representing both outdated mental and 
physical information that was at odds with reality. They demonstrated ease with mental and 
non-mental representation, as well understanding the real state of affairs. No effect of 
representation was identified in terms of the number of errors made; thus, adults showed no 
behavioural cost between assuming a belief, versus physical, representation of an event. This 
is in line with research which demonstrates that young children find similar difficulty with 
both types of representation (Zaitchik, 1990) and, when executive demands are tightly 
controlled, adults with brain damage perform equivalently across the two tasks, where deficit 
or success with false belief reasoning is accompanied by respective deficit or success in false 
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photograph reasoning (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, Bickerton, & Humphreys, 2007). A 
significant behavioural cost was, however, associated with making a representational 
inference under the influence of a highly salient self perspective. This is in line with 
numerous behavioural data which suggest that own perspective interferes when making 
judgments about a naive or misinformed other (see Birch & Bloom, 2004; 2007 for a review). 
For example, the classic unexpected transfer task illustrates that children under the age of four 
respond from their own, egocentric perspective (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Furthermore, 
adults tend to overestimate the extent to which own knowledge is shared by others, in terms 
of the outcome of an event (Fischhoff, 2003) or general knowledge (Thomas & Jacoby, 2013). 
Also, adults, like children, suffer interference from their own visual perspective when 
considering the viewpoint of an agent (Keysar et al., 2003; Surtees & Apperly, 2012). 
Considered together, these data add further credence to the view that holding an incompatible 
perspective with an agent, when realised, is necessarily effortful.  
 A whole brain analysis, using the approach specified in Saxe and Kanwisher (2003), 
confirmed that the modifications presented here had not altered the operation of the localizer. 
As a result, TPJ and mPFC were identified when representing a false belief over a false 
photograph, or the like. Nonetheless, the novel factorial analysis identified that bilateral 
vlPFC was responsive to representational content. Whilst the original localizer does not detect 
this difference using the whole brain approach, it is worth highlighting that there is no 
contradiction between the result from the standard localizer contrast and the factorial analysis. 
The voxels identified by this factor are, overall, more positively activated for physical versus 
belief representation. As a consequence, one would not expect to see vlPFC in a whole brain 
analysis that computed belief > physical. Its inverse, however, should recruit this region. This 
assertion was confirmed post-hoc by computing physical > belief, which resulted in bilateral 
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vlPFC. In addition, the difference between mental and non-mental representation is amplified 
in this subset of voxels by the low salience belief condition. Importantly, the difference 
between types of representational content when self perspective is highly salient, as is the 
standard approach with these vignettes, is negligible. Furthermore, due to constraining the 
analyses to the frontal cortex, the factorial model had increased power over a whole brain 
approach to detect subtle effects within vlPFC. For all of these reasons, the original vignettes 
would be highly unlikely to replicate this result if the appropriate contrast were to be 
computed.  
 The interaction effect and quadrupled t-test identified a difference in neural demands 
in left anterior vlPFC for high versus low salience of self perspective in belief representation. 
A reduction in resource demands was associated with lowering the salience of one’s own 
perspective of the real state of affairs during mental representation. No such gain, however, 
was identified in vlPFC when reasoning about outdated non-mental content, such as 
photographs, videos and paintings. To consider the data as a whole, a distinct pattern exists, 
where the amplitude of activation in vlPFC is greater for high versus low belief, as a 
consistent feature. This region did not, however, appear to differentiate between 
representational content when self perspective was highly salient, or between  salience of self 
perspective when making a physical representation. Taken together, these data suggest that 
the processes occurring across representational tasks are non-equivalent.  
 A possible imbalance in executive demands between representing false beliefs and 
false photographs, specifically, has been proposed on theoretical and behavioural grounds 
(Callejas, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2011; Muller, Zelazo, & Imrisek, 2005; Perner et al., 2006; 
Perner & Leekam, 2008; Russell et al., 1999; Sabbagh, Moses, & Shiverick, 2006). For 
example, Callejas et al. (2011) demonstrated non-equivalent working memory demands and 
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linguistic structures between the original false belief and false photograph localizer vignettes. 
More generally, theoretical concerns have been raised regarding the ‘falseness’ of the false 
photograph task, in so much that a photograph cannot really be false (Perner & Leekam, 
2008). Both false belief and false photograph vignettes appear to elicit confliction between the 
world as it is now, against how it was at the time the representation was captured. 
Nonetheless, what the false photograph condition captures is actually an accurate 
representation of the referent that it captured, as it was at that moment in time. A false belief 
on the other hand, such as Lorraine’s belief that her money is on the side table, is inaccurate 
with regards to the referent on which her belief centres – the money is actually in her 
daughter’s purse (see Perner & Leekam, 2008 for a more comprehensive discussion). Whilst 
the literature support the general assertion that not all representation tasks are equivalent, they 
do not address the difference found in left anterior vlPFC, as only the neural profile of low 
versus high salience belief reasoning was statistically divergent. Instead, prior arguments have 
evaluated the more typical high inhibition belief versus high inhibition photo tasks, where we 
find no difference. Whilst we have do not have the scope to accept or refute prior claims 
regarding non-equivalence in the present study, we add a specific dimension to the argument, 
in that we demonstrate that the processes needed to successfully manipulate competing 
perspectives are distinct, on the basis of representational content. We therefore suggest that, 
where two information streams are incongruent, an amount of executive control will be 
exerted to discard erroneous responses. This effect is seen in social, as well as non-social, 
tasks such as Go/No-Go and Stroop. In belief reasoning, and perhaps in wider social tasks 
(see Surtees & Apperly, 2012), however, self perspective creates a unique problem, in that it 
interferes with the ability to appreciate what a misinformed or naive agent will know (Birch & 
Bloom, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007). One basis for this difficulty has been suggested to 
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reflect the self referent serving as a default knowledge state (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). When 
making sense of the world around us, we may use our own knowledge as a primary informant. 
This is likely to hold predictive value in situations where other social information is lacking. 
In all four experimental conditions, regardless of the salience manipulation, the self 
perspective and the representational content compete for attention. However, in the case of 
belief reasoning specifically, by reducing the salience of self perspective, the salience of the 
default state was reduced. This in turn, we propose, would reduce the amount of competition 
between the two information streams, therefore guiding attentional resources towards the 
representational content. Non-mental representation tasks, on the other hand, are unlikely to 
call upon the self referent in the first instance, as there is little predictive benefit in using self 
as a model for physical causality. Here then, the salience manipulation would be ineffectual in 
terms of reducing competition, as without a default reference state, information regarding 
reality and the representational content would carry equal weighting. Thus, we suggest that 
the processing streams for these tasks reflect different rules. These are set according to the 
nature of the representation, where reasoning about beliefs attracts semantic knowledge for 
ToM, including the self referent, whereas reasoning about photographs recruits semantic 
knowledge for artefacts (Apperly et al., 2007). On this basis, we propose that left IFG 
mediates the controlled retrieval of, and selection from, competing informational items, where 
competition between informational items reflects salience cues that are directed from 
semantic information stores.  
 In contrast to the current result, together, Vogeley et al. (2001), Samson et al. (2005) 
and McCleery et al. (2011), suggest a right lateralised process is involved in inhibiting 
competing perspectives. We put forward a refinement to this suggestion, in that the right 
vlPFC reflects the general process of suppressing irrelevant informational items. Note that, in 
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all conditions, two competing information streams were present; a representational and real 
state of affairs was always outlined. As a result, attention must always be directed away from 
one informational item. As a result, if IFG supports this general inhibitory mechanism, it 
would not be identified by the analyses that can be performed on the present data. We 
tentatively suggest, therefore, that the presence of right vlPFC may reflect a more generalised 
process of suppressing irrelevant distracters for the purpose of inhibition, whereas left vlPFC 
is involved in controlling the retrieval of competing informational items. Notably, this latter 
process can be facilitated in mental representation by reducing the salience of own 
perspective, as ‘self’ serves as a source of reference in situations of limited knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
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INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis has presented four studies of adult Theory of Mind (ToM). Using 
techniques from cognitive neuroscience, the functional profile of the temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), considered core mentalizing regions, alongside 
ventrolateral prefrontal and dorsal medial prefrontal cortices (vlPFC/dmPFC respectively), 
regions more typically associated with executive processes, have been explored. Throughout, 
this thesis has attempted to bring together data from social, developmental and cognitive 
psychology with the methods pertained by neuroscience. The influence from developmental 
psychology should be apparent; thus, to  have only collected data from typically functioning 
adult participants may seem somewhat strange. However, the approach used reflects the belief 
that working with a mature, fully functioning system is informative to understanding the 
development of ToM, as well as what might constitute or explain dysfunction (Apperly et al., 
2009). The case in point is that every chapter in this thesis has demonstrated that the overall 
pattern of adult ToM reasoning is consistent with that of young children, albeit to a lesser 
magnitude; adults have been shown to be slower and more error prone when making 
judgements about an agent who holds a false belief or avoidance desire, for example. This, in 
itself, is revealing when working towards an account of ToM that explains when 
(contextually) and how (cognitively) executive processes are recruited. Whilst adults 
demonstrate greater proficiency with ToM than children, with careful experimental 
manipulation, it was possible to elicit behavioural and neural costs which might normally go 
undetected. For example, in Chapter 2, manipulation of the valence of an agent’s ToM state 
highlighted a larger behavioural cost associated with belief versus desire. Likewise, the 
developmental literature has demonstrated that children typically are able to apply a simple 
desire based reasoning before they can use a belief based approach, but that negatively 
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valenced states attract the greatest difficulty (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2007; 
Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). This finding has already been replicated in adults elsewhere 
(Apperly et al., 2011; German & Hehman, 2006). The present thesis, however, provides new 
information regarding the basis of the increased behavioural cost associated more generally 
with belief over desire reasoning: whilst the valence of desire manipulation was shown to 
modulate neural executive selection resources in dmPFC, particularly dorsal ACC, the belief 
reasoning manipulation additionally modulated vlPFC, which is thought to serve an important 
role in inhibiting self perspective. Taken together, these data suggest that, in the adult brain, 
different neurocognitive processes are engaged when representing these specific belief and 
desire states. Consequently, though both belief and desire reasoning may draw on dmPFC, 
belief reasoning was shown to also engage vlPFC, due to incongruence in self versus other 
perspectives. This information, of course, leads to testable hypotheses regarding population 
sub-groups, such as children and clinical populations. Nevertheless, the manipulations 
presented here reflect the approach that has, more generally, been adopted in prior 
developmental research. It may be that systematic variation in congruence between self versus 
other preferences would also elicit activation in vlPFC. Thus, the appearance of greater 
difficulty with belief in the developmental literature is merely a reflection of previous 
paradigmatic biases. This question needs to be addressed in order to ascertain whether belief 
reasoning, in general, is simply more effortful than desire reasoning because there are 
additional processing costs associated with epistemic states, or whether this just appears so 
due to the nature of the questions previously asked. Moreover, such a question would be 
informative in terms of identifying the true nature of the conflict that has been identified in 
false versus true belief. 
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 In these closing pages, a brief summary of each experiment and result is given. This is 
followed with sections which examine what the culmination of the studies presented in this 
thesis say about the role of TPJ, mPFC including dmPFC, and vlPFC in ToM. I close with 
concluding comments regarding how these regions may interact with each other, and how 
specific ToM contexts and concepts reflect the recruitment of these regions. 
 
Summary of Empirical Results and General Conclusions 
 Chapter 2 described a belief-desire reasoning paradigm that was used to examine two 
theories of executive control in ToM. The first suggests that control is required in negatively 
valenced ToM states, such as false belief and avoidance desire, due to the need to disengage 
attention from one salient target in order to switch to another (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). Based 
on neuroimaging studies of ToM and executive control, such a process was suggested to 
involve regions within dmPFC, such as the ACC and frontal eyefields (Rothmayr et al., 2011; 
Saxe, Schulz, et al., 2006; van der Meer et al., 2011). The key criterion that would evidence 
this process, however, was that executive control regions would be recruited due to systematic 
variation in valence. As a consequence, both factors of belief and desire would recruit this 
region. The second theory that was outlined proposes that false belief reasoning has the 
unique property over true belief and approach/avoidance desire, in that it generates 
incompatibility between the viewer’s own perspective and that of the agent. As a result, 
additional control processes may be required to inhibit one’s own privileged knowledge in 
false belief reasoning specifically (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007). Based on 
neuroimaging (van der Meer et al., 2011; Vogeley et al., 2001), lesion (Samson et al., 2005) 
and event related potential (ERP) data (McCleery et al., 2011), this process was expected to 
recruit vlPFC. The paradigm outlined in Chapter 2 identified neural data which complemented 
 156 
 
the predictions made by each of these theories. dmPFC appeared to generally index conflict 
resulting from varying the valence of each mental state. vlPFC responded due to variation in 
congruence between self and other perspectives, which was only a feature of false versus true 
belief reasoning. Together, these data suggest that ToM draws on different executive 
mechanisms, which are driven by the content of the ToM state that is being represented and, 
in special circumstances, how this relates to own perspective.   
 Chapter 2 also sought to provide clarity on how core elements of the ToM network, 
such as TPJ and mPFC, respond to fine-grained mental states. In addition to the belief-desire 
reasoning paradigm, the participants also completed a ToM localizer task (Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003). This enabled identification of the area of TPJ believed to be specific for ToM (Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Scholz et al., 2009; Young, 
Dodell-Feder, et al., 2010), and scrutiny of signal changes which occurred as a result of the 
valence manipulation. These analyses determined that TPJ was modulated by variation in the 
content of mental states, where negatively valenced mental states drew more heavily on 
resources. This result suggests that the proposal that TPJ responds preferentially to transitory 
mental states (Van Overwalle, 2009) does not adequately describe the functional profile of 
this region. Instead, in Chapter 2, it was suggested that activation in TPJ may be regulated by 
the relative difficulty of each belief-desire state, where more complex mental states will draw 
more heavily on this region. Finally, Chapter 2 highlighted that rostral medial prefrontal 
cortex (rmPFC) was not recruited by the belief-desire task, despite this region being thought 
to be important for ToM (Amodio & Frith, 2006), and it having been identified in the same 
participants using the ToM localizer. In this context, Chapter 2 outlined the proposal that 
rmPFC facilitates mentalizing when one needs to make more elaborate judgments, such as 
when reasoning beyond the constraints of the given information. It was suggested that the 
 157 
 
belief-desire reasoning task would not attract reasoning in such a manner, as participants were 
told precisely the agent’s beliefs and wants. The localizer, on the other hand, invited a much 
deeper inference, where the agent’s state of mind had to be deduced on the basis of a complex 
scenario. 
 The experiment in Chapter 3 sought to modulate rmPFC by systematically varying the 
mode of reasoning required to represent an agent’s ToM. By making a minimal change to the 
belief-desire reasoning paradigm outlined in Chapter 2, an additional experimental level was 
added to the desire condition, wherein the agent’s desire state was unspecified. This 
manipulation required participants to reason abductively about the agent’s desire on the basis 
of sparse social information (a photograph). This new condition was included alongside the 
prior true/false belief and approach/avoidance desire states; all of which invited a more 
constrained, deductive ToM inference. The resultant experimental paradigm therefore invited 
both deductive reasoning, as featured in the original paradigm, and abductive reasoning. 
Importantly, a distinction was drawn between activation in dmPFC, which was argued to 
reflect conflict in Chapter 2, and anterior rmPFC, which is more typically described as a core 
part of the ToM network (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006). Consequently, it was proposed that, 
again, dmPFC would be recruited for both belief and desire reasoning, but that only reasoning 
about an agent who held an unspecified desire would recruit rmPFC. The data supported this 
assertion, where an area of anterior rmPFC was recruited preferentially when reasoning about 
an agent whose desire was unspecified. Thus, Chapter 3 demonstrated that activation in 
rmPFC can be explained by the mode of reasoning, where rich, abductive inferences recruit 
this region but constrained, deductive inferences do not. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 showed that vlPFC was recruited when the truth status of an agent’s 
belief was manipulated, suggesting that this region was responsive to differences in the 
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perspective between self and other. As a result, Chapters 4 and 5 both focussed specifically on 
the role of vlPFC in inhibition of self perspective. The patient study outlined in Samson et al. 
(2005) provides the only causal evidence for the role of inferior frontal cortex in inhibition of 
self perspective. Patient WBA was shown to be impaired on classic, high inhibition false 
belief tasks. He was, however, highly capable at making ToM judgements when the salience 
of his own perspective was reduced. Vogeley et al. (2001) identified a small region of right 
vlPFC that was active when imagining self in a fictional scenario whilst simultaneously 
reasoning about an agent’s ToM. Drawing on Vogeley’s result, Samson et al. (2005) 
suggested that WBA’s deficit may be attributable to damage in right vlPFC, which rendered 
him unable to overcome interference from his own perspective in the high salience tasks. 
Nevertheless, WBA’s lesion was sizeable, making it difficult to have confidence regarding the 
precise localization of the cause of WBA’s impairment.  
 In order to confirm a causal role for right vlPFC in supporting the inhibition of self 
perspective, a Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) study was conducted. Using a 
modified version of the belief-desire task presented in Chapter 2, adult participants were 
required to identify the emotive outcome of an agent in a simple ToM scenario. Using an 
offline TMS protocol, data were collected from participants following the application of 
continuous theta burst stimulation to a coordinate set for vlPFC identified in Hartwright et al. 
(2012, [Chapter 2 here]). An interaction effect was predicted, where participants were 
expected to be slower and more error prone in false belief reasoning, but not true belief or 
desire reasoning, following TMS to right vlPFC versus a control site at the vertex. Despite 
replicating the overall behavioural effects of negatively valenced mental states, where these 
were shown to be more effortful, the effect of TMS was highly variable across participants. 
The effect on response latencies and error rates was heterogeneous, where almost half of the 
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participants showed a reduction in reaction time following TMS to vlPFC. A subgroup of 
these showed a further facilitatory effect, where an improvement in accuracy was identified. 
Later research has been published which demonstrates that the theta burst protocol, as was 
used in Chapter 4, is inefficacious in producing homogenous, consistent effects that are 
repeatable both within and across subjects (Hamada et al., 2012; McAllister et al., 2013), and 
may even produce a facilitatory drive from the contralateral region to the perturbed area 
(Hartwigsen et al., 2013). As a result, no firm conclusions were drawn in Chapter 4 regarding 
whether right vlPFC is casually involved in ToM scenarios that invite incongruence between 
perspectives.  
 The data presented in Chapters 2 and 3 suggested that vlPFC was recruited when the 
truth status of an agent’s belief was manipulated. In Chapter 2, this was argued to reflect the 
fact that false, versus true, belief reasoning raises a discrepancy between own perspective of 
the real state of affairs and the agent’s (misinformed) understanding of reality. Whilst 
compatible with a growing literature which implicates vlPFC in resisting interference from 
self perspective (Samson et al., 2005; van der Meer et al., 2011; Vogeley et al., 2001), it was 
important to make certain that this result was not, in fact, a reflection of modulation due to 
truth status. That is, that vlPFC contains a module which responds specifically to truth status 
and not to conflict between self and other perspectives. Whilst unlikely, it was important to 
disambiguate these possibilities. As a result, an alternative paradigm was devised in which the 
salience of the participant’s perspective was manipulated within the context of a 
representational task, rather than using valence as before. By making a minor modification to 
the ToM localizer (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), the false belief and false photograph stimuli 
were modified so that the change of state that typifies these scenarios was either explicitly, or 
loosely, specified; thus resulting in either a highly, or minimally, salient self perspective 
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respectively. This experiment demonstrated that left vlPFC was responsive to salience, but 
only in the case of making a mental representation. For non-mental representation – the false 
photograph-type scenarios – left vlPFC did not differentiate between high or low salience of 
self perspective. These data led to the conclusion that left vlPFC is brought in to serve an 
underlying mechanism that is a necessary feature of selecting a perspective that is 
incompatible to one’s own, such as resolving interference between the two perspectives, or 
inhibiting one’s own, task-irrelevant viewpoint. On the basis of the left lateralised activation 
identified in Chapter 5, but bilateral activation in our other experimental protocols, right 
vlPFC was suggested to operate more generally in actioning the resolution of two competing 
information streams – a feature that was consistent across both levels within mental and non-
mental representation conditions.  
 
Activation in the Temporoparietal Junction Reflects ToM Content 
 Of the neural regions examined within this thesis, the TPJ, perhaps surprisingly, 
receives the least investigation. This in part reflects the already sizable literature which 
outlines its functional characteristics. It is also a reflection of how the research questions have 
naturally evolved in studying the neurocognitive basis of adult ToM. Nevertheless, the TPJ 
has been the cause of considerable debate, particularly regarding whether it reflects a domain-
specific module for mentalizing, and thus responds in an undifferentiated manner towards 
ToM states.  
 The TPJ is identified with significant regularity in studies of ToM. Unlike mPFC, 
which is also regularly recruited for ToM, TPJ, however, reflects a more consistent profile, 
where it appears to respond preferentially to representing transient mental states like beliefs 
and desires, over control tasks, such as representing non-mental content like outdated 
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photographs or signs (see Van Overwalle, 2009 for a review). On this basis, a ToM localizer 
has been devised (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), where neural activation that is specific to 
inferring an agent’s false belief over the contents of an outdated, as in ‘false’, photograph or 
sign, is identified. This activation is taken to reflect processes that are unique to ToM. This 
localizer demonstrates robust recruitment of TPJ, mPFC, precuneus and temporal poles (e.g., 
Aichhorn et al., 2009; Hartwright et al., 2012; Mitchell, 2007; Perner et al., 2006; Saxe & 
Powell, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Scholz et al., 2009; Young, Dodell-Feder, et al., 2010). 
Using these locations for region of interest (ROI) analyses, further examinations into how 
each ROI responds to other socially relevant stimuli have been conducted. These studies 
suggest that, unlike the other neural regions recruited by the localizer, right TPJ, whilst 
preferentially engaged when reasoning about the mental state of an agent, does not 
discriminate between human and non-human physical descriptions, suggesting that it is not 
responsive simply to the mere presence of a human actor (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), and that 
it is not specifically engaged in response to descriptions regarding the social, cultural or 
geographical background of an agent, indicating that it is not just engaged by social content 
(Saxe & Wexler, 2005). Note that in individuals with autism, however, similar comparisons 
show that right TPJ does not differentiate between mental and non-mental representation 
(Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, & Baron-Cohen, 2011) 
 Though these studies provide a convincing argument that the right TPJ may reflect a 
module for ToM, doubt has been raised on the basis of a parallel between the format of false 
belief vignettes, which typically follow the structure of the unexpected object transfer task 
(see Chapters 1 and 2), and the observation that right TPJ is recruited when attention is 
broken in order to reorientate towards task relevant stimuli (Mitchell, 2007) . A subsequent 
meta-analysis confirmed that false belief reasoning and attentional reorientation tasks jointly 
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recruit right TPJ (Decety & Lamm, 2007), calling into question the basis on which this region 
was responding for ToM. Saxe and colleagues, however, later demonstrated that a distinct 
subdivision exists in TPJ, where voxels associated with ToM were separate from those for 
attentional processes (Scholz et al., 2009; Young, Dodell-Feder, et al., 2010). Similarly, 
parcellation of this region has also been identified through structural imaging (Mars et al., 
2012) and functional connectivity analysis (Bzdok et al., 2012). These later claims support the 
utility of the false belief false photograph contrast in matching executive demands, in terms of 
the general requirement to reorientate attention from one stimulus to another. This is an 
important point that I return to later, in relation to ToM processes and mPFC.   
 In Chapters 2 and 3, participants were required to predict the action of an agent on the 
basis of that agent’s belief-desire state. In Chapter 2, the ToM localizer was used alongside 
the novel belief-desire reasoning paradigm to enable ROI analyses within TPJ for specific 
belief-desire states. Whole brain analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 determined that bilateral TPJ 
were modulated by the valence of an agent’s ToM state; ROI analyses further indicated that 
this effect reflected a greater magnitude of activation for the negatively valenced mental 
states, false belief and avoidance desire. This result provided strong evidence that TPJ is not 
responsive to representing mental states per se, as this was a requirement across all 
conditions, but that its activity varies according to the valence of the mental state. On the 
basis that these negatively valenced mental states attracted the greatest processing costs, in 
terms of reaction time and accuracy data, we suggested that TPJ may be up- or down-
regulated by the relative difficulty, as indexed by behavioural data, of each belief-desire 
condition (Hartwright et al., 2012). This supposition is in line with other neuroimaging studies 
which demonstrate greater activation in TPJ for false over true belief reasoning (Aichhorn et 
al., 2009; Sommer et al., 2007). Recently, Koster-Hale and Saxe (2013) put forward an 
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alternative, compatible suggestion, which similarly explains the pattern of both the 
behavioural and the neural data for each belief-desire state examined in Chapters 2 and 3. 
They suggest that TPJ exhibits predictive coding behaviour, where the magnitude of activity 
is related not to the value of the immediately perceived stimulus, but to the difference 
between the stimulus value and its predicted value. Such a neural code is likely to increase 
efficiency as more neural resources are devoted to new, and therefore unpredictable, stimuli. 
The authors propose that when behaviour is judged in the context of these minute by minute 
decisions, neural prediction is based on a complex generative model of thoughts and 
behaviours. Reduced neural responses reflect predicted behaviour; behaviours which match 
the predictive model. Thus, situations where smaller neural responses are identified, if 
reflecting a neural prediction code, will be associated with improved behavioural performance 
as a result of proficiency through familiarity.  
 The neural prediction model proposed by Koster-Hale and Saxe (2013) makes 
intuitive sense by suggesting that positively valenced mental states, true beliefs and approach 
desires, are likely to attract lower processing costs because their associated behaviours are 
more typical to what we experience in the social world. Accordingly, negatively valenced 
mental states attract greater processing costs as these reflect less predictable behaviours. 
Clearly, social agents act on the basis of what they believe to be true; thus, they may act in a 
way which is incompatible with our expectations due to alternative, and at times misinformed, 
perspectives on reality. This is likely to result in a neural prediction error which, in turn, 
results in increased activation in TPJ.  
 Whilst the paradigms outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 were not designed to identify 
regions specific for ToM, nevertheless, the use of the ToM localizer task in Chapter 2 
provided some assurance that overlapping activations in TPJ reflected voxels which were 
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most likely to be preferentially activated for ToM, if such a module exists. As a result, the 
finding that activity in TPJ is directly affected by the content of mental states should be 
considered as if these data reflect the functional profile of ‘ToM nodes’. Though the data here 
do not speak to the case of domain specificity in ToM, it is noteworthy that neuroimaging 
work with people who have autism identifies a different functional response in right TPJ to 
representational tasks, which distinguishes these from neuro-typical participants (Lombardo et 
al., 2011). However, on the basis that parts of TPJ are known to reflect attentional reorienting, 
and that this can be a confounding feature in ToM tasks (Mitchell, 2007), it may simply be the 
case that people with autism have different attentional biases, or that they have no bias at all 
towards social stimuli. Alternatively, there may be no general, higher-cognitive framework on 
which to base neural predictions. All of these possibilities provide interesting avenues for 
further research; nevertheless, such speculation cannot be resolved with the present data. 
Moreover, assurances are needed that the analyses in clinical studies take into account the 
known functional subdivisions within TPJ (Bzdok et al., 2012; Mars et al., 2012) as autism is 
also characterised by executive dysfunction (Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994).  
 
A Functional Subdivision within the Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
 The mPFC is regularly recruited in ToM studies (e.g., see reviews by Carrington & 
Bailey, 2009; Lieberman, 2007; Mar, 2011; Spreng et al., 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
Whilst researchers have debated its centrality in ToM (cf. Frith & Frith, 2006; Saxe & 
Wexler, 2005), the frequency with which ToM tasks elicit activation in this region suggests 
that it is likely to play an important role in mentalizing. The experimental paradigms outlined 
in Chapters 2 and 3 sought to examine the functional profile of this region. This was with the 
intention of identifying specific processes which affect recruitment of mPFC and, in turn, 
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using these to highlight anatomical divisions in this large cortical area. The study featured in 
Chapter 2 comprised two separate experiments. The first varied the valence of an agent’s 
belief and desire state, with a view to unpacking two theories of executive control in ToM. 
These theories predicted different neural profiles, which were explicable on the basis of the 
wider literature on executive functions. Behavioural data suggest that certain mental states 
attract greater processing costs; adult participants are slower and more error prone when 
applying a false versus a true belief, or an avoidance versus an approach desire, to an agent 
(Apperly et al., 2011; German & Hehman, 2006). Thus, drawing parallel with research into 
the neural basis of executive functions, such a manipulation was used to determine which 
frontal activations were consistent with the predictions made by the aforementioned theories. 
The second experiment, a ToM localizer (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), varied the content of 
representational information from mental to non-mental; a protocol which has been used 
extensively to localise neural regions which are specific to ToM. Though each of the two 
experimental approaches feature limitations if used singularly, together, they permit powerful 
inferences regarding important processes for ToM, which have often been obscured by more 
typical experimental protocols (Hartwright et al., 2012 [Chapter 2 here]). 
 Chapter 2 demonstrated that representing behaviourally effortful ToM states, such as 
false belief and avoidance desire, was associated with dissociable patterns of frontolateral and 
dorsomedial prefrontal activation. Whilst lateral activations are discussed separately in due 
course, for the purpose of discussion here, it is sufficient to state that only variation in the 
valence of an agent’s belief state modulated the lateral frontal cortex. Manipulation of both 
belief and desire valence, however, attracted common modulation of dmPFC, particularly the 
dorsal ACC. Chapter 3, which adopts a structurally similar paradigm, replicated these results.  
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 Leslie and colleagues posit that belief-desire reasoning is supported by a common 
process which switches attention in cognitively demanding situations, for example, when 
attributing negatively valenced mental states, such as false belief and avoidance desire, to an 
agent (Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Friedman & Leslie, 2005; Leslie et al., 2005; Leslie & 
Polizzi, 1998). By manipulating the valence of an agent’s mental state, the analyses presented 
in Chapters 2 and 3 isolated those neural regions which support behaviourally effortful ToM 
states. This is important; such effort is associated with significant processing costs throughout 
the lifespan (e.g., Apperly et al., 2008; Apperly et al., 2011; Cassidy, 1998; German & 
Hehman, 2006; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), thus, identifying their brain bases highlights neural 
regions to investigate in the development of ToM, and in the case of its dysfunction. 
Consistent with Leslie and colleagues, and prior behavioural work with adults (Apperly et al., 
2008; Apperly et al., 2011; German & Hehman, 2006), false belief and avoidance desire were 
shown to pose behavioural difficulty even in adults who should be proficient at mentalizing. 
This behavioural cost was associated with activation in dmPFC. Importantly, although no 
belief or desire inferences were required in the paradigm outlined in Chapter 2 (and in all bar 
one condition in Chapter 3), the need to attend to the mental state of an agent was present in 
all of the experimental conditions within the belief-desire reasoning paradigms. As a result, it 
does not follow that activation in dmPFC is due to the act of representing the mental state of 
an agent (i.e. applying a ToM). Similarly, the localizer task, which should identify neural 
regions that are specialised for representing mental, but not physical, content, fails to identify 
dmPFC in the same group of participants (Chapter 2). This localizer task has been designed so 
that it necessarily subtracts out executive processes which manage attention between ‘false’ 
and ‘true’ locations – a consistent feature in both false belief and false photograph conditions. 
Therefore, an absence of dmPFC is indicative that, either this region is recruited by both false 
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belief and false photograph reasoning, suggesting a domain general process that is requisite to 
both tasks, or that dmPFC is recruited by neither. On the basis of the result from the initial 
belief-desire reasoning paradigm, the former suggestion is more likely. Taken together, then, 
these data suggest that more dorsal activation of mPFC, particularly dorsal ACC, reflects 
domain general resources. This viewpoint converges with other studies of belief valence 
(Sommer et al., 2007) and those that have used separate executive control and ToM tasks to 
identify areas of commonality (Rothmayr et al., 2011; Saxe, Schulz, et al., 2006; van der Meer 
et al., 2011). On the basis of the belief-desire reasoning paradigm presented in Chapters 2 and 
3, and from the localizer results which feature in Chapter 2, it is suggested that dmPFC, 
particularly ACC, does not constitute a module for ToM. Instead, this region is likely to be 
modulated by variation in attentional demands. Such variation occurs when one is required to 
hold in mind and switch attention between multiple informational items, as is the case in false 
belief and avoidance desire (Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Friedman & Leslie, 2005; Leslie et al., 
2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998) . Thus, a general executive role is assigned to this region in 
ToM. 
 Chapter 3 outlined three processes – representation, control and reasoning – which 
could be used to explain how specific regions of mPFC are involved in mentalizing. The first 
process describes the basic tenet on which the widely used ToM localizer (Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003) is based; that is, that ToM specifically requires representation of mental state content. 
Whilst touched upon within the current thesis, this process was not a specific focus of any of 
the studies outlined here. Nonetheless, arguments for such a case are presented elsewhere 
(e.g., see Frith & Frith, 2006; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). The second process, control, has 
already featured in prior discussion which relates dmPFC to supporting attentionally 
demanding scenarios. Further control processes subserved by lateral prefrontal regions are 
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outlined towards the latter part of the current chapter. Lastly, then, it was proposed that 
different approaches to ToM reasoning activate alternative modes of inference. rmPFC is 
recruited by numerous, what appear to be highly diverse, circumstances such as mentalizing 
under uncertainty (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2009), autobiographical thinking (Schacter et al., 
2012; Spreng et al., 2009), prospection, and even when at rest (Spreng et al., 2009). In both 
Chapters 2 and 3, the mode of reasoning employed during ToM influenced whether anterior 
rmPFC was recruited. Richer, abductive inferences, such as those required in the ToM 
localizer task (Chapters 2) recruited this region, whereas constrained, deductive inferences, 
such as those required in the initial belief-desire reasoning paradigm (Chapter 2), did not. 
Together, these findings indicate that rmPFC supports an inferential process of free thinking 
that is required in numerous aspects of social cognition. This process can broadly be described 
in terms of the need to reason abductively.  
 This theory was tested in Chapter 3 by including a novel, unspecified desire condition, 
alongside the existing, specified belief-desire conditions. This minimal change was sufficient 
to elicit substantial recruitment of rmPFC, which was previously absent when this condition 
was not included; thus, suggesting that this region is brought in to service rich, deep 
representational processes. There are, however, two challenges to this proposal. The first 
relates to suggestions that rmPFC is specific for stimulus dependent thought. For example, 
when comparing neural regions that are required for stimulus independent versus stimulus 
orientated thought, rmPFC is recruited when required to attend to the external environment 
without generating any information internally (Gilbert, Simons, Frith, & Burgess, 2006). This 
contradicts the proposed role for rmPFC in reasoning beyond the constraints of the stimuli. 
There are, however, good reasons for believing that the work of Gilbert and colleagues (2006) 
presents no challenge to the new theory outlined in this thesis. The recruitment of rmPFC in 
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Chapter 3 was extensive. Consequently, it is unlikely that the voxels within this result reflect 
a single function. The unspecified desire condition, unlike the clearly specified approach and 
avoidance desire conditions, is likely to have attracted greater attention towards the stimuli 
provided. Participants were explicitly requested to make an inference regarding the agent’s 
desire state on the basis of the visual appearance of the agent in a photograph. As a result, it is 
quite likely that part of this activation in rmPFC can be explained by an attentional 
mechanism which focuses one towards the salient features of the stimuli. Nevertheless, later 
work by Gilbert et al., (2007) highlights a rostral-caudal division within rmPFC, where ToM 
recruits a distinct neural population to that which was ascribed to attentional control. Thus, 
the authors conclude that there is no contradiction between activation described in rmPFC for 
mentalizing, which we propose reflects reasoning beyond the constraints of the stimuli 
(Hartwright, Apperly, & Hansen, 2013, [Chapter 3 here]), and activation for attention to 
stimulus dependent thought, which may also have been captured in Chapter 3. Inspection of 
the cluster identified in the unspecified desire condition in Chapter 3, against the rostral-
caudal division in rmPFC outlined in Gilbert et al. (2007), suggests that the abductive 
condition captured both of these processes. Thus, the data find support for both types of 
inference in rmPFC; on the one hand, a general attentional process that may be incidental to 
the task and, on the other, a rich inferential process which is likely to reflect ToM reasoning 
outside of the laboratory. It would be informative to experimentally determine this, for 
example, by conducting a further study where both elements are systematically varied within 
a single paradigm.  
 The second challenge to the proposal that rmPFC supports a rich, inferential process 
relates to the ToM localizer. Recruitment of rmPFC by the ToM localizer (e.g., see Chapters 2 
and 5) was earlier stated as one of the observations on which this abductive inferential process 
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was formulated. Yet, on the surface, the protocol of using short vignettes in this task may 
predict that both false belief and false photograph stimuli would invite abductive reasoning. 
As a result, rmPFC would not be identified by a contrast which subtracted activation that was 
common to the two tasks. There are grounds, however, for thinking that the level of 
abstraction is not wholly equivalent in the two tasks. Chapter 5 provided some discussion 
regarding the different nature of processing that is likely to be attached to mental, versus non-
mental, representation. This is also further discussed in the present chapter, a little later. 
Nevertheless, the core argument, in this context, centres on theoretical concerns regarding the 
‘falseness’ of the false photograph task. In short, Perner and Leekam (2008) suggest that a 
photograph cannot truly be false. It is an accurate representation of the referent that was 
captured in that moment in time. When considered in relation to the proposed reasoning 
process, the possibilities associated with reasoning about the contents of a photograph are 
therefore, in themselves, relatively constrained. Reasoning about an agent’s belief, on the 
other hand, can attract innumerable representational possibilities; what the agent was thinking 
then, what the agent is thinking now, how are they going to feel when they discover 
occurrence X, what they might do when they discover occurrence X, and so on. As such, then, 
I suggest that the ToM localizer contrast is skewed towards abductive reasoning. Thus, as 
well as recruiting regions which may be specialized for ToM itself, it is also likely to recruit 
regions which are more active when reasoning beyond the constraints of the information 
provided. Note that the two are not synonymous. As was demonstrated in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, 
it is entirely possible to apply a ToM without inferring a mental state. Regardless, neural 
recruitment from the localizer task (Chapters 2 and 5) and the unspecified desire reasoning 
task (Chapter 3), converge on a region of anterior rmPFC which is consistent with the area 
identified in Gilbert et al. (2007) for supporting rich, abductive inferences.  
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A Laterality Effect in the Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
 The vlPFC, including the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in particular, has been 
described in quantitative meta-analyses of ToM as a likely candidate for inclusion in the core 
mentalizing network (Mar, 2011; Spreng et al., 2009), yet its functional profile has been little 
explored. Whilst a handful of researchers have speculated that vlPFC supports inhibition of 
self perspective (Samson et al., 2005; van der Meer et al., 2011), the nature of such a process 
was unclear. This thesis has detailed three experiments which carefully manipulated 
psychologically relevant parameters, such as belief valence and salience of self perspective, in 
order to vary the magnitude of incongruence between the perspective of self and other 
(Chapters 2, 4 and 5). This approach was expected to modulate vlPFC, with the overarching 
aim of describing the functional profile of this region in ToM.  
 Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that recruitment of bilateral vlPFC reflected whether 
making an action prediction was based on an agent whose belief state was positively or 
negatively valenced. The critical distinction here being that, in false versus true belief 
reasoning, the participant’s own privileged knowledge of reality was in direct conflict with 
the agent’s. Thus, own perspective would need to be set aside in order to assume the 
competing knowledge state of the agent. Chapter 2 further clarified that the activation of 
vlPFC was unlikely to be attributable to general attentional differences, as the valence of an 
agent’s desire state, which causes no conflict between perspectives but features similar 
attentional demands, was unrelated to recruitment of vlPFC. Interestingly, however, note that 
in Chapter 3, the inclusion of a new unspecified desire condition, which required an abductive 
inference regarding an agent’s desire, resulted in the recruitment of bilateral vlPFC. Though 
not the focus of Chapter 3, this result is indicative that the participants reflected on self 
perspective – what their own thoughts and desires were – when attributing a desire state to the 
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agent, when no other social information was available. This process was unlikely to be invited 
in the other desire reasoning conditions outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, as these were always 
clearly specified. Thus, this result is consistent with the view that vlPFC is responsive to 
interference from self perspective when assuming that of an agent.  
 The previously reviewed chapters have all indicated that vlPFC provides a mechanism 
with which to inhibit self perspective. On the basis of the data described in Chapter 5, 
however, the functional description of vlPFC was further refined. These data suggest that left 
vlPFC manages incongruence between self and other perspectives, in terms of controlling the 
retrieval of, and selection from, multiple competing informational streams. For example, in 
mental representation, left vlPFC was modulated by salience of self perspective. When 
making a ToM judgment and self perspective was highly salient, left vlPFC was recruited to a 
greater magnitude than when self perspective was minimally salient. Considerable 
behavioural data indicate that children and adults confer to their own knowledge as a marker 
for truth (Fischhoff, 2003; Roxβnagel, 2000; Thomas & Jacoby, 2013; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983)  suggesting that the self referent may act as a default state in certain scenarios (Leslie & 
Polizzi, 1998). Thus, if the prepotency of the default self referent is extinguished, or at least 
minimised, as was the case specifically in the low salience condition in Chapter 5, vlPFC does 
not need to work as hard to guide selection towards the appropriate informational content. 
When making a non-mental representation, however, no such default state can logically exist. 
Unlike thinking about the contents of another person’s mind, which may sometimes be 
predicted using self as a model, no similar gain can be achieved by modelling the contents of 
a physical representation on the self referent. Thus, the process of representing false 
photographs is likely to be different from representing false beliefs, particularly in terms of 
demands on semantic knowledge (Apperly et al., 2007). Chapter 5 demonstrated that the 
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salience manipulation for non-mental representation did not affect demands on left vlPFC. 
Here, left vlPFC placed equal weighting on the real versus the representational content, 
regardless of how well specified the real state of affairs was. Thus, in the false photograph 
condition, competition was roughly equivalent between the two informational items for high 
and low salience presentation. Though this did not translate into a different behavioural 
pattern between representational states, note that the paradigm used in Chapter 5 was unlikely 
to be sensitive enough to detect very subtle differences in response accuracy. Regardless, the 
level of competition that left vlPFC reflects is predicted by the postulated processing streams 
adopted for mental versus non-mental representation.  
 When the need for self perspective inhibition was varied, the paradigms used in 
Chapters 2 and 3 saw bilateral activation of vlPFC, whereas this was not the case for the task 
outlined in Chapter 5. One possibility for the absence of right vlPFC in Chapter 5 is that it 
reflects the general process of suppressing irrelevant informational items. All of the 
experimental conditions in Chapter 5 required the participant to ignore their own knowledge 
of the real state of affairs, so that they could attend to the representational content. 
Consequently, if right vlPFC represents the mechanism which actions this inhibitory process, 
it would not be identified by the statistical contrasts computed in Chapter 5, as the 
requirement to inhibit a competing informational item is held constant across conditions. In 
Chapters 2 and 3, however, it is likely that the true belief condition attracts minimal inhibitory 
processes, as the informational content between self and other are congruent. As a 
consequence, I suggest that modulation of right vlPFC in Chapters 2 and 3 was reflecting 
variation in valence, where the false belief manipulation was driving activation in the right 
hemisphere, as a result of the need to inhibit the irrelevant self perspective. Left vlPFC, on the 
other hand, I propose is modulated by differential demands in controlling the retrieval and 
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selection of competing information streams. In the case of Chapters 2 and 3, this would reflect 
conflict due to incongruence between perspectives that was present in false, but not true, 
belief reasoning. Likewise, in Chapter 5, by reducing the salience of self perspective, 
interference was minimised in the belief condition from the competing, default perspective. In 
the high salience condition, however, competition will have remained high between two 
relevant targets. As a result, the high salience condition attracted greater demands on left 
vlPFC than the lower salience condition. 
 The proposed functional descriptions of vlPFC just outlined fits well with the existing 
literature on how lateral prefrontal regions are purported to support higher cognitive 
functions. For example, structural imaging data demonstrate that individual variation in 
inhibitory control is associated with white matter integrity in right vlPFC (Forstmann et al., 
2008).  More generally, lesions to right PFC result in performance errors which reflect a 
failure to adjust performance according to discrepant stimuli (Stuss & Alexander, 2007). 
Likewise, as has been referred to frequently throughout this thesis, patient WBA, who had an 
extensive right frontal lesion, was unable to perform ToM tasks which exposed him to a 
competing truth, thus requiring inhibition of salient informational content. He was, 
nonetheless, able to successfully negotiate ToM tasks where conflicting perspectives were 
avoided (Samson et al., 2005). The suggestion that right vlPFC is specifically required for 
inhibiting salient self knowledge was supported by van der Meer et al. (2011). Using a 
version of the Samson et al. (2005) paradigm that was modified for functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), van der Meer et al. (2011) demonstrated that bilateral vlPFC was 
recruited for high versus low salience ToM tasks. Note the parallel, here, between the 
experimental manipulation in these two studies and the experiment outlined in Chapter 5. 
What is particularly noteworthy is that, despite very different paradigmatic approaches, the 
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results converge with the overall data and how these fit with the currently proposed function 
of vlPFC. Nevertheless, despite converging evidence that right vlPFC supports an important 
inhibitory process in ToM, the TMS study in Chapter 4 failed to identify a causal role for this 
region in reasoning about an agent whose perspective was incongruent with reality. There are, 
however, recently published data which suggest that the heterogeneous effect identified may 
be due to the particular TMS protocol that was used (Hamada et al., 2012; Hartwigsen et al., 
2013; McAllister et al., 2013). A further perturbation study using an alternative TMS protocol 
may be fruitful, particularly in light of later evidence outlining where right vlPFC may feature 
in the time course of ToM (McCleery et al., 2011). 
 The literature in the domain of executive function suggests that right vlPFC plays a 
secondary role in supporting the left homolog, where right lateralised vlPFC guides inhibitory 
processes when necessary (Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; O’Reilly, 
2010). Left vlPFC, on the other hand, is argued to work in a top-down fashion to drive 
selection and retrieval (O’Reilly, 2010). Stuss and Alexander (2007) suggest that left vlPFC 
organises the schemata necessary to complete a set task. Badre and Wagner (2007) expand on 
this, suggesting that structural connectivity between left vlPFC and lateral temporal regions 
implicate left vlPFC in the controlled retrieval of semantic information. Earlier, the 
suggestion was made that the processing streams involved in representation are likely to 
reflect different rules according to the nature of the representation; reasoning about beliefs 
may attract semantic knowledge for ToM, whereas reasoning about photographs and the like 
would recruit semantic knowledge for artefacts (Apperly et al., 2007). A process was 
described that related semantic content to the method of prioritizing competing informational 
units; ToM was suggested to default to the self referent, whereas no such default was 
available for non-mental representation. The processing consequences of which were 
 176 
 
detectable in left vlPFC. In line with Badre and Wagner (2007), ToM is regularly seen to 
recruit lateral semantic association areas, such as the temporal poles (Olson, Plotzker, & 
Ezzyat, 2007). As can be seen in Chapters 2 and 5, the temporal poles were recruited by the 
localizer contrast which subtracts activation for false photograph from false belief reasoning. 
Taken together, this provides a plausible framework for the role of left vlPFC in controlling 
the retrieval of competing informational items, where competition between informational 
items reflects salience cues that are directed from semantic information stores.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
 The method of cross-subject averaging that is typically used in neuroimaging research 
necessitates a homogenous participant group, where possible. The studies presented within 
this thesis all utilised participants who met strict inclusion criteria, in order to achieve an 
appropriate sample (see Appendix 1). For instance, all participants were strongly right 
handed, native English speakers and they were required to demonstrate aptitude with the tasks 
behaviourally. Whilst this approach is likely to reduce noise within the data and, thus, 
increase the power to detect relevant experimental effects, the use of a narrow participant 
sample is not without its limitations. Of course, one cannot be certain that the results can be 
extended to those groups who were ineligible to participate. There are, for example, data 
which demonstrate behavioural differences between those who have a dominant hand and 
those who are mixed handed (e.g., Rose, Jasper, & Corser, 2012). The use of right handed 
participants in neuroimaging studies, however, dominate the literature in order that any results 
are generalisable to the wider population, which is predominantly right handed. Though it is 
less clear whether the participants who performed the tasks adequately (and were therefore 
invited to participate in the neuroimaging experiments) were, themselves, in some way a-
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typical, the causes that underpin error-rate are less explicable than those associated with 
performing a task accurately. Nonetheless, there remains the question as to whether there 
would be differences in ToM activation in those who could, versus those who could not, do 
the tasks.  
 This thesis outlined experiments which mainly used fMRI. There are, nevertheless, 
other approaches which would add further to our understanding of the social cognitive 
processes which underlie ToM. Patient studies, for example, allow causal inferences 
regarding brain function, which is not possible with fMRI. Nonetheless, neuropsychological 
studies are limited by the availability of patients with similarly circumscribed lesions, who 
also share similar pharmacological regimens. The use of virtual lesion techniques such as 
TMS, on the other hand, whilst also having the power to attribute causality, allow precise 
targeting of neural regions in neurologically intact participants. Unlike patient studies, virtual 
ablation permits one to obtain a homogenous sample which, as discussed previously, is 
generally desirable. Chapter 4 outlined a TMS experiment which sought causal evidence for 
the role of vlPFC in ToM. Although the results of the experiment in Chapter 4 were 
inconclusive, advancements that have occurred since conducting that particular study suggest 
new protocols which would disambiguate the previous null result. These protocols, therefore, 
warrant further investigation. 
 Though fMRI provides a powerful tool for localizing cognitive processes, the addition 
of structural imaging data, such as fibre tract information from Diffusion Tensor Imaging 
(DTI), would further add to our understanding of the social cognitive neuroscience of ToM. 
For example, performance in certain ToM tasks has been shown to correlate with white matter 
integrity which, in turn, has been shown to decline with age (Charlton, Barrick, Markus, & 
Morris, 2009). This result is perhaps unsurprising; nonetheless, questions regarding the ease 
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at which individuals are able to process mental state information may be explained not only 
by the activation of a network of neural regions, but by the integrity of the connections across 
that network. If we return to the exclusionary criteria for the tasks presented in this thesis, the 
basis of poor performance could, in part, be explained by differences in neural architecture. 
The use of DTI or other structural imaging methods would permit the investigation of 
questions such as this.  
 Understanding individual differences in ToM, both behaviourally and neurally, is an 
important next step from the work I have presented in this thesis. The additional approaches I 
have suggested in the preceding paragraphs provide possible ways of attempting this. Each 
experiment presented in this thesis was carefully constructed in order to address specific 
questions of interest. Importantly, these questions were underpinned by the belief that having 
a good understanding of the cognitive and neural bases of a typically functioning, adult ToM 
leads to testable hypotheses in developmental and clinical populations. The results from the 
experiments presented in this thesis promote further examination of a wider scope of 
questions, in terms of individual differences, the developing ToM, or atypical mentalizing, 
which in turn, can speak to some of the limitations addressed.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 In presenting four studies of adult ToM, this thesis has described how experimental 
manipulation of control and reasoning processes can modulate activation in executive control 
and social brain regions. The tasks that have been outlined all manipulated psychologically 
relevant parameters within ToM tasks in order to modulate hypothesised neural regions in a 
pre-specified way. This approach identified the neural bases which underpin behavioural costs 
associated with representing specific ToM states in adult participants, some of which pose 
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challenge throughout the lifespan. Identifying the neural substrates of such costs, alongside 
their behavioural signatures, therefore, provides a useful evidence base on which to examine 
a-typical and neurodevelopmental functioning in ToM.  
 I have suggested that TPJ is not responsive to the content of mental states as such, but 
instead reflects neural effort applied to assimilate mental states which are more or less 
cognitively demanding. This suggestion is compatible with the predictive coding framework, 
outlined by Koster-Hale and Saxe (2013). I have evidenced a division in mPFC, where 
dmPFC, in particular dorsal ACC, reflects a domain general resource which is required when 
one needs to switch attention from one target to another. More rostral areas of mPFC, 
however, I propose are engaged when the ToM context invites rich, abductive inferences. 
Lastly, I suggest that vlPFC is involved in supporting inhibitory processes, when the ToM 
concept attracts conflict between salient perspectives. Considered as a whole, the 
neurocognitive data I have collected demonstrate how the social brain interacts with neural 
regions for executive function to facilitate a working ToM. Importantly, engagement of these 
executive regions is dependent on the ToM situation, as would be the case outside of the 
laboratory; the recruitment of executive regions for ToM is not simply due to incidental 
features such as poor experimental task design. The ToM network should, therefore, be 
thought of as a collection of brain regions which are flexibly engaged in order to adapt to the 
specific demands of the social world at that time. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Participant Recruitment and Selection 
 
Online Screening 
Due to the nature of the experimental tasks and the equipment used in the experiments 
presented in this thesis, strict exclusionary criteria were applied. This was so that the safety of 
the participant group could be ensured, and to identify a maximally homogeneous (i.e. 
considered behaviourally and neurally typical) participant group.  
 
The opportunity to participate in each experiment was advertised through the University of 
Birmingham’s online Research Participation Scheme. Before registering their interest to take 
part, prospective participants were asked to read the below 10 questions. If they answered yes 
to any of the questions, they were asked not to continue with their online application to 
participate.  
 
1. Are you left handed? 
2. Is your native language anything other than English? 
3. Are you bilingual? 
4. Are you dyslexic? 
5. Are you pregnant? 
6. Are you claustrophobic? 
7. Do you have any metal or surgical implants (e.g. pacemakers, surgical clips etc)? 
8. Do you suffer from any neurological or psychiatric condition? 
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9. Have you ever suffered a stroke, or any other brain injury? 
10. Have you been diagnosed with an Autistic Spectrum Disorder or ADHD? 
 
Questions 1 to 3 screen for issues which may affect the homogeneity of the neural data 
collected. There are data which suggest different behavioural profiles and functional brain 
organisation in individuals who are left handed or bilingual compared with typical controls. 
Questions 2 and 4 reflect the requirement to ensure reading proficiency in line with the task 
requirements; the localizer task, for example, which was used alongside the majority of the 
paradigms presented in this thesis, requires confidence with written English. Questions 5 to 7 
screen for safety/comfort contraindications which may preclude the individual from taking 
part in an Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) experiment. Note that for the experiment 
outlined in Chapter 4, additional screening questions were included (see Appendix 2), which 
reflect the School of Psychology’s standard ethical protocol for studies involving Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). Questions 8 to 10 screen for conditions which may affect the 
homogeneity of the data, in terms of reflecting the behavioural profile and functional/cortical 
organisation of typical participants.  
 
Behavioural Pre-screen 
After registering their interest through the online Research Participation Scheme, all 
participants physically attended a pre-screen. All were asked to reconfirm their status 
regarding the previously outlined 10 questions. The main purpose of the pre-screen, however, 
was to identify participants who were able to perform the task of interest; any individual who 
performed below chance was not invited to participate in the neuroimaging/TMS experiments. 
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This was on the premise that it was only possible to negotiate the tasks by engaging a Theory 
of Mind (ToM), whereas incorrect trials reflect heterogeneous causes. In order to take part in 
the experiments outlined in Chapters 2 to 4, participants needed to be able to perform the 
main experimental task, including any filler/catch trials, to above chance at p < 0.05 
(calculated for a binomial distribution in all cases). Before attempting any trials, participants 
were taken through an interactive training programme which outlined the task and included 
practise trials with feedback on their performance. No behavioural pre-test was required for 
the experiment outlined in Chapter 5. During the pre-test for all experiments outlined in this 
thesis, participants completed a handedness measure (Annett, 1970) and a simple reading 
scale (WRAT 3) which required them to read a selection of words aloud. The latter measure 
was used as a coarse method to identify and exclude individuals who may have a reading 
disability from participating. This was particularly important as the localizer task, which was 
regularly used alongside the main task of interest, was not part of the behavioural pre-test. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Additional Screening for TMS 
 
To ensure participant safety, the University of Birmingham’s School of Psychology requires 
that the below information is collected from participants prior to them participating in any 
TMS study. A ‘yes’ response indicates a possible TMS contraindication, which would be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.  
 
 
 
Have you ever suffered from any neurological or psychiatric conditions? . . . . . . . . . . . . YES / NO 
If YES please give details (nature of condition, duration, current medication, etc) 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Have you ever suffered from epilepsy, febrile convulsions in infancy  
or had recurrent fainting spells?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  YES / NO 
Does anyone in your immediate or distant family suffer from epilepsy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . YES / NO 
If YES please state your relationship to the affected family member. 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Do you suffer from migraine? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  YES / NO 
Have you ever undergone a neurosurgical procedure (including eye surgery)?  . . . . . .  YES / NO 
If YES please give details.  
Do you currently have any of the following fitted to your body? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  YES / NO 
Heart pacemaker 
Cochlear implant 
Medication pump 
Surgical clips 
Are you currently taking any unprescribed or prescribed medication? . . . . . . . . . . . . .  YES / NO 
If YES please give details. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Are you currently undergoing anti - malarial treatment?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . YES / NO 
Have you drunk more than 3 units of alcohol in the last 24 hours? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . YES / NO 
Have you drunk alcohol already today?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . YES / NO 
Have you had more than one cup of coffee, or other sources of caffeine,  
in the last hour? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  YES / NO 
Have you used recreational drugs in the last 24 hours? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  YES / NO 
Did you have very little sleep last night? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . YES / NO 
Have you already participated in a TMS experiment today? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  YES / NO 
Have you taken part in 2 or more TBS or tDCS experiments in the last 6 months?  . . .  YES / NO 
Are you taking any prescribed drugs (prescribed by your GP or a hospital)? . . . . . . . .  YES / NO 
Is there any chance that you could be pregnant? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  YES / NO 
Are you left or right handed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Left / Right 
Date of Birth _____/_____/_____ 
 
